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 Abstract 
Listed firms at the Chinese stock market are typically transformed former 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). They are usually characterized by a con-
centrated ownership structure with the state, represented by its agencies at 
central and local levels, acting as the blockholder. Over the past 30 years of 
China's economic transition, three stages of SOE reforms have exerted great 
influence on the formation of the current corporate governance model at the 
Chinese stock market. This dissertation reviews the status and changes of 
the governance practices at each of the three stages in China’s SOE reforms. 
It further explains how these changes took place by examining the most 
influential factors in the evolution of governance practices. We argue that 
there exists a path dependency, mainly driven by a learning process, in 
China's corporate governance evolution. By applying linear regression mod-
els, this dissertation provides evidence that listed firms with overall better 
corporate governance are valued higher and that the effectiveness of corpo-
rate governance differs from industry to industry.  
 Contents 
I. Introduction.................................................................................................1 
II. Theoretical Foundations of Corporate Governance ..................................4 
1. Definition of Corporate Governance..........................................................4 
2. The Importance of Corporate Governance.................................................5 
3. Conflicts of Corporate Governance ...........................................................6 
a) Separation of Ownership & Control ..........................................................7 
b) Principal - Agent........................................................................................8 
c) Trust ...........................................................................................................9 
d) Information Asymmetry ............................................................................9 
e) Goal Congruence .....................................................................................10 
4. Corporate Governance Paradigms............................................................13 
a) Agency Theory.........................................................................................14 
b) Transaction Cost Economics ...................................................................18 
c) Stewardship Theory .................................................................................20 
d) Stakeholder Theory..................................................................................22 
e) Institutional Theory..................................................................................24 
f) Resource Dependence Theory..................................................................24 
g) Network Governance ...............................................................................25 
h) Managerial Hegemony.............................................................................26 
i) Class Hegemony .......................................................................................26 
5. Corporate Governance and Financial Markets.........................................26 
a) Corporate Governance and Debt Finance ................................................27 
 b) Corporate Governance and Equity Finance .............................................28 
c) Corporate Governance and the Market for Corporate Control ................28 
III. Backgrounds of the Financial System in China .....................................30 
1. Financial System Structure ......................................................................30 
2. Development of the Chinese Banking System.........................................33 
3. Development of the Chinese Capital Markets .........................................35 
a) Stock Market ............................................................................................36 
b) Bond Market ............................................................................................43 
c) Futures Market .........................................................................................44 
IV. Corporate Governance in China.............................................................46 
1. How Did Corporate Governance Become Popular? ................................46 
2. Why Does Corporate Governance Matter? ..............................................47 
a) Social Stability .........................................................................................47 
b) Capital Competition.................................................................................48 
c) Further Transition ....................................................................................48 
3. What Has Been Done to Improve Corporate Governance? .....................49 
4. How Different is the Chinese Model?......................................................50 
a) Classical Models ......................................................................................50 
b) Chinese Model in Comparison ................................................................51 
V. Evolvement of Corporate Governance Practices in China......................57 
1. Corporate Governance Practices in Chinese SOEs: Content of 
Change.....................................................................................................58 
a) The Incentive Stage (1978-1983).............................................................59 
b) The Contracting Stage (1984-1992) ........................................................60 
c) The Corporatization Stage (since 1993)...................................................64 
 2. Driving Forces in China’s Corporate Governance Evolution: 
Process of Change ...................................................................................68 
a) Two Radical Campaigns ..........................................................................69 
b) Incremental Reforms in the Non-State Sector .........................................72 
c) Learning Process in SOE Reforms...........................................................77 
3. Conclusions ..............................................................................................82 
VI. Empirical Research ................................................................................83 
1. Research Methodology ............................................................................83 
a) Implications of the Corporate Governance Evolvement in China ...........83 
b) Regression Models...................................................................................84 
c) Industry Clustering...................................................................................86 
d) Choice of Observation Period..................................................................87 
e) Sampling and Regression Data Sources...................................................89 
f) Regression Variables ................................................................................91 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses to be tested .......................................95 
a) Blockholding............................................................................................95 
b) Board Composition................................................................................102 
c) Executive Compensation........................................................................109 
3. Clustering of Industries ..........................................................................113 
a) Political Dimension................................................................................113 
b) Market Dimension .................................................................................115 
c) Clustering of Sample Industries.............................................................120 
4. Regression Models and Results .............................................................121 
a) Blockholding..........................................................................................121 
b) Board Composition................................................................................140 
 c) Executive Compensation........................................................................178 
d) Overall Corporate Governance Rating ..................................................186 
5. Conclusions ............................................................................................192 
VII. Summary and Outlook........................................................................194 
1. Summary ................................................................................................194 
2. Outlook...................................................................................................197 
List of Abbreviations .................................................................................198 
References ..................................................................................................200 
 
 List of Figures and Tables 
Figure 3.1: China’s Financial System Structure, 2008 ................................30 
Figure 3.2: Banking Assets Structure, 2008 ................................................31 
Figure 3.3: Overall Share Structure at the  Chinese Stock Market, 
2005 .........................................................................................................32 
Figure 3.4: Bonds Structure, 2008 ...............................................................32 
Figure 3.5: Number of Listed Firms, 1992-2008 .........................................38 
Figure 3.6: Stock Market Capitalization versus Nominal GDP in 
China, 1992-2008 ....................................................................................38 
Table 3.1: Total Funds Raised, Number of Investment Accounts, 
1992-2008................................................................................................39 
Table 3.2: Total Funds Raised on the SME Board, 2004-2009 ...................40 
Table 3.3: Market Capitalization of Leading Stock Exchanges, 2006-
2007 .........................................................................................................40 
Data source: WFE (2007), SZSE (2006, 2007) ...........................................40 
Figure 3.7: Total Funds Raised Through Overseas Listings,  1993-
2008 .........................................................................................................41 
Figure 4.1: Corporate Governance Models in the USA, Germany, and 
China .......................................................................................................52 
Table 4.1: Ownership Structure of Chinese Public Firms 2005 ..................55 
Figure 5.1 Corporate Governance Practices since 1978 ..............................61 
Figure 5.2 Path Dependence in China’s SOE Reforms................................77 
Figure 6.01 Shanghai & Shenzhen Indices 2000-2008................................89 
Figure 6.02 Industry Distribution of the Sample .........................................90 
Figure 6.03 Total Assets of Different Sectors 2004...................................116 
Figure 6.04 Equities of Different Sectors 2004 .........................................116 
 Figure 6.05 Main Business Turnovers of Different Sectors 2004 .............117 
Table 6.001: Total Assets, Equities and Main Business Turnovers of 
Different Sectors 2004...........................................................................118 
Table 6.002: Tobin’s Q 2000-2002............................................................121 
Table 6.003: Tobin’s Q 2003 .....................................................................121 
Table 6.004: Tobin’s Q 2004 .....................................................................121 
Table 6.005: ROA 2000-2002....................................................................122 
Table 6.006: ROA 2003 .............................................................................122 
Table 6.007: ROA 2004 .............................................................................123 
Table 6.008: Debt Ratio 2000-2002...........................................................123 
Table 6.009: Debt Ratio 2003 ....................................................................123 
Table 6.010: Debt Ratio 2004 ....................................................................123 
Table 6.011: Main Business Growth 2000-2002 .......................................123 
Table 6.012: Main Business Growth 2003.................................................124 
Talbe 6.013: Main Business Growth 2004.................................................124 
Table 6.014: Firm Size 2000-2002 ............................................................124 
Table 6.015: Firm Size 2003......................................................................124 
Table 6.016: Firm Size 2004......................................................................124 
Table 6.017: Blockholder A 2000-2002 ....................................................125 
Table 6.018: Blockholder B 2000-2002.....................................................126 
Table 6.019: Blockholding 2000-2002 ......................................................126 
Table 6.020: Shareholding 2-10 2000-2002 ..............................................126 
Table 6.021: Liquidity 2000-2002 .............................................................126 
Table 6.022: Blockholder Change 2000-2002 ...........................................126 
Table 6.023: Blockholder Change Frequency............................................127 
 Table 6.024: Correlations between  Blockholding, Shareholding 2-10, 
and Liquidity .........................................................................................127 
Table 6.025: Regression Results of Model Blockholding A (non-
linear).....................................................................................................132 
Table 6.026: Regression Results of Model Blockholding B (non-
linear).....................................................................................................133 
Table 6.027: Regression Results of Model Blockholding A .....................134 
Table 6.028: Regression Results of Model Blockholding B......................135 
Table 6.029: Regression Results of Model Shareholding2-10 A...............136 
Table 6.030: Regression Results of Model Shareholding2-10 B...............137 
Table 6.031: Regression Results of Model Liquidity A ............................138 
Table 6.032: Regression Results of Model Liquidity B.............................138 
Table 6.033: Board Size 2000....................................................................140 
Table 6.034: Board Size 2001....................................................................140 
Table 6.035: Board Size 2002....................................................................140 
Table 6.036: Board Size 2000-2002 ..........................................................141 
Table 6.037: Frequency Statistics Board Size 2000 ..................................142 
Table 6.038: Frequency Statistics Board Size 2001 ..................................142 
Table 6.039: Frequency Statistics Board Size 2002 ..................................142 
Figure 6.06: Frequency of Board Size 2000 ..............................................144 
Figure 6.07: Frequency of Board Size 2001 ..............................................144 
Figure 6.08: Frequency of Board Size 2002 ..............................................145 
Table 6.040: Independent Director Number 2000 .....................................145 
Table 6.041: Independent Director Number 2001 .....................................145 
Table 6.042: Independent Director Number 2002 .....................................146 
 Table 6.043: Independent Director Number 2000-2002............................146 
Table 6.044: Frequency Statistics Independent Director 2000 ..................146 
Table 6.045: Frequency Statistics Independent Director 2001 ..................146 
Table 6.046: Frequency Statistics Independent Director 2002 ..................146 
Figure 6.09: Frequency of Independent Director Number 2000................147 
Figure 6.10: Frequency of Independent Director Number 2001................147 
Figure 6.11: Frequency of Independent Director Number 2002................148 
Table 6.047: Independent Director Proportion 2000 .................................148 
Table 6.048: Independent Director Proportion 2001 .................................148 
Table 6.049: Independent Director Proportion 2002 .................................148 
Table 6.050: Independent Director Proportion 2000-2002........................148 
Table 6.051: Executive Director Number 2000 .........................................149 
Table 6.052: Executive Director Number 2001 .........................................149 
Table 6.053: Executive Director Number 2002 .........................................149 
Table 6.054: Executive Director Number 2000-2002................................149 
Table 6.055: Frequency Statistics Executive Director Number 2000........150 
Table 6.056: Frequency Statistics Executive Director Number 2001........150 
Table 6.057: Frequency Statistics Executive Director Number 2002........150 
Figure 6.12: Frequency of Executive Director Number 2000....................152 
Figure 6.13: Frequency of Executive Director Number 2001....................152 
Figure 6.14: Frequency of Executive Director Number 2002....................153 
Table 6.058: Executive Director Proportion 2000 .....................................153 
Table 6.059: Executive Director Proportion 2001 .....................................153 
Table 6.060: Executive Director Proportion 2002 .....................................153 
 Table 6.061: Executive Director Proportion 2000-2002............................153 
Table 6.062: Director Positioning at Blockholder Number 2001 ..............154 
Table 6.063: Director Positioning at Blockholder Number 2002 ..............154 
Table 6.064: Director Positioning at Blockholder Number 2001-2002.....154 
Table 6.065: Frequency Statistics Director Positioning at Blockholder 
Number 2001.........................................................................................156 
Table 6.066: Frequency Statistics Director Positioning at Blockholder 
Number 2002.........................................................................................156 
Figure 6.15: Frequency of Director Positioning at Blockholder 
Number 2001.........................................................................................158 
Figure 6.16: Frequency of Director Positioning at Blockholder 
Number 2002.........................................................................................158 
Table 6.067: Director Positioning at Blockholder Proportion 2001 ..........158 
Table 6.068: Director Positioning at Blockholder Proportion 2002 ..........159 
Table 6.069: Director Positioning at Blockholder Proportion 2001-
2002 .......................................................................................................159 
Table 6.070: Female Director Number 2000 .............................................159 
Table 6.071: Female Director Number 2001 .............................................159 
Table 6.072: Female Director Number 2002 .............................................160 
Table 6.073: Female Director Number 2000-2002....................................160 
Table 6.074: Frequency Statistics Female Director Number 2000 ............160 
Table 6.075: Frequency Statistics Female Director Number 2001 ............160 
Table 6.076: Frequency Statistics Female Director Number 2002 ............160 
Figure 6.17: Frequency of Female Director Number 2000........................161 
Figure 6.18: Frequency of Female Director Number 2001........................161 
Figure 6.19: Frequency of Female Director Number 2002........................162 
 Table 6.077: Female Director Proportion 2000 .........................................162 
Table 6.078: Female Director Proportion 2001 .........................................162 
Table 6.079: Female Director Proportion 2002 .........................................162 
Table 6.080: Female Director Proportion 2000-2002................................163 
Table 6.081: CEO/Chair Duality 2000 ......................................................163 
Table 6.082: CEO/Chair Duality 2001 ......................................................163 
Table 6.083: CEO/Chair Duality 2002 ......................................................163 
Table 6.084: CEO/Chair Duality 2000-2002 .............................................163 
Table 6.085: Supervisory Board Size 2000 ...............................................164 
Table 6.086: Supervisory Board Size 2001 ...............................................164 
Table 6.087: Supervisory Board Size 2002 ...............................................164 
Table 6.088: Supervisory Board Size 2000-2002 ......................................164 
Table 6.089: Frequency Statistics Supervisory Board Size 2000 ..............166 
Table 6.090: Frequency Statistics Supervisory Board Size 2001 ..............166 
Table 6.091: Frequency Statistics Supervisory Board Size 2002 ..............166 
Figure 6.20: Frequency of Supervisory Board Size 2000..........................168 
Figure 6.21: Frequency of Supervisory Board Size 2001..........................168 
Figure 6.22: Frequency of Supervisory Board Size 2002..........................169 
Table 6.092: Supervisor/Director Ratio 2000 ............................................169 
Table 6.093: Supervisor/Director Ratio 2001 ............................................169 
Table 6.094: Supervisor/Director Ratio 2002 ............................................169 
Table 6.095: Supervisor/Director Ratio 2000-2002...................................170 
Table 6.096: Female Supervisor Number 2000 .........................................170 
Table 6.097: Female Supervisor Number 2001 .........................................170 
 Table 6.098: Female Supervisor Number 2002 .........................................170 
Table 6.099: Female Supervisor Number 2000-2002................................171 
Table 6.100: Frequency Statistics Female Supervisor Number 2000 ........171 
Table 6.101: Frequency Statistics Female Supervisor Number 2001 ........171 
Table 6.102: Frequency Statistics Female Supervisor Number 2002 ........171 
Figure 6.23: Frequency of Female Supervisor Number 2000....................172 
Figure 6.24: Frequency of Female Supervisor Number 2001....................172 
Figure 6.25: Frequency of Female Supervisor Number 2002....................173 
Table 6.103: Female Supervisor Proportion 2000 .....................................173 
Table 6.104: Female Supervisor Proportion 2001 .....................................173 
Table 6.105: Female Supervisor Proportion 2002 .....................................173 
Table 6.106: Female Supervisor Proportion 2000-2002............................174 
Table 6.107: Regression Results of Model Board of Directors .................176 
Table 6.108: Regression Results of Model Board of Directors 
(Continuation) .......................................................................................176 
Table 6.109: Regression Results of Model Supervisory Board .................177 
Table 6.110: Total Remuneration (Mio. RMB)  of Boards and 
Management 2001-2002........................................................................179 
Table 6.111: Total of Highest 3 Director Remunerations (Mio. RMB) 
2001-2002..............................................................................................179 
Table 6.112: Non-Paid (Non-Independent) Director Proportion 2001-
2002 .......................................................................................................179 
Table 6.113: Director Shareholder Number 2000-2002 ............................180 
Table 6.114: Director Shareholder Proportion 2000-2002 ........................180 
Table 6.115: Director Shareholding Proportion 2000-2002 ......................180 
Table 6.116: CEO Turnover 2000-2002 ....................................................180 
 Table 6.117: Total of Highest 3 Manager Remunerations (Mio. RMB) 
2001-2002..............................................................................................180 
Table 6.118: Manager Shareholding Proportion 2000-2002......................181 
Table 6.119: Non-Paid Supervisor Proportion 2000-2002 ........................181 
Table 6.120: Supervisor Shareholding Proportion 2000-2002 ..................181 
Table 6.121: Regression Results of Model Director Compensation..........184 
Table 6.122 Regression Results of Model Director Compensation 
(Continuation): ......................................................................................184 
Table 6.123: Regression Results of Model Management 
Compensation........................................................................................185 
Table 6.124: Regression Results of Model Supervisor Compensation......185 
Table 6.125: Corporate Governance Index for Chinese listed firms .........187 
Table 6.126: Corporate Governance Rating 2000-2002 ............................187 
Table 6.127: Rating to Tobin’s Q 2000-2002 ............................................190 
Table 6.128: Rating to Tobin’s Q 2003 .....................................................190 
Table 6.129: Rating to Tobin’s Q 2004 .....................................................191 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AT CHINA’S STOCK MARKET 1 
I. Introduction 
Shortly after the foundation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 
October 1949, the Chinese government socialized the country’s total econ-
omy. By doing so, a planned system in reference to the former Soviet Union 
was built up and directed the Chinese economy for almost three decades. 
Upon the end of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), China began to re-
form and open-up its economy to the outside world in 1978 under the lead-
ership of Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997), who has been widely regarded as 
designer of China’s economic reform and opening-up era since 1978. 
Initial reform efforts in China were to combine plan and market together. 
The central government introduced incentives to agricultural productions 
and to the state sector, aligned prices to the underlying supply and demand, 
and opened the economy up to the outside world (cf. Qian 1999a, p. 3). The 
most important reform policy was the dual-track price system, introduced in 
the mid-1980s. Under this system, any commodity carried a planned price 
for the production quota set by the state and a market price set by the market 
supply and demand. Until early 1990s, most commodities were priced by 
the market, while the planned price track largely phased out (cf. Qian/Wu 
2000, p. 7). In 1992, the central government altered its course from “com-
bining plan and market together” to a “socialist market economy” with 
“Chinese characteristics”, i.e., a competitive market system in which public 
ownership predominates. While the adjective “socialist” characterizes the 
political system in China, the term “market economy” clearly points to 
China’s overall reform goal. 
China had faced in the pre-reform era a number of problems such as 
enormous population pressure, severe shortages of human capital and natu-
ral resources, very poor industrial and infrastructure bases, and the difficulty 
of maintaining financial stability (cf. Qian 1999b, p. 2). In 1978, as the re-
form era began, 250 million Chinese were still living in absolute poverty 
(cf. GRRB 2008, p. 3). Since the reform and opening-up policies were 
adopted, the number of Chinese living in absolute poverty has been substan-
tially cut down and came to merely 14.8 million by the end of 2007 (cf. ibid.  
p.3). 
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Meanwhile, China’s national nominal GDP has achieved nearly a 10 per-
cent average growth rate and proliferated from 364.5 billion RMB in 1978 
to 30,067.0 billion RMB in 2008 (cf. NBSC 2007a, 2007b, 2008b). Starting 
from almost nil (0.167 billion USD in 1978), its foreign exchange reserves 
now rank the first in the world (1,946.0 billion USD by the end of 2008).1 In 
2008, China ranked 17th in the World Competitiveness Yearbook of the 
International Institute for Management Development (cf. IMD 2008) and 
30th in the Global Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum 
(cf. WEF 2009), respectively, and thus stood out among all the transition 
economies and developing countries. 
A few remarkable features characterize China’s economic transition over 
the past three decades. Firstly, China has been following a gradual transition 
path. Many reforms had been initially carried out on an experimental basis 
and in some localities, before successful experiences were extended into a 
wider or even national scale by policies. Almost all important reform poli-
cies in China were based on former steps on lower and local levels. Sec-
ondly, China's transition succeeded without complete market liberalization. 
Though the state sector has been shrinking in its weight in the national 
economy, the state2 still holds a big stake in several key industries (transpor-
tation, telecom, banking, oil, steel, etc.) and controls their operations. 
Thirdly, privatization and private property rights were not essential compo-
nents of China’s first three decades of transition. It was not until middle 
1990s that the central government allowed privatization of small- and mid-
dle-sized SOEs. As recently as in March 2007, private property rights be-
came de jure recognized by the Real Rights Law. 3  Last but not least, 
China’s transition has been progressing without democratization. The 
Communist Party of China dominates in governing the country, and this 
one-party system is supposed to further exist for a long time.4 
                                                          
1  See SAFE 2010 for the data of the respective years. 
2  The term “state” is to some extent a vague term. Here, it refers to the central govern-
ment on behalf of all the Chinese people or local governments on provincial and mu-
nicipal levels, as the case may be. After a wave of administrative decentralization in the 
1970ies, most large-size SOEs were delegated to local governments, while the central 
government supervised less than 150 SOEs. In this context, “the state” rather refers to 
local governments in the context of managing and monitoring SOEs. 
3  Article 4 of the Real Rights Law states: “The real right of the state, collective, individ-
ual or any other right holder shall be protected by law, and may not be damaged by any 
entity or individual.” 
4  Very recently, Wu Bangguo, chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Peo-
ple’s Congress (NPC), proclaimed during NPC’s annual meeting in 2009 that China will 
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China’s economic success as well as the Chinese characteristics makes 
its transition path an attractive object for economical researches. One of the 
most popular research areas is the booming Chinese stock market. Early 
literature in this area tends to prefer initial public offerings and stock pric-
ings. Recently, more and more researchers have become interested in the 
corporate governance issues at the Chinese stock market. 
This dissertation is a study on corporate governance practices in China. It 
tries to answer the main research question whether it makes sense to invest 
into listed firms with good corporate governance at the young Chinese stock 
market. This main research question is divided into a few sub-questions 
concerning corporate governance at China’s stock market: 
 
a. What are the current corporate governance practices? 
b. How has corporate governance evolved over the past decades? 
c. What backs this corporate governance evolvement? 
d. Does stock valuation reflect peculiarities of this evolvement? 
e. Are listed firms with good corporate governance relatively higher val-
ued? 
 
The structure of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter II out-
lines the theoretical foundations of corporate governance. Chapter III briefly 
describes the financial system in China. Chapter IV devotes to the current 
corporate governance practices in China. Chapter V deals with corporate 
governance evolvement in China and its deep roots. Chapter VI empirically 
investigates the link between Chinese listed firms’ corporate governance 
and market valuation. Chapter VII summarizes the dissertation and gives an 
outlook for the future research work. 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
never become a Western-style democracy in terms of a multiple party system and a 
separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers (cf. ZHU 2009). 
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II. Theoretical Foundations of Corporate Governance 
This part of the thesis pursues the goal to provide an in-depth overview 
over the theoretical foundations of corporate governance. As the starting 
point the term corporate governance will be defined considering a narrow 
and a broader perspective. Subsequently the importance of corporate gov-
ernance is laid out, which will be followed by a reflection of the elementary 
conflicts of corporate governance. A wide range of paradigms that emerged 
to provide explanatory considerations to these conflicts will subsequently be 
elaborated upon. The lastsubsection of this part devotes itself to the review 
of the functions and influences of the financial markets on the development 
of enterprises and their corporate governance structures. 
1. Definition of Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance, as narrowly defined by Shleifer & Vishny (1997, 
p. 737), “deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations 
assure themselves of getting a return on their investment”. As such corpo-
rate governance relates to a set of institutional and market-based mecha-
nisms that “induce the self-interested controllers of a company […] to make 
decisions that maximize the value of the company to its owners” (Dennis & 
McConnell, 2003, p.2). Under this narrow definition corporate governance 
effectively ensures “that market signals and other relevant information are 
translated into investment decisions” (Berglöf 1997, p. 95) and that “imper-
fect information and different mechanisms that reduce or eliminate moral 
hazard in the relation between firms and financiers” are dealt with (Hellwig, 
1991). The concerns of finance providers to firms - the reduction of their 
investment risks as well as the optimization of their capital allocation - are, 
thus, the main area of focus for corporate governance (Rubach & Sebora, 
1998). 
In a broader definition corporate governance is considered “describing 
good, efficient management and supervision of companies on the basis of 
internationally recognized standards in the interests of the company’s own-
ers and its social environment” (Cromme, 2005, p. 366). In this sense it is 
“concerned with holding the balance between economic and social goals 
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and between individuals and communal goals” (Cadbury, 2000) through “a 
set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its share-
holders and other stakeholders” (OECD, 2004a, p. 11). Being deemed criti-
cal to economic and social well-being, corporate governance is to provide 
for the incentives and performance measures to achieve business success, 
and for accountability and transparency to the ensure the equitable distribu-
tion of the resulting wealth (Clarke, 2007, p. 2). In this broader definition 
corporate governance is concerned with the internal aspects of corporations, 
such as the delegation of authority, the interaction of the corporate bodies, 
issues of internal control, etc., as well as external issues to corporation such 
as relationships between a company’s management, and its share- and 
stakeholders (OECD, 2004; Werder 2005, S.34). Here the aim of corporate 
governance is to “align as nearly as possible the interests of individual cor-
porations and society” (Cadbury, 2000). 
Despite their differences both definitions of corporate governance have 
the understanding in common that corporate governance provides “the struc-
ture through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of 
attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined” 
(OECD, 2004a, p. 11). Equally, both definitions agree to the fact that “good 
corporate governance should provide proper incentives for the board and 
management to pursue objectives that are in the interests of the company 
and its shareholders and should facilitate effective monitoring” (ibid). Any 
“governance framework is there to encourage the efficient use of resources 
and equally to require accountability for the stewardship of those resources” 
(Cadbury, 2000). 
2. The Importance of Corporate Governance 
For businesses to grow and expand they need to be able to attract funding 
from investors. Investors, on the other side, will only want to grant funds to 
companies they trust of being financially sound, well-managed and profit-
able (Mallin, 2007, p.1). Consequently, corporate governance should be 
seen as a highly desirable precondition for capital investments (Bartha, 
Gillies; 2006, p. 86) that reduces the cost of capital and encourages of more 
efficient utilization of resources through a provision of a degree of confi-
dence that is necessary for the proper functioning of any market economy 
(OECD, 2004, p. 11). As a consequence, corporate governance represents a 
major factor determining economic performance (Cernat, 2004, p. 148) and 
enhancing growth (OECD, 2004a, p. 11).  
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According to Berglöf (1997, p. 113) may the importance of corporate go-
vernance also originate from “other aspects of the environment in which 
firms operate.” As corporate governance is said to be a substitute to compe-
tition in the sense that when indicators of corporate governance are strong 
the relative significance of competition decreases, and vice versa (Aghion et 
al., 1997, Berglöf, 1997, p. 113) a correlation between financial systems and 
competitive environment may be derived. In environments where competi-
tion is well developed, corporate governance is likely to be less imperative. 
However, in environments unlikely to develop a strong level of competition, 
effective corporate governance is going to be particularly important. “The 
corollary for financial systems is that, in countries where competitive forces 
in industry for some reason are weak, the demands on corporate governance 
are going to be stronger, and vice versa.” (ibid, p. 113) 
At last, “good governance has always been intuitively associated not just 
with sound, but with successful companies” (Clarke, 2007, p. 22). 
3. Conflicts of Corporate Governance 
The literature commonly considers two sets of corporate governance con-
flicts that arise between shareholders as the owner of an enterprise and man-
agement focusing mainly on the ability or lack thereof of shareholders to 
control the usage of their capital invested into a firm or to influence the uti-
lization of the invested capital in a way they want (Berle & Means, 1932; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983a, 1983b; Jensen, 1986, 
1993). This is due to the fact that both the narrow and the broad definition 
of corporate governance consider the interaction of these two key govern-
ance participants. But next to the conflicts between shareholders and man-
agement arising out of the separation of ownership and control (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983a), a second set of conflicts may like arise between large and 
small shareholders (Burkart et al., 2003). And since shareholders are not the 
only suppliers of capital to firms there may as well be a third set of potential 
conflicts between shareholders and creditors that need to be taken into con-
sideration (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 44). Lastly and in accordance with 
the broader definition of corporate governance it can be considered that cor-
porate governance conflicts may well arise between any two or more of the 
stakeholding parties. Swanson (1996, p. 417) therefore subsumes that the 
primary governance conflict is “the intricate balance between maximizing 
the efficiencies necessary to create wealth and ensuring that the controlling 
parties are accountable to those with a stake in the enterprise”. 
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The substance of corporate governance conflicts commonly follows from 
the separation of ownership of control or in the broader sense from the sepa-
ration into performing and controlling parties. Once this separation is in 
place it serves as the starting point for a diversity of potential conflicts. The 
main areas of conflict originate from the relationship between the principal 
(owner, stakeholder) and the agent (manager), the level of trust upheld by 
and in key players, the extent of information asymmetries between the re-
lated parties and lastly issues related to a common goal alignment of all re-
levant parties. As indicated earlier the definition of relevant parties or stake-
holders itself bears already potential for a conflict as there are different per-
ceptions uphold with regard to the parties to be considered. 
a) Separation of Ownership & Control 
Berle & Means (1932) noted that with the increased capital requirements 
of the modern corporation a separation between ownership and control of 
wealth was to inevitably occur. This was so despite the unchanged prefer-
ences of owners to maximize their utility by managing their companies 
themselves rather than entrusting someone else with doing so. (ibid). Even-
tually corporations grew beyond the means of a single owner as they 
proofed incapable of meeting the increased economic obligations of a cor-
poration. Consequently, “the modern corporation typically has multiple 
owners, each intent on maximizing his or her investment in the enterprise” 
(Davis et al., 1977, 22). With the number of shareholders starting to in-
crease, shareholders’ influence upon corporate management diminished 
(Clarke, 2007, p. 87). Means (1931) recognizes various ranges of ownership 
control dilution. From control through almost complete ownership via ma-
jority control and control through legal devices without majority ownership 
to minority control and lastly management control. “Thus in the manage-
ment controlled company the separation of ownership and control has be-
come virtually complete. The bulk of owners have in fact almost no control 
over the enterprise, while those in control hold only a negligible proportion 
of the total ownership” (Means, 1931, p. 89). Clarke (2007, p. 87) con-
cluded similarly that “as corporations became the dominant vehicle […] 
their legal instruments of incorporation […] increasingly reflected the con-
cerns not of stockholders, but of executive management”. 
With the increase of the amount of owners or, stated otherwise, with the 
wider dispersion of ownership individual shareholdings decreased and with 
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it the ability to influence decision-making as well as incentives to invest 
significant resources for the monitoring of the management (Clarke, 2007, 
p. 87). With the majority of shareholders following passive risk diversifica-
tion strategies rather than active ownership assignment the importance of 
individual shareholders with a significant ownership increases compara-
tively. A rather modest shareholding may suddenly be an influential block-
holding if all remaining shares are held widely dispersed among individuals 
and investors. Whereas the letter profit from the blockholder expending re-
sources to monitor and influence management, they may suffer from a de-
crease of share value if the blockholder uses its control to extract corporate 
resources. ”Thus, the ultimate effect of blockholder ownership on measured 
firm value depends upon the trade-off between the shared benefits of block-
holder control and any private extraction of firm value by blockholders” 
(Dennis & McConnell, 2003, p. 3). 
b) Principal - Agent 
Adam Smith (1776) constituted that “being managers of other people’s 
money than their own, it cannot well be expected that they should watch 
over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private 
co-partner frequently watch over their own. […] Negligence and profusion, 
therefore, must always prevail more or less in the management of the affairs 
of a joint stock company” (Smith, 1976, p. 264 - 265). Smith thereby de-
fines the conflict arising out the situation that “owners become principals 
when contracting with executives to manage their firms for them” (Davis et 
al., 1977, p. 2). As an agent, a manager is called upon to maximize of the 
principal’s utility. Any agent will accept this responsibility for as long as he 
thereby maximizes his own utility (ibid). The relationship between the prin-
cipal and agent is therefore of fundamental to corporate governance, espe-
cially as diverging interests and utility choices of them lead inevitably to a 
conflict.  
Jensen & Meckling (1976, p. 484) note that principal-agent relations “are 
the essence of the firm, not only with employees but with suppliers, custom-
ers, creditors, and so forth” as they can be considered to describe any situa-
tion of cooperative effort by two or more people. 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AT CHINA’S STOCK MARKET 9 
c) Trust 
“The essential and eternal concept of trust is a vital component of corpo-
rate governance”(Clarke, 2007, p. 30). Trust “promotes decision making and 
enhances cohesiveness” (Stiles & Taylor, 2002, p. 123 - 124). As “the ab-
sence of trust is deeply corrosive”(Clarke, 2007, p. 30) much of the activity 
of corporate governance revolves around its development (Stiles & Taylor, 
2002, p. 13). If trust between parties and to a transaction can be developed 
depends on the prevalence of social norms (Powell, 1996). Being generally 
based “on an individual’s theory as to how another person will perform on 
some future occasion, as a function of that target person’s current and previ-
ous claims, either implicit or explicit” (Good, 1988, p. 33) trust is usually 
created in networks or groups. Puffer & McCarthy (2008, p. 21) declare that 
no “corporate governance system can be effective without public trust in the 
actions of company managers, boards of directors, and such entities as audi-
tors, financial institutions, and government oversight bodies that can influ-
ence company governance processes”. 
d) Information Asymmetry 
Due to the separation of ownership and control and imperfect markets the 
management of a company will always prevail with an information advan-
tage over the shareholder on past but especially future transactions. As the 
management runs the operations of an enterprise, knowledge about these 
must be unevenly spread between management and shareholder. The litera-
ture describes three types of information asymmetries in the management - 
shareholder relationship. 
An adverse selection may occur as a consequence to unevenly distributed 
knowledge about particular (hidden) characteristics of a transaction prior to 
the deal conclusion (Akerlof, 1970). Hidden action describes a situation of 
moral hazard, characterized by the inability of the owners to monitor the 
actions of the contracting party, which may provide for exploitation 
schemes. Hidden intention describes another instance of moral hazard and 
refers to the secret intention of a contracting party to extort rents via unco-
operative behavior once the contract is signed. 
Hutchinson & Gul (2004, p. 597) explain that corporate governance con-
trols are commonly considered to be diminishing information asymmetries. 
However, such controls are truly important only for firms with a high level 
information asymmetry. Additionally, information asymmetries are higher 
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with growth firms because managers have private information about the 
value of future projects and hence their actions are not readily observable to 
shareholders. Therefore, growth firms experience a greater need for corpo-
rate controls (ibid). 
e) Goal Congruence 
Modern corporations are complex team-productions, with the output be-
ing jointly produced by several-input owners, e.g. managers, employees etc. 
(Alchian & Demesetz, 1972). In attaining the goal to achieve some level of 
efficiency, tasks are delegated within the corporation and specialized units 
emerge that produce part of the output on behalf of the entire team. An in-
evitable result of this specialization is the dispersion of knowledge among 
the different team-units and information and knowledge being distributed 
asymmetric (Kunz & Pfaff, 2002, p. 277). Next to information asymmetries 
cooperative efforts may suffer from the fact that individuals commonly pur-
sue their own goals which may only partially be overlapping with the team 
goals (Mayo, 1945; Barnard, 1968). Barnard (1968, p. 141) therefore holds 
that “an organization can secure the efforts necessary to its existence […] 
either by the objective inducement it provides or by changing states of 
mind.” Fama (1980, p. 289) adds that despite the fact that the members of an 
organization act from self-interest, they "realize that their destinies depend 
to some extent on the survival of the team in its competition with other 
teams”. 
As principals and agents have varying utility functions (Jensen & Meck-
ling, 1976) and from there on different goal orientations as well as risk-
preferences (Wright et al., 2001, p. 417), goal conflicts occur. To the extent 
that such conflicts prevail, the costs of an agent’s decisions to the principal 
are expected to increase (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Whereas in political models goal conflicts are resolved through bargain-
ing, negotiation, and coalitions whereas in economic models they are re-
solved through the coalignment of incentives (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 63) and 
the implementation of controls. Accordingly incentives and monitoring are 
“the essence of organizational analysis, whether the substance has to do 
with decentralization, division of labour, formal rules, structure, communi-
cation or ownership versus control” Moe (1984, p. 755). 
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A) Incentives 
Eisenhardt (1989, p. 61) holds that a principal has two options to influ-
ence the behavior of the agent should he lack complete information. One is 
to contract with the agent on the outcomes of the agent's activities, whereby 
the agent's behavior is motivated by co-alignment of his preferences with 
those of the principal. This co-alignment comes at the price of transferring 
risk to the agent as outcomes are only partly a function of behaviors and are 
likely to be affected by events uncontrollable to the agent (e.g. technological 
change, competitor actions, etc.). As outcome uncertainty constitutes a risk 
that must be borne by someone, the costs of shifting this risk onto the agent 
are positively associated with the level of uncertainty to achieve the 
goal(ibid) as the agent will require a higher premium for taking on addi-
tional risk. 
The incentives to reach a certain outcome are generally divided to be ei-
ther extrinsic or intrinsic. Extrinsic incentives take the form of pecuniary 
and non-pecuniary benefits (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 486) whereas 
"people are said to act intrinsically motivated if they value activities for 
their own sake, such as they perform them without being externally in-
duced" (Kunz & Pfaff, 2002, p. 279). 
Whereas tournament theory maintains that larger extrinsic incentives mo-
tivate agents to aspire to higher goals and results in and improved enterprise 
performance (Lee et al., 2008, p. 318) Lazear (1989) pointed out that large 
extrinsic incentives may induce sabotage of other managers’ results instead 
of efforts to do better oneself. Several authors pointed out that extrinsic per-
formance incentive may diminish an agent’s intrinsic motivation (Deci, 
1975; Frey, 1997; Ryan & Deci, 2000). An extrinsic reward granted to the 
agent is said to contradict, at least to some degree, the notion of the princi-
pal to raise his own utility. As such the conclusion of a contract providing 
the agent with an extrinsic incentive is said to come with a hidden cost to 
the principal (Lepper & Greene, 1978). 
A further problem with extrinsic rewards is that the organization goal to 
which they are tied is often "defined only imperfectly and frequently is in-
tended to be modified or updated as the organization progresses towards it" 
(Rosanas & Velilla, 2005, p. 85). An incentive system that always provides 
an extrinsic incentive "in the ‘right’ direction (the organizational goal) can-
not exist" especially when the organizational objectives are ambiguous (ib-
id, p. 87). 
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B) Internal Control 
As the second option to influence the behavior of an agent should the 
principal lack complete information Eisenhardt (1989, p. 61) suggests an 
investment in control systems (e.g. information) such as budgeting systems, 
reporting procedures, boards of directors, and additional layers of manage-
ment to discover the agent's behavior and to revert from incomplete infor-
mation to complete information. Williamson (1985) supports this notion 
arguing that since principals find it difficult to know ex ante which agents 
will selfaggrandize, it is prudent for them to limit potential losses to their 
utility (Williamson, 1985). 
Any collectivity which has an economic goal must then find a means to 
control diverse individuals efficiently (Ouchi, 1980, p. 130). To this effect 
formal control systems are commonly set up which provide the principal 
with richer information. Consequently incentives can be aligned with organ-
izational interests to motivate actions in their direction. At the same time the 
control systems allow for an evaluation of the achievements which build the 
basis for extrinsic rewards being grated. The evaluation process is usually 
less than perfect because the organizational goal is not only often imper-
fectly defined or frequently changing (Rosanas & Velilla, 2005, p. 85) it is 
also difficult to measure. This measurement challenge derives from the fact 
that firms are usually team productions where several types of resources are 
used, the output is not a sum of separable inputs of each team member, and 
where not all of the resources used by the team belong to one person (Al-
chian & Demsetz 1972). Nilakant & Rao (1994, p. 665) elaborate further 
that in complex team productions one generally must be differentiating be-
tween two types of business activities upon which the final outcome is con-
tingent - operational and facilitative effort. The earlier involves the trans-
formation of inputs into an output or a set of outputs and the latter involves 
the acquisition of inputs, coordination of inputs, intermediate outputs and 
transformation processes, and the selection of conversion technologies. 
While for operational efforts (e.g. structured, mechanical jobs) the goal to 
be achieved can be clearly defined and is rather simple to measure, for fa-
cilitative efforts (e.g. corporate management) the goals are difficult to define 
and the contribution only imperfect to measure. Consequently, in increas-
ingly more complex situations, "measurement systems are very imperfect or 
even difficult to define, and the result of the measurement is inevitably dif-
ferent from the goal the organization is actually trying to achieve.; therefore, 
the correlation between the real goal to be pursued and the performance ac-
tually measured is bound to be less than one" (Rosanas & Velilla, 2005, p. 
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85). The simpler the situation (e.g. operational effort), the higher is the cor-
relation between measured performance and the real organizational goal; 
and the more complex a situation (e.g. facilitative effort) the weaker is the 
correlation between the measured performance and the organizational goal. 
Anthony & Govindarajan (2003, p. 94) conclude that perfect goal congru-
ence cannot exist in practice in any complex situation. Hence, the control 
system will also not be perfect and therefore necessarily allow managerial 
opportunism to a certain extent (Rosanas & Velilla, 2005, p. 89). 
In this regard, Lazear (1989) pointed to the potential of moral hazard for 
agents arising out of the inability to properly define the managerial goal and 
to measure its achievement appropriately. This situation leads any control 
system to improperly (from the perspective of the organizational goal) de-
cide on key performance indicators to be measured. Lazear (1989) con-
cludes that this may result in two detrimental actions of an agent. Whenever 
an action has an effect on the key performance indicator to be measured but 
none on the organizational goal, thereby being organizationally useless, a 
corporate incentive may induce the agent to perform that useless action. 
Corollary, if an action has a decisive effect on the organizational goal, but 
none on the key performance indicator to be measured any incentive to fur-
ther the key performance indicator may induce the agent not to perform that 
action. (Rosanas & Velilla, 2005, p. 86) 
If the internal control systems and mechanisms fail, external control me-
chanisms (e.g., acquisitions, divestitures, and ownership amendments) will 
emerge to control self-serving managers despite the fact that the latter are 
commonly more expensive. Because of this extra expense, internal mecha-
nisms are generally preferred by principals (Walsh & Seward, 1990). 
4. Corporate Governance Paradigms 
A variety of paradigms and theoretical constructs have been developed 
and applied to better comprehend and eventually to solve or at least mini-
mize the costs arising out of the conflicts in corporate governance. This sec-
tion will consider eight different paradigms with a particular emphasis on 
agency theory as the main paradigm, followed by the transaction cost eco-
nomics approach, the stewardship theory, the stakeholder approach and 
eventually in short overview of paradigms with less academic coverage such 
as managerial hegemony, resource dependency, class hegemony and net-
work governance. 
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a) Agency Theory 
The ubiquitous agency relationship stands for a situation in "which one 
or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to per-
form some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision 
making authority to the agent" (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 310). Agency 
theory suggests that problems of organization arise out of this delegation of 
duty and authority. Two main problems have been found inherent in agency 
relationships which agency theory is concerned with solving. The first refers 
to the agency problem which arises from goal incongruencies between prin-
cipal and agent and/or from the costs to monitor the agent's behavior and 
performance outcome. The second problem refers to risk sharing and arises 
whenever the principal and agent have different attitudes toward risk and 
consequently may prefer different actions because of the varying risk pref-
erences (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 58). 
The model of man underlying organizational economics and agency the-
ory "is individualistic and […] predicated upon the notions of an in-built 
conflict of interest between owner and manager" (Donaldson, Davis, 1991, 
p. 51) and of a rational actors who seek to maximize their individual utility 
with the least possible expenditure (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Moreover, 
the model is one of an individual calculating likely costs and benefits, and 
thus seeking to attain rewards and avoid punishment, especially financial 
ones (Donaldson, Davis, 1991, p. 51). Per agency theory, the principal de-
rives pecuniary benefits (costs) from an agency relationship, whereas the 
agent derives both pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits (costs) from this 
relationship. The nonfinancial benefits may include “the physical appoint-
ments of the office, the attractiveness of the office staff, the level of em-
ployee discipline …" (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 486) (Wright et al., 
2001, p. 417) 
Unless the role of the principal and the agent are merged into one, i.e. 
ownership and management in the hands of the same person agency costs 
cannot be completely eliminated (Wright et al., 2001, p. 417). Commonly 
there are three different kinds of agency costs considered (Jensen & Meck-
ling, 1976; Matos, 2001). Bonding costs refer to such costs as incurred for 
appointment of independent auditors, residual costs refer to costs related to 
the appointment of an independent board and monitoring costs refer to any 
costs incurred to monitor management’s activities. (Rashid & Islam, 2008, 
p. 25) The larger the firm becomes the larger are the total agency costs” 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 522; Wright et al., 2001, p. 419) 
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Agency theory attributes uncertainty in performance outcomes to moral 
hazard, adverse selection and the state of nature. With the state of nature, 
referring to external environmental influences uncontrollable by an organi-
zation which may cause variations in outcomes, considered as an exogenous 
factor, agency theory focus on the reduction of uncertainty arising out the 
agent’s effort and type (Nilakant & Rao, 1994, p. 655). 
Moral hazard refers to the lack of agreed upon effort as exerted by the 
agent. That is, moral hazard refers to shirking, the most important source of 
agency conflict ((Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 487) which is likely to go 
unnoticed due to a prevailing information asymmetry around a complex 
issue that would require considerable expenses by the principal to be over-
come (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Adverse selection refers to the misrepresentation of facts by the agent 
which the principal is unable to completely verify at the time of the transac-
tion (Fama & Jensen, 1983a).  
Having its roots in economic utilitarianism (Ross, 1973) agency theory 
examines the agency relationship primarily in the context of an individual 
principal or agent based on the social science doctrine of methodological 
individualism (Donaldson, 1990). The paradigm holds that economic phe-
nomena should be examined with the behavior of individuals being consid-
ered deliberate as economic life is best understood as maximizing individ-
ual's behavior (Wright et al., 2001, p. 414). Agency theory has subsequently 
developed along two main branches: positivist agency theory and principal-
agent theory. (Nilakant & Rao, 1994, p. 650) The contract between the prin-
cipal and the agent is the commonly shared unit of analysis for both theo-
rems (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 59). 
Positivist agency theory focuses on the broad issues arising out of separa-
tion of ownership and emphasizes governance mechanisms to discipline 
agents, such as incentive schemes, financial and labour markets (Fama 
1980; Fama and Jensen 1983a; Jensen 1983). The emphasized governance 
mechanisms are best covered by two propositions (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 60). 
First, outcome-based contracts are effective in limiting agent opportunism 
by better coaligning the preferences of agents with those of the principal. 
The second proposition is that information systems also limit agent oppor-
tunism as they provide information about the behavior of the agent to the 
principal, which in turn will serve as a deterrent to deceive the principal 
(ibid). 
Principal-agent theory takes the ownership and allocation of firms as a 
given and concentrates on the design of optimal, behavior vs. outcome, em-
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ployment contract and information systems (Baiman 1982, 1990). As a the-
ory that can be applied to various other agency relationships such employer-
employee, lawyer-client, buyer-supplier, etc. (Harris & Raviv, 1978). The 
model assumes goal conflict between principal and agent, and an agent who 
is more risk averse than the principal as he is unable to diversify his em-
ployment in comparison to the principal being able to diversify his invest-
ments (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 60). Eisenhardt (1989, p. 61) formulates that in 
case of complete information a behavior-basedcontract is most efficient, as 
an outcome-based contract would needlessly transfer risk to the agent. In 
case of incomplete information an outcome-based contract is most efficient 
as the principal lacks the ability to control for the conformity of the agent's 
behavior as well as for the congruence of the actual goals pursued. 
The two agency theory branches are complementary as positivist agency 
theory identifies various contract alternatives, and principal-agent theory 
indicates which contract is the most efficient under varying levels of out-
come uncertainty, risk aversion, information. The essence of positivist 
agency theory is the evaluation of goal conflicts arising out of cooperative 
efforts among individuals with differing preferences. Principal-agent theory 
on the other side elaborates on the trade-off between the costs for monitor-
ing the agent's behavior and the cost of a risk transfer associated with moni-
toring only the agent's performance outcomes (Eisenhardt, 1989; Nilakant 
and Rao, 1994). 
From a principal-agent perspective relaxing the assumptions of agency 
theory related to risk-attitude, goal conflict, predefinition accuracy of tasks 
and goals may affect the choice of one contract type over the other (e.g. be-
havior-based vs. outcome-based contract). 
As such MacCrimmon & Wehrung (1986) conclude that to the extent that 
an agent becomes less risk averse (e.g., a wealthy agent), a principal will 
find it more attractive to pass on risk to the agent using outcome-based con-
tracting. With the principal becoming more risk-averse (e.g. old principal) 
the attractiveness to pass on risk to the agent using outcomebased contract-
ing increases. So, if the agent is becoming less risk averse or the principal is 
becoming more risk averse the attractiveness of outcome-based contracting 
increases.Demski, (1980) indicated that with decreasing potential for goal 
conflict, e.g. in highly socialized firm (Ouchi, 1979) or in situations driven 
by intrinsic rather than extrinsic motivation (Perrow, 1986) the principal 
incurs less monitoring costs to observe the agent's behavior and behavior-
based contracting becomes more attractive. 
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Levinthal (1988) has shown that optimal principal-agent contract under 
complete information (first-best contract) is different from the optimal con-
tract information is incomplete (second-best contract). Under complete in-
formation the principal will conclude a behavior-based (employment) con-
tract whereas under incomplete information the principal favors an out-
come-based contract to avoid the incurrence of tremendous monitoring 
costs. The second-best contract is compared to the first-best contract less 
efficient with part of the efficiency loss deriving from the transfer of risk 
onto the agent. This is supported by the findings of Eisenhardt (1985, 1988) 
that with the increasing ability to correctly predefine an agent's goals and 
tasks the costs for the observation and evaluation of the agent's behavior 
decrease. Consequently principals will prefer behavior-based contracts to 
outcome-based as information about the agent's behavior is more readily 
available to them. On the other side Anderson (1985) and Eisenhardt (1985) 
determined that with increasing difficulties to measure outcomes or individ-
ual contribution within a practical amount of time, outcomebased contracts 
become less attractive and vice versa. Lastly, Lambert (1983) established 
that the longer the cooperation between a principal and an agent, the better 
will a principal know his agent. Consequently the assessment of the agent's 
behavior is less costly and behaviorbased contracting becomes more attrac-
tive. 
The limits of agency theory are determined by its underlying the model 
of man (Davis et al, 1997, p. 24). Jensen & Meckling (1994) criticize it as 
being a simplification for mathematical modeling and an unrealistic descrip-
tion of human behavior. Hirsch et al. (1987) said the models assumptions 
limit its generalizability which Doucouliagos (1994) supports in arguing that 
labeling all motivation as self-serving does not provide for the complexity 
of human action. Perrow (1986) reasons that agency theory overemphasizes 
the prevalence of self-serving behavior and disregards other behavioral no-
tions. He also holds that agency theory does not account for common organ-
izational slack and promotion policies, which for example take the length of 
service into account length, to reduce the effects of moral hazard and ad-
verse selection. Kaplan (1983) in the same vein questions whether managers 
indeed engage in continuous utility maximization. 
Despite being concerned with strategies and mechanisms to reduce un-
certainty in task performance, agency theory is said to overlook two critical 
sources of outcome uncertainty - "incomplete knowledge about the effort-
outcome relationship and lack of agreement about effort and outcome" (Ni-
lakant & Rao, 1994, p. 649). Principal-agent approaches to contract design 
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are considered by Nilakant & Rao (1994, p. 649) to be "unrealistic to the 
extent that they presume that performance in organizations results exclu-
sively from individualcontributor jobs, exaggerate the degree to which indi-
viduals are work-averse, and emphasize the quantity of effort at the expense 
of the quality and type of effort." 
Lastly, Davis et al. (1997) note that agency theory by specifying an in-
termediate condition of control, e.g. the installation of controls to reduce 
abuse of the delegated duty and authority arising out of an agent's poor mo-
tivation, many other reasons for performance failures such as low ability, 
lack of knowledge, and poor information are left unaddressed and unconsid-
ered. 
In spite of this criticism agency theory has become one of the most rele-
vant theoretical paradigms in economics. It has been used by scholars in 
accounting, economics, finance, marketing, political science and organiza-
tional behavior (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 57). Agencytheory reestablishes the 
importance of self incentives and self-interest in organizational thinking 
(Perrow, 1986), especially as "contractual relations are the essence of the 
firm, not only with employees but with suppliers, customers, creditors, and 
so on" (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 484). Agency theory furthermore made 
two specific contributions to organizational thinking. It introduced the con-
sideration of information being a commodity, that has a cost can be pur-
chased (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 64). This highlights the significant role of for-
mal information systems, such as budgeting and boards of directors, and of 
informal information systems, such as managerial supervision, not known to 
organizational research before. "The implication is that organizations can 
invest in information systems in order to control agent opportunism" (ibid). 
Secondly, agency theory contributed to organizational risk considerations as 
organizations face uncertain futures which are only partly determined by its 
members. Viewing uncertainty in terms of risk/reward trade-offs and not 
just in terms of the inability to preplan, agency theory implies that "outcome 
uncertainty coupled with differences in willingness to accept risk should 
influence contracts between principal and agent" (ibid, p. 65). 
b) Transaction Cost Economics 
Transaction cost economics is said to be the most established theoretical 
approach after agency theory (Clarke, 1997, p. 26). Williamson (1975, 
1985) argued that markets and firms are alternative modes of executing eco-
nomic transactions. The transaction cost economics paradigm was devel-
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oped by Coase who noted that "the main reason why it is profitable to estab-
lish a firm would seem to be that there is a cost of using the price mecha-
nism" (Coase, 1937, p. 390). There are several cost considerations that lead 
production to be organized through a firm price mechanism rather than the 
market price mechanism. First, determining prices at the market is much 
more costly than within a firm as the price discovery process at the market 
requires significantly more transactions compared to the one within a firm, 
particularly as prices at the market differ widely (Cheung, 1983, p. 6). Sec-
ond, the information cost of knowing a product is important as it allows for 
the incurrence of lower costs in price negotiations. Eventually the costs of 
measuring attributes of a product and the costs for individual price agree-
ments with contributors in cooperative efforts (ibid, p.6-8) constitute other 
cost factors. Ouchi (1980, p. 130) therefore maintained that transaction costs 
arise mainly out of the difficulty to determine the value of a good or service 
arising from the underlying nature of the good or service or from a lack of 
trust between the parties to a transaction. Transactions cost economics, 
hence, relates the nature of firms with the imperfection of markets and with 
the transaction costs in market exchanges (Clarke, 2007, p. 26) and explic-
itly regards efficiency as the fundamental element in determining the nature 
of organizations (Ouchi, 1980, p. 129) as the latter supersede the market in 
its efficiency for equitable mediation of transactions between parties (ibid, 
p. 140) 
Transaction-cost economics emphasizes in addition to ownership and in-
centive alignment, ex post support institutions (Williamson 1985). Alchian 
& Demsetz (1972) argue that firms exist because of team production which 
leads to metering problems, since there is an incentive for individual mem-
bers to shirk. One method of reducing shirking is for someone to specialize 
as a monitor to check the input performance of team members, which leads 
to the emergence of a firm. To transaction cost economics the notion that 
firms are superior to markets in monitoring input performance and in pro-
viding incentives for individual performance is central (Williamson, 1986, 
p. 87). 
The locus of attention remains the principal-agent relationship, but ac-
cording to transaction cost economics shareholders are perceived to “face a 
diffuse but significant risk of expropriation because the assets in question 
are numerous, and ill-defined, and cannot be protected in a well-focused, 
transaction specific way” (Williamson, 1985, p. 306). Transaction cost eco-
nomics has at its heart the goal to discover internal measures and mecha-
nisms that would reduce costs associated with contractual hazards to an effi-
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cient level. (Willamson, 1975, p. 143 negates the reliability of a financial 
market to mitigate these problems, as it has only “limited constitutional 
powers to conduct audits and has limited access to the firm’s incentive and 
resource allocation machinery” 
Barney & Ouchi (1986) noted that agency theory and transaction cost 
economics jointly share the assumptions of self-interest and bounded ration-
ality. They also have similar dependent variables, e.g. firms closely corre-
spond to behavior-based contracts, and markets to outcome-based contracts. 
The independent variables considered by both theories are the most impor-
tant difference (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 64). In transaction cost theory these 
independent variables are asset specificity and small numbers bargaining, 
whereas in agency theory the risk attitudes of the principal and agent, out-
come uncertainty, and information systems are the variables of interest (ib-
id). Williamson (1988) considers both theories to mainly differ in their ap-
proach to costs and in the elementary notion that transaction cost economics 
unlike agency costs views corporate governance problems as proceeding 
from a number of contractual hazards. 
As with agency theory, transaction cost economics has been criticized by 
organizational theories such as Jones (1983) & Perrow (1981, 1986) to ne-
glect aspects such as altruism and power and to overemphasize the rele-
vance of self-interest and efficiency in the evolution of organizations. Ni-
kalant & Rao (1994, p. 667) add that "to the extent that transaction-cost 
economics emphasizes hierarchical control, performance evaluation, moni-
toring, and incentives, it fails to view the firm as a network of interdepend-
ent roles and ignores the critical role of facilitative effort in firms." 
c) Stewardship Theory 
Having its roots in psychology and sociology rather than economics ste-
wardship theory examines situations in which executives as stewards are 
motivated to act in the best interests of their principals (Donaldson & Davis, 
1989, 1991). The theory holds that managers are not motivated by individu-
alistic goals, but by the success of the organization as the steward's utility 
functions are said to be maximized upon accumulation of shareholders' val-
ue (Davis et al., 1997, p. 25). The manager as seen by stewardship theory, 
thus, shows a pro-organizational, collectivistic rather than a self-serving 
behavior (ibid). Consequently behaviors such as moral hazard and adverse 
selection could not be arising in a stewardship relation between manager 
and owner. 
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Despite the fact that stewardship theory generally assumes that the mo-
tives of the steward can be and are aligned with the objectives of their prin-
cipals (Davis et al., 1997, p. 21), a steward will place higher value on coop-
eration than defection even if the goals between the principal and the stew-
ard are not congruent as the steward perceives greater utility in cooperative 
behavior (ibid, p. 24). Even when a course of action is considered unreward-
ing the steward will act upon it out of a sense of duty towards the organiza-
tion and the principal, that is, normatively induced compliance (Etzioni, 
1975). 
The model of man underlying stewardship theory is that of a person who 
is being motivated by a need to achieve, to successfully master challenging 
work, to exercise responsibility and authority, from which recognition of 
peers and superiors is obtained (McClelland 1961; Herzberg et al., 1959). 
Thus, stewardship theory emphasizes intrinsic factors rather than extrinsic 
rewards to be the underlying drivers for performance. Donaldson & Davis 
(1991, p. 51) add that "identification by managers with the corporation, es-
pecially likely if they have served there with long tenure and have shaped its 
form and directions, promotes a merging of individual ego and the corpora-
tion, thus melding individual self-esteem with corporate prestige". 
Similarly to agency theory stewardship theory assumes that most stake-
holders' interests are well served by increasing shareholder value, albeit a 
potential multiplicity of stakeholders and a multitude of competing objec-
tives pursued by them (Davis et al., 1997, p. 25). 
"Contrary to agency theory, stewardship theory uses a different model of 
man and assumes different situational and psychological antecedents to in-
dividual behavior" (Klein, 2007, p. 1081). According to O'Reilly & Chat-
man (1996) stewardship theory proposes social control mechanisms based 
on shared values, goals, and attitudes in contrast to agency theory's promo-
tion of formal control mechanisms relying on extrinsic rewards or punish-
ments to control managerial behavior. Barney and Hansen (1994) consider 
control devices to likely be inefficient since “what works well to control or 
motivate an opportunistic manager may not work well to control or motivate 
a steward” (Lee & O'Neill, 2003, p. 212). 
Donaldson & Davis (1991) argue that stewardship theory - in contrast to 
agency theory - supports the notion of a chief executive officer to also be 
the chair of the board of directors, as pro-organizational actions are best 
facilitated when corporate governance structures provide the chief executive 
officer with high authority and discretion. As stewards are assumed to max-
imize their utility by achieving organizational rather than self-serving objec-
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tives the accumulation of authority is considered fostering corporate per-
formance. 
As such stewardship theory calls for corporate structures that empower 
and facilitate rather than monitor and control, especially as monitoring and 
controlling can potentially be counterproductive to the organizational goal 
since control may undermine the pro-organizational behavior of the steward 
(Argyris, 1964). Under control a steward will not enjoy the aimed for inter-
nal rewards, such as achievement or self-actualization. As a result the stew-
ard's motivation may diminish as the workplace becomes depersonalized 
and members of the organization including the steward appear interchange-
able (Davis et al., 1997, p. 39). In such "environments, employees may re-
sort to antagonistic adaptive activities such as absenteeism and turnover; 
theft and vandalism; and demanding better financial compensation" (ibid, p. 
40). 
d) Stakeholder Theory 
While agency theory has its clear focus on the principal-agent relation-
ship with the maintenance or enhancement of shareholder value being pa-
ramount (Mallin, 2007, p. 16), stakeholder theory demands that a wider of 
group of constituents is taken account for in corporate decision making. 
Redmond (2005, p. 156) explains this demand in reference to a generally 
accepted legal concept stating that "the logic of separate personality and 
limited liability doctrines favour the externalization of the social costs of 
corporate behaviour, shifting the risk of the enterprise operations away from 
shareholders and onto stakeholders or wider society”. Blair (1995) argues in 
the same vein that companies could not be seen just as a bundle of assets 
that belong to shareholder, but need be conceived as institutional arrange-
ments governing the relationships of all parties that contribute firm-specific 
assets.  
Whereas it was argued that ownership grants exclusive rights to property 
title holders and that shareholders bearing the residual risk with their finan-
cial investments into a corporation should have the exclusive right to decide 
over the course of the enterprise (Engelen, 2002), Berle & Means (1932, p. 
309) declared that “neither the claims of ownership nor those of control can 
stand against the paramount interests of the community”. A further argu-
ment that agents have a contractual obligation only to the shareholders and 
therefore a fiduciary duty only towards the latter, Blair and Stout (2001, p. 
5) utilizing another legal excurse explain that managers enjoy a remarkable 
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degree of freedom from shareholder command and control as "corporate law 
itself does not obligate directors to do what the shareholders tell them to 
do". Blair & Stout (2001, p. 6) conclude that corporate law does not compel 
management to the sole goal of shareholder value maximization "but does 
not preclude them from pursuing this goal either." 
Monk's & Minow's (2001, p. 40) argument that the pursuit of a multitude 
of goals leads to a problem of effective accountability and therefore in-
creased agency costs as “it is difficult enough to determine the success of a 
company’s strategy based only on one goal - shareholder value. It is impos-
sible when we add other goals”, has yet been left unresolved by proponents 
of the stakeholder approach. 
Puffer & McCarthy (2003b, p. 400) identify three distinguished groups of 
shareholders with a different level of influence on corporate decision mak-
ing and corporate governance. Top management, the supervisory board, and 
the shareholders are referred to as primary stakeholders who decide upon, 
implement, and execute corporate governance in corporations Secondary 
stakeholders are - employees, creditors, customers, and suppliers - groups 
that can affect a firm’s operations and results by providing or withholding 
goods, services, and resources. In stakeholder-based corporate governance 
systems they may be directly involved in governance through memberships 
on supervisory boards. The third and least influential group of stakeholders, 
referred to as peripheral stakeholders, are - business associations, rating 
bodies, investment banks, financial analysts, and auditing firms - groups that 
can influence corporate governance by providing advice or exerting pressure 
on the company, or the through misstatements or miscommunication of 
company processes and results. Peripheral stakeholders usually interact di-
rectly with primary stakeholders on a relatively frequent basis, but are rarely 
members of boards of directors. 
Fink et al (1999, p. 12) elaborate that the actual ability of stakeholders to 
influence corporate decision making derives from a variety of sources with 
the access to physical resources not being the only influential factor. Stake-
holder are said to be able to influence corporation due to their position (le-
gitimate power), their expertise (expert power), their ability to reward com-
pliance (reward power) or to punish non-compliance (coercive power). The 
goal of their involvement in decision making commonly relates to the 
"scope and the timing of investment decisions, as well as on considerations 
of decision alternatives and opportunity costs stemming from alternative 
decisions" (ibid). They will naturally also aim to influence corporate deci-
sion-making whenever they perceive their own interests to be affected, par-
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ticularly should a transfer of control be about to take place (ibid, p. 8). Ball-
ing, (1998) notes that control rights transfers usually take place in conjunc-
tion with ownership changes (e.g. privatization, takeovers, mergers, restruc-
turing) or in times of financial distress, when employees are being laid off, 
managers exchanged or upon (ibid). 
In this regard, stakeholder theory is considered to be in "juxtaposition to 
agency theory" (Mallin, 2007, p. 16) with stakeholders claiming that a con-
sideration of their interests in the agent's business conduct leads to superior 
moral and ethical decisions. 
e) Institutional Theory 
Institutional theory as promoted by Axelrod (1997) holds that ac-
tors/organizations may in difference to agency theory adapt their behavior 
towards a given environment by internalizing its norms and values without a 
particular rational reasoning as they are social beings. According to Scott 
(2001) there are three different kinds of institutions affecting the behavior of 
any actor or organization. Regulative institutions provide for norms as ex-
pressed in laws and rules which are explicitly followed (e.g. a Corporate 
Governance Code). As the non-abidance to these norms is commonly sanc-
tioned they are being adapted to in order to avoid punishment. Normative 
institutions are behaviours that are considered appropriate and expected to 
be abided by in accordance with prevalent moral standards. Culturalcogni-
tive institutions refer to norms being followed with little awareness as they 
appeal to beliefs or logics of action commonly shared (e.g. form of greet-
ing). As such cultural-cognitive institutions relate to behaviours of particular 
cultural relevance which are mainly adapted to through mimetic mecha-
nisms. 
f) Resource Dependence Theory 
Resource dependence theory in agreement with institutional theory and 
network theory highlights "the interdependencies of organizations rather 
than viewing them simply in terms of management intentions" (Clarke, 
2007, p. 29). According to Hilman et al. (2000) corporate management pro-
vides a critical link to the external environment hat helps to overcome un-
certainty via the provision of resources. Management with its key relation-
ships with suppliers, buyers, public policy makers and other social groups 
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thereby effectively deal influence the level of uncertainty a corporation is 
exposed to. Daily & Dalton (1994) argue that the selection of management 
must be considered also from the perspective if their inclusion provides ac-
cess to vital resources and information, thereby reducing environmental 
dependency. Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) add that to the extent that directors 
effectively manage environmental uncertainty corporations become power-
ful, which according to Singh et al. (1986) leads ultimately to an increased 
probability of survival for the company. In this light resource dependence 
theory is considered by Clarke (2007, p. 29) to add "a vital external dimen-
sion to corporate governance relationships". 
g) Network Governance 
Network governance is defined as an interfirm coordination through in-
formal social systems to coordinate complex products or services in uncer-
tain competitive environments (Clarke, 2004, p. 160). These informal social 
networks are developed unconnected to existing formal contractual relation-
ships among the firms (Gerlach, 1992, p. 64). Through these networks se-
lected autonomous firms operate persistently like a single entity towards the 
achievement of particular tasks, whereas they may be competing fiercely in 
other domains or with regard to their formal relationships (Jones et al., 
1997, p. 916). 
Network governance systems are said to constitute "a distinct form of 
coordinating economic activity" (Powell, 1990, p. 301) to "resolve funda-
mental problems of adapting, coordinating, and safeguarding exchanges" 
(Clarke, 2004, p. 159) in contrast to the market or firms. These viability of 
network governance increases significantly with the need of enterprises to 
deal with "hypercompetition where rapid and flexible responses are neces-
sary" (Clarke, 2004, p. 10). "Patterns of interaction in exchanges and rela-
tionships" and "flows of resources between legally separate and independent 
units" are identified as the two key concepts of network governance struc-
tures (Jones et al. 1997, p. 914). 
The arguments in favour of network governance resemble the arguments 
for the establishment of firms as used by the transaction costs economics 
paradigm. To be emerging and existing in the long run any governance 
form, including network governance, must resolve economic exchanges 
more efficiently than other governance forms (Williamson, 1991). Such 
networks are therefore likely to be very flexible in their appearance as well 
as their disappearance. This notion is supported by the finding that network 
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governance relies mainly on "social coordination and control, such as occu-
pational socialisation, collective sanctions, and reputations, than on author-
ity and legal recourse" (Jones et al., 1997, p. 916) as the engaged in agree-
ments are of social and not legal nature. 
h) Managerial Hegemony 
Managerial hegemony has at its heart the demonstration of the factual 
control of the supervisory board by the management board (Clarke, 2007, 
p.29). Mace (1971) indicated that the domination of the board of directors 
by senior executives were rather the normal case than the exception in the 
U.S.A. directors. This was expressed by the factual determination of board 
memberships as well as the compensation paid to senior executives by the 
chief executive officer rather than the board of directors. Mace also noted 
that that there was a "wide gap of what directors are supposed to do, what 
people generally assumed they do, and what directors actually do". 
i) Class Hegemony 
Class hegemony is rather radical paradigm arguing that corporations per-
petuate the power of an elite, thereby aiding to exploit others in the interest 
of accumulating wealth and even more power (Mills, 1971). Radical ap-
proaches of similar kind have not found much attention since Mills but as 
noted by Clarke & dela Rama (2006) this may change again in light of the 
globalization. 
5. Corporate Governance and Financial Markets 
To finance growth companies need funding, which they can either gener-
ate internally through profitable operations or which they can obtain exter-
nally in financial markets. "From where a company derives the finance it 
requires to develop and grow is one of the most fundamental questions any 
enterprise faces" (Clarke, 2007, p. 93). This is due to the fact that any choice 
in this regard has profound implications for both the future profitability of 
an enterprise as well as its corporate governance structure (ibid). Whereas 
the utilization of internally generated funds may allow corporate governance 
structures to be unchanged, corporate growth will often be inhibited as new 
ventures can only be realized to the extent of free cash flows derived from 
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ongoing operations. The utilization of external funds on the contrary may 
allow corporations to engage in new ventures but will inevitably lead to 
changes in their corporate governance structures as external suppliers of 
finance will want to "assure themselves of getting a return on their invest-
ment" (Shleifer & Vishny 1997, p. 737). 
Consequently, for any economy to grow a developed financial market has 
proven to be an important prerequisite (Dennis & McConnell, 2003, p. 31). 
This is underpinned by the fact that the four most important financial cen-
ters worldwide - New York, London, Tokyo and Frankfurt - are located in 
four of the eight leading economies worldwide. But if strong financial mar-
kets are to develop strong investor protection is necessary (Dennis & 
McConnell, 2003, p. 31). As such, investor protection legislation and their 
effective enforcement "affect the size and extent of countries’ capital mar-
kets and, with them, the level of economic growth" (ibid). With increasing 
investor protection investors face less risks such as expropriation and con-
sequently demand a lower rate of return (La Porta et al., 1997). With lower 
rates of return demanded firms in turn are more likely to use external fi-
nance as the cost for external capital thereby decreases (Dennis & McCon-
nell, 2003, p. 31). La Porta et al (1997) note that investor protection is gen-
erally stronger in common law countries than in countries who adopted the 
civil law doctrine. They consequently found that the utilization of external 
finance is highest in common law countries and lowest in civil law coun-
tries. 
Essentially, there are two ways of obtaining external finance, either 
through bank finance (e.g. debt) or by selling shares on the stock market 
(e.g. equity) (Clarke, 2007, p. 93). According to Williamson (1998, p. 567) 
"debt and equity are treated not mainly as alternative financial instruments, 
but rather as alternative governance structures. Debt governance works 
mainly out of rules, while equity governance allows much greater discre-
tion". 
a) Corporate Governance and Debt Finance 
Essentially there are two different ways to attain debt finance. By obtain-
ing a loan from either a bank or other direct creditors commonly leading to 
the maintenance of close relationships with these few suppliers of debt fi-
nance as they exert immediate and direct control over the company. The 
other way is to issue bonds to the public thereby commonly obtaining fi-
nance from a large amount of debt suppliers. With a decreasing amount of 
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debt held in comparison to the capital stock of a company, the suppliers of 
debt (e.g. the market) will increasingly forego to actively monitor corporate 
performance (Hutchinson & Gul, 2004). If suppliers of debt have no access 
to inside control mechanisms, they are likely to require further safeguarding 
procedures and mechanisms (Goncharov et al., 2006, p. 440).  
 
With decreasing oversight and increasing amounts of debt acquired (e.g. 
higher leverage) directors and shareholders "might have an incentive to en-
gage in high risk projects, since under limited liability their creditors would 
bear most of the cost if the venture was unsuccessful" (Clarke, 2007, p. 94). 
b) Corporate Governance and Equity Finance 
A company may also decide to obtain financial means from selling shares 
to the public. In this case a company will need to adhere to market disclo-
sure requirements. Similarly to the situation with debt holders, the level of 
oversight exerted by shareholders decreases with the amount of individual 
shareholders to a company increasing and the relative amount of shares held 
in blocks decreasing (see section 2.c.A on ownership and control). Share-
holders, especially widely dispersed shareholders, rely on functional, liquid 
and efficient equity markets (Clarke, 2007, p. 94). The more efficient a 
market, the more information is provided timely to shareholders thereby 
reducing the information asymmetries between management and sharehold-
ers which results in an increased willingness of market participants to trade 
the securities in question and thus an increased market liquidity (Diamond 
and Verrecchia, 1991). A higher market liquidity essentially sets sharehold-
ers in the position to exercise influence over a corporation through the pur-
chase or sale of shares, whereby "the market rewards performing companies 
with higher share prices, and sanctions poorly performing companies with 
lower share prices" (Clarke, 2007, p. 94). 
c) Corporate Governance and the Market for Corporate Control 
 
The lower its share price the more vulnerable becomes a company, in-
cluding to the possibility of a takeover (Clarke, 2007, p. 94). The market for 
corporate control - whereby a company perceived to be not performing well, 
or to have hidden underutilized assets could be purchased - is one of the 
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most severe disciplinary mechanisms in the outsider-based market model of 
corporate governance (ibid, p. 98). A takeover is said to be the most dra-
matic way of resolving an apparent conflict of goal incongruence between 
management and shareholders as "firms which deviate most extensively 
from shareholders’ objectives - and which consequently tend to have lower 
market values as shareholders dispose of their holdings - have a greater like-
lihood of being acquired. The threat of a takeover, as much as its manifesta-
tion acts as a constraint on managerial behaviour” (Davis 1996, p. 83). 
Henry Manne (1965) noted that a takeover may likely be attempted when a 
company’s management appears inefficient and the stock price relatively 
low to what it could be with a more efficient management. With the market 
of corporate control being the last resort of the equity market, full disclosure 
of information, strict adherence to trading rules, and stock market liquidity 
are important preconditions to its functionality (Nestor & Thompson 2000, 
p. 8). 
The financial market and in particular the market for corporate control 
serve as the second - the external - level of control over a corporation (Ro-
sanas & Velilla 2005, p. 85) and complements the internal level of control 
(see section 3.e.B). 
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III. Backgrounds of the Financial System in China 
1. Financial System Structure 
We describe the Chinese financial system in a simplified sense, namely one 
that barely consists of the banking system, the stock market, and the bond 
market. For each component, we utilize banking assets, the stock market 
capitalization, and the bond depository balance, respectively, to measure 
their slices in the entire financial industry pie (see Figure 3.1). In 2008, 
banking assets amounted to 69% of the entire financial system’s assets. 
Bonds ranked a distant second with a proportion of 17%. Stocks stood 
closely behind bonds with a share of 14%. China’s banking system is more 
than twice as big as its bond and stock markets together.  
Figure 3.1: China’s Financial System Structure, 2008 
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Data source: http://www.pbc.gov.cn, http://www.chinabond.com.cn, 
http://www.cbrc.gov.cn 
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Figures 3.2 and 3.3 demonstrate the banking assets structure5 and the bond 
structure, respectively. In 2008, half of the banking assets (51%) were 
owned by the four state-owned commercial banks, namely the Bank of 
China (BOC), the China Construction Bank (CCB), the Agricultural Bank 
of China (ABC), and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC). 
At present, 12 joint-stock commercial banks6 are performing in China. They 
held 14% of the entire banking assets in 2008. Municipal commercial banks, 
operating in regional areas, had a share of 7% in the banking assets in 2008. 
Other institutions include policy banks, rural commercial banks, rural and 
urban credit cooperatives, foreign financial institutions, company finance 
houses, trust and investment corporation, financial leasing companies, 
automobile finance companies, currency brokers, post-office saving banks, 
etc. They took the remaining proportion of 28%. 
Figure 3.2: Banking Assets Structure, 2008 
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5  The banking institutions include policy banks, state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs), 
joint stock commercial banks (JSCBs), city commercial banks, rural commercial banks, 
urban credit cooperatives (UCCs), rural credit cooperatives (RCCs), postal savings, for-
eign banks, and non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs).  
6  Bank of Communication, China Citic Bank, China Everbright Bank, Hua Xia Bank, 
Guangdong Development Bank, Shenzhen Development Bank, China Merchants Bank, 
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, Industrial Bank, China Minsheng Banking Corp., 
Evergrowing Bank, China Zheshang Bank. 
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Figure 3.3: Overall Share Structure at the  
Chinese Stock Market, 2005 
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Data source: CSRC (2006), http://www.wind.com.cn/ 
 
Within the bonds structure, government bonds, central bank bonds, and fi-
nancial bonds (mostly policy bank bonds) are the three dominating seg-
ments. They added up to over 90% of the total bond depository balance in 
2008 (see figure 3.4). By contrast, corporate bonds had a small quotient of 5%. 
Figure 3.4: Bonds Structure, 2008 
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It can be stated that China’s financial system is a banking-centric one. 
China’s banking system dominates by far in the financial system structure. 
Among all the Chinese banks, the four state-owned commercial banks pos-
sess the largest stake of all banking assets. China’s stock market and bond 
market are, compared with the size of China’s banking system, underdevel-
oped. Both of them are dominated by the state. By 2005, the state prevailed 
with a proportion of nearly 50% in the overall shareholding structure.7 The 
bond market is mostly used to issue government and central bank bonds, 
while corporate bonds are not a common financing tool in China. 
2. Development of the Chinese Banking System8 
Prior to the reform era, China had been following a Soviet-style banking 
system. The People’s Bank of China (PBOC), founded in 1948 under the 
Ministry of Finance, had been the only bank in China and combined the 
roles of central and commercial banking. By 1978, it controlled about 93% 
of the total financial assets in China and settled almost all financial transac-
tions (cf. Allen et al. 2009, p. 5).  
With the reforms launched, the PBOC became a separate entity by 1979. 
From 1978 to 1984, its commercial banking businesses were taken over by 
four large state-owned commercial banks (BOC, CCB, ABC, ICBC), known 
as the Big Four. The Big Four were initially designated a different sector of 
the economy (foreign trade and exchange, construction, agriculture, indus-
trial and commercial lending) which they were allowed to serve only. Since 
1985, the Big Four are competing in all sectors. During the 1980s, regional 
banks, in which local governments typically had a big stake, were estab-
lished in the so-called Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in the coastal areas. 
Meanwhile, a net of credit cooperatives was implemented in both rural and 
urban areas. 
                                                          
7  Before 2005, state-owned shares belonged to the non-tradable share types. With the 
2005 non-tradable share reform launched, most of state-owned shares have become 
tradable ordinary A-shares and are not reflected in the official market statistics any 
longer. But the state maintains its control, as long as the shares are not sold (cf. Section 
2.3 and Section 3.). 
8  Though foreign banks have been operating for some time in China, their market share 
is, compared with domestic banks, still small. Thus, we focus in our brief description on 
the Chinese banks. 
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The asset quality of the four state-owned banks worsened substantially 
during the 1990s, as their policy-lendings for SOEs were typically not re-
paid. As solution for this problem, the central government founded three 
policy banks in 1994 to undertake the policy-lending activities instead of the 
Big Four, while the Minister of Finance issued 270 billion RMB govern-
ment special bonds to recapitalize the four banks in 1998. In 1999, four 
state-owned asset management companies9 bought the non-performing loans 
(NPL) at the face value of 1.4 trillion RMB.  
Two important bank-laws were issued in 1995. The 1995 Central Bank 
Law of China confirmed the PBOC as the central bank and significantly 
reduced the influence of local governments on credit allocation decisions. 
The 1995 Commercial Bank Law officially termed the four state-owned 
banks as commercial banks, directing them more towards commercial busi-
ness based on market principles instead of policy-lending (cf. Berger et al. 
2009, p. 117). New joint-stock banks, some of which privately owned, also 
entered the market in the mid-1990s. At the same time, foreign investors 
were allowed to hold minority stakes in regional Chinese banks under regu-
latory permission.  
Significant reforms of the Chinese banking system took place after China 
joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. The 1995 Central 
Bank Law and Commercial Bank Law were revised to be compliant with 
the WTO agreement. China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) was 
established in 2003 to oversee reforms and regulations. CBRC took two 
strategies to improve Chinese banks’ management and efficiency. In 2003, 
it allowed foreign investors to own up to 25% of any domestic bank, 
whereas the ownership from any one investor had to be between 5% and 
20%, subject to regulatory approval. Introduction of foreign investors firstly 
occurred at Chinese joint-stock commercial banks,10  and then spread to 
three of the Big Four.11 Another strategy was to encourage the Chinese 
                                                          
9  China Great Wall Asset Management Corporation, China Cinda Asset Management 
Corporation, China Orient Asset Management Corporation, China Huarong Asset Man-
agement Corporation. 
10  In 2003, Shanghai Pudong Development Bank sold 5% stake to Citigroup, while Indus-
trial Bank sold 24.98% stake to a consortium made up by Hang Seng Bank Ltd. and 
others. In 2004, Shenzhen Development sold about 18% stake to Newbridge Capital 
Ltd, while Bank of Communications sold 19.9% stake to HSBC. 
11  The CCB sold 9% stake to the Bank of America, 5.1% stake to Temasek in 2005. The 
BOC sold 20% stake to Royal Bank of Scotland and Temasek in 2005. ICBC sold 10% 
stake to Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Allianz AG, and American Express Co. in 2006. 
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banks to issue shares12 so as to set up external monitoring. Since 2005, some 
joint-stock commercial banks as well as CCB, BOC, ICBC have gone public 
in Hong Kong and Shanghai. 
3. Development of the Chinese Capital Markets 
Under the Chinese planned system before 1978, funds had been allocated to 
enterprises by the central and local governments. There had been no need 
for capital markets for enterprises to raise money. After 1978, relaxation 
policies over the business conduct generated capital demand from economic 
entities. In this context, bonds, stocks, and future contracts came into being 
in China. With the two stock exchanges established in Shanghai and in 
Shenzhen, respectively, the Chinese capital markets were established. The 
foundation of the Securities Committee and the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) brought the capital markets under a nationwide regula-
tory system. 
Analogously to other reforms in China’s transition process, the develop-
ment of the Chinese capital markets has been mainly driven by the central 
government. New market segments and products were typically launched on 
an experimental basis, before expanding across the country. In some cases, 
the development progresses were ceased and corrected by the regulators and 
then relaunched.  
The development of the capital markets was strongly backed by Deng 
Xiaoping. On his southern tour to promote the reform and opening-up poli-
cies in early 1992, he stated: 
Are securities and the stock market good or bad? Do they entail any dangers? Are 
they peculiar to capitalism? Can socialism make use of them? We allow people to 
reserve their judgement, but we must try these things out. If, after one or two years 
of experimentation, they prove feasible, we can expand them. Otherwise, we can 
put a stop to them and be done with it. We can stop them all at once or gradually, 
totally or partially. What is there to be afraid of? So long as we keep this attitude, 
everything will be all right, and we shall not make any major mistakes. (Deng Xia-
oping 1992/1994, p. 361) 
                                                          
12  Funds raised at stock exchanges outside mainland China are not subject to the 25% 
restriction on foreign ownership. 
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a) Stock Market 
Emergence 
The emergence of stocks can be traced back to the shareholding reforms that 
were initiated in rural areas in China. During the late 1970s, the earliest 
joint-stock township enterprises were built up by farmers. In the mid-1980s, 
shareholding reforms spread to the urban areas. A few large and medium-
sized enterprises were permitted to conduct a shareholding experiment and 
to issue shares. In doing so, the primary stock market emerged. Most of 
those issued shares were offered to employees of the enterprises and local 
residents, without participation of underwriters. They were similar to bonds, 
as they guaranteed fix dividends, were sold at par, and redeemed on matur-
ity. In 1986, over-the-counter (OTC) transactions appeared for stocks.  
In 1990, the central government approved of establishing two stock ex-
changes in Shanghai and Shenzhen, respectively, aiming at broadening ex-
ternal financing channels and improving operating performance for former 
SOEs.13 From the beginning, short sale of shares is not allowed in the ex-
change trading. Both exchanges launched their respective composite indices 
in 1991.14 By the end of 1991, eight stocks were listed on the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange (SSE), while the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) had six 
listings. Later, RMB-denominated ordinary shares for domestic residents 
and institutions to invest in were called A-shares for short. In 1991, China 
also undertook a pilot scheme to issue shares, known as B-shares, to foreign 
investors. B-shares are domestically listed, denominated in RMB, but sub-
scribed to and traded in USD or HKD by overseas investors.15 
                                                          
13  For example, CSRC issued in December 1996 the Notice of Several Regulations on 
Share Issuance, which required local authorities to “give preference to the 1,000 key en-
terprises determined by the state, especially 300 of them, as well as to the 100 enter-
prises and 56 enterprise groups in experiment with the modern enterprise system” (own 
translation). The key enterprises were mostly SOEs. 
14  The Shenzhen Composite Index was launched on April 4, 1991, taking the previous 
days as the base of 100 points. SSE took December 19, 1990 as its base of 100 points 
for the Shanghai Composite Index and launched it on July 15, 1991. 
15  Since 2001, domestic residents can trade in B-shares as well.  
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Market Growth 
Since 1992, the Chinese stock market has boomed and become one of the 
worldwide largest in a relatively short lapse of time. Starting from 53 in 
1992, the number of firms listed on SSE and SZSE increased about 30 times 
to 1,594 in 2008 (see Figure 3.5). More than 2,230 billion RMB and 5.09 
billion USD were raised through A-share and B-share offerings, respec-
tively, while the market capitalization totaled over 10 trillion RMB since 
2007 (see Table 3.1). More than 40 million investment accounts were 
opened (see Table 3.1). After the rally in 2007, the Chinese stock market 
reached a market capitalization of over 30 trillion RMB. This volume over-
stepped not only China’s nominal GDP for the first time (see Figure 3.6), 
but, as exhibited in Table 3.3, most of the developed stock markets and 
ranked No. 2 behind the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).16 
In the first decades of China’s stock market, regulators and exchanges 
preferred listing of big SOEs in several industries. From 2001 on, the SZSE 
began to explore the possibility of building up a Growth Enterprises Market 
(GEM). As the first step, the SZSE set up the Small and Medium-sized En-
terprises (SME) Board in May 2004. By the end of 2008, there were 273 
firms listed on the SME Board in Shenzhen, having raised over 120 billion 
RMB through IPOs and refinancing (see Table 3.2). 
                                                          
16  Although SSE alone ranks just six in the annual report and statistics (2007) of the World 
Federation of Exchanges, we come to this result by adding up the market capitalization 
of SZSE to it and comparing the total value with the data of other exchanges. 
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Figure 3.5: Number of Listed Firms, 1992-2008 
 
* The number includes listed firms which have only issued A-shares or  
B-shares, or both types 
Data Source: CSRC (2006) 
 
Figure 3.6: Stock Market Capitalization versus Nominal GDP in 
China, 1992-2008 
Data source: SSE (2006), CSRC (2008), NBSC (2009), CSDCC (2009) 
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Table 3.1: Total Funds Raised, Number of Investment Accounts, 
1992-2008 
Total funds 
raised 
through A-
shares 
Total funds 
raised 
through B-
shares 
Number of 
investor 
accounts 
(stock + 
fund) 
Total market 
capitalization of 
A- and B-shares Year 
(bn. RMB) (bn. USD ) (m.) (bn. RMB) 
1992 5.00  0.80 2.7 104.8  
1993 27.64  0.70 8.4 354.2  
1994 9.98  0.40 11.1 369.1  
1995 8.55  0.40 12.9 347.4  
1996 29.43  0.60 24.2 984.2  
1997 82.59  1.30 34.8 1,752.9  
1998 77.80  0.30 42.6 1,952.2  
1999 89.40  0.05 48.1 2,647.1  
2000 152.70  0.20 61.5 4,809.1  
2001 118.20  0 69.7 4,352.2  
2002 78.00  0 72 3,832.9  
2003 82.00  0.04 73.4 4,245.8  
2004 83.60  0.30 75.9 3,705.6  
2005 33.80  0 77.1 3,243.0  
2006 246.40  0 82.5 8,940.4  
138.8
2007 772.80  0
(118.8)*
32,714.1  
152
2008 339.60  0
(132.8)*
12,136.7  
Total 2,237.50  5.09  
* Number of the active investment accounts 
Data source: CSRC (2006), NBSC (2008a), NBSC (2008b), SSE 
(2008a), SZSE (2008), CSDCC (2008). 
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Table 3.2: Total Funds Raised on the SME Board, 2004-2009 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
New listings 38 12 52 100 71 273 
Total raised 
funds (bn. 
RMB) 
9.11 2.91 17.93 48.95 41.01 119.91 
Data source: finance.sina.com.cn/stock/  
Table 3.3: Market Capitalization of Leading Stock Exchanges, 
2006-2007 
end 
2007 
end 
2006 Change Change 
Stock Exchanges 
bn. 
USD 
bn. 
USD in USD 
in local cur-
rency 
01. NYSE Group 15,651 15,421 1.50% 1.50% 
02. Tokyo Stock Exchange 
Group 4,331 4,614 -6.10% -12.00% 
03. Euronext 4,233 3,713 13.70% 2.60% 
04. Nasdaq Stock Market 4,014 3,865 3.80% 3.80% 
05. London Stock Exchange 3,852 3,794 1.50% -0.20% 
06. Shanghai Stock Ex-
change 3,694 918 302.70% 276.80% 
07. Hong Kong Exchanges 2,654 1,715 54.80% 55.20% 
08. TSX Group 2,187 1,701 28.60% 9.00% 
09. Deutsche Börse 2,105 1,638 28.60% 15.90% 
10. Bombay Stock Exchange 1,819 819 122.10% 97.80% 
11. BME Spanish Exchanges 1,799 1,323 36.10% 22.70% 
12. National Stock Exchange 
India 1,660 774 114.50% 91.00% 
SSE+SZSE 4,479 1,145 291.20% 265.90% 
Data source: WFE (2007), SZSE (2006, 2007) 
Opening-up 
To attract foreign investment, China’s opening-up policies covered the stock 
market as well. The introduction of B-shares in 1991 was the first step to 
open up China’s stock market to the outside world. Soon thereafter, domes-
tic firms were allowed in 1993 to go public on overseas stock exchanges. 
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The Chinese stocks listed and traded in Hong Kong, New York, London, 
and Singapore are, in reference to A- and B-shares, also called H-shares, N-
shares, L-shares, and S-shares. From 1993 to 2007, Chinese firms raised 
more than 100 billions USD through overseas listings (see Figure 3.7). 
Since overseas listings connected domestic firms to international capital 
market more closely, the B-share market became less important in fund rais-
ing (see Table 3.1). 
 
Figure 3.7: Total Funds Raised Through Overseas Listings,  
1993-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Source: CSRC (2008) 
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curities industry. First, foreign securities firms could directly trade in B-
shares. Second, representative offices of foreign securities firms in China 
could apply for special membership at all domestic exchanges. Third, for-
eign service providers could set up joint ventures for securities trading and 
fund management, with initial shareholdings capped at 33% and 49% within 
three years after the WTO accession. Fourth, within three years of the WTO 
accession, foreign securities firms could set up joint ventures with share-
holding not exceeding 33%, and the joint ventures could, without the need 
to enlist the service of an Chinese intermediary, underwrite A-shares, un-
derwrite and trade B-/H-shares and government/corporate bonds, as well as 
launch funds (cf. CSRC 2008, p. 184). 
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By the end of 2006, Beijing had complied rather fully with China’s 2001 
securities industry WTO commitments, both in formal (legislative and regu-
latory) terms and in implementation of the WTO mandated regime (cf. 
Howson 2007, p. 153). The authorities also adopted some additional policies 
in opening up the stock market. For example, in November 2002, foreign 
companies were allowed to purchase state-owned shares and legal person 
shares of Chinese listed firms.17 In February 2006, foreign investors were 
allowed to make strategic investments in the A-share of listed companies.18 
In December 2002, the CSRC launched the Qualified Foreign Institu-
tional Investor (QFII) program, which licenses foreign institutional investors 
to trade A-shares on the secondary market. By the end of 2007, 52 foreign 
institutional investors had been granted the QFII status, 49 of which had 
been allocated quota of totally 10 billion USD, while five foreign banks had 
been permitted to provide QFIIs custodian services (cf. CSRC 2008, p. 32).  
By the end of 2007, there were seven Sino-foreign securities firms and 28 
Sino-foreign fund management companies operating in China, of which 19 
firms had a foreign shareholding of above 40% (cf. ibid., p. 31). Four repre-
sentative offices of foreign securities firms became special members of the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges; 39 and 19 foreign securities firms 
were trading B-shares on Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, respec-
tively (cf. ibid., p. 31). 
Meanwhile, the authorities further promoted connections to overseas 
capital markets. In May 2006, the Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor 
(QDII) program was launched, allowing licensed domestic institutional in-
vestors to invest in overseas markets. By the end of 2007, 15 fund manage-
ment firms and five securities firms had been granted QDII status with an 
aggregate investment quota of 24.5 billion USD (cf. ibid., p. 32).  
                                                          
17  According to the Notice Regarding Transfer to Foreign Investors of State-Owned 
Shares and Legal Person Shares of Listed Companies (CSRC 2002), only those indus-
tries that are opened to foreign investors can conduct such a share transfer, while the 
Chinese controlling shareholder should maintain his (relative) controlling status after 
the transfer. 
18  According to the Measures for Strategic Investments by Foreign Investors upon Listed 
Companies (MCPRC 2005), foreign investors may acquire A-shares of the Chinese 
listed firms having finished the reform of non-tradable shares by means of long- and 
mid-term strategic investment. They may acquire A-shares by means of contract trans-
fer or share offering, while the proportion of obtained shares should be no less than 10% 
after the first investment and should not be transferred within three years. 
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b) Bond Market 
From 1954 on, the central government issued its first treasury bonds (T-
bonds), so-called Economic Construction Bonds, for five years in succes-
sion. In 1959, the issuance of T-bonds was stopped. In 1981, the central 
government relaunched T-bonds. T-bonds in the early 1980s typically had a 
long maturity (10 years) and were non-transferable. From 1982 on, a few 
enterprises took the initiative to issue enterprise bonds. In 1987, the State 
Council stipulated that further enterprise bond issuances were subject to 
approval by the PBOC, and that PBOC, the State Planning Commission, and 
the Ministry of Finance would set a cap on the total amount of enterprises 
bonds to be issued annually. A third type of bonds, so-called financial 
bonds, appeared in 1984. They were issued by banks to support the comple-
tion of construction projects that ran short of funds. Since then, it has served 
as a regular financing tool for Chinese banks. 
In April 1988, experiments with OTC trading of T-bonds by individual 
investors were made in a few big cities. Two months later, the permission 
for individual transactions expanded to 28 provinces and municipalities, and 
54 large and medium-sized cities (cf. CSRC 2008, p. 6). By the end of 1988, 
trading of T-bonds had spread across the country. The secondary bond mar-
ket emerged. In December 1990, trading of T-bonds was introduced by SSE. 
In 1995, all OTC bond markets were closed by the central government, be-
cause the once uncontrolled business caused high risks. In consequence, 
SSE and SZSE became the only legal bond markets. In 1996, a big amount 
of book-entry T-bonds began to be issued and repurchased on SSE and 
SZSE, which marked the formation of bond market on exchanges. 
In 1997, Chinese commercial banks withdrew from bond business at ex-
changes.19 In the same year, the PBOC established the inter-bank bond mar-
ket on the basis of China Foreign Exchange Trading System. Besides com-
mercial banks, other financial institutions such as insurance companies, 
credit cooperatives, securities firms, securities investment funds, finance 
houses, foreign institutional investors, non-financial institutions, and pen-
sion annuities gained the access to the inter-bank bond market in the follow-
ing years. International institutions were permitted to issue bonds denomi-
nated in RMB, known as Panda bonds. The types of bonds issued by finan-
                                                          
19  As a big amount of bank deposits flew into the stock market through bond repurchase 
business early this year, PBOC ceased bond repurchase and dealing by commercial 
banks. 
 44 JUNHUA TANG 
cial institutions included short-term, ordinary, foreign currency, subordi-
nated, hybrid and asset-backed bonds, bond forwards, and enterprise bonds. 
Since 2002, commercial banks offer, as an extension of the inter-bank 
bond market, counter services for individual investors and SMEs to trade in 
T-bonds. In January 2009, commercial banks listed on Chinese exchanges 
were experimentally allowed to return to the bond market at exchanges. 
c) Futures Market 
As early as in October 1990, Zhengzhou Grain Wholesale Market was 
opened, and forward contracts were introduced there. In October 1992, 
Shenzhen Nonferrous Metals Futures Exchange made the first standard fu-
tures contract in China. In 1993, the commodity futures market flourished. 
There were over 50 commodity futures exchanges and more than 300 fu-
tures brokerage companies across the country. Meanwhile, T-bond futures 
came into existence. In December of 1992, SSE introduced the first T-bond 
futures. In early 1995, the number of exchanges dealing in T-bond futures 
increased to 14. 
However, the futures market was fraught with speculations and manipu-
lations due to insufficient regulation (cf. CSRC 2008, p. 19). In 1993, the 
State Council emphasized that its Securities Committee and the CSRC were 
the regulators of the Chinese futures market and began to clear it. Futures 
brokers which were either unqualified or acting illegally were closed or sus-
pended. Dealing of a number of commodities, including steel, sugar, coal, 
rice, and rap oil, was suspended. In May 1995, trading of T-bond futures 
was suspended as well. In 1998, the existing 14 futures exchanges were 
consolidated into three (Shanghai, Dalian, Zhengzhou). 
From 1999 to 2002, the State Council and the CSRC promulgated the 
first regulations on futures trading, exchanges, and brokerage firms at the 
futures market, starting to establish a legal and regulatory framework. From 
2004 on, new commodity futures contracts were introduced, including cot-
ton, fuel oil, corns, soybean, sugar, soybean oil, purified terephthalic acid 
(PTA), zinc, rapeseed oil, linear low-density polyethylene (LLDPE), and 
palm oil. The three commodity futures exchanges have been gradually uni-
fying their trading rules and expanding the use of a common trading portal. 
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In May 2006, the first Sino-foreign futures joint venture20 was established, 
marking the start of foreign participants in China’s futures market. In Sep-
tember 2006, the China Financial Futures Exchange (CFFEX) was set up in 
Shanghai. The preparation on introduction of stock index futures is still on-
going. Up to now, Trading Rules of China Financial Futures Exchange 
have been promulgated; and nearly 80 members have been licensed for 
transactions (cf. CFFEX 2008). Mock trading of stock index futures has 
been ongoing for testing purposes since October 2006, but there is still no 
fixed plan or schedule to launch the stock index futures.21 In January 2008, 
the Shanghai Futures Exchange (SHFE) introduced the first futures contract 
on gold. 
                                                          
20  The futures brokerage was established by China Galaxy Securities Co. and ABN 
AMRO Asia Futures Limited with 60% and 40% stake, respectively. 
21  The CFFEX General Manager, Zhu Yuchen, stated during an interview on 9 March 
2009 that the financial crisis hindered the introduction of stock index futures and there 
was no schedule of launching them (cf. HU 2009). 
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IV. Corporate Governance in China 
1. How Did Corporate Governance Become Popular? 
While China’s stock market has been expanding impressively, it is mean-
while conspicuous that this development has so far been inconsistent with 
China’s economic success measured by its nominal GDP (see Figure 2.6). 
As the national economy recorded a yearly GDP growth of at least 8% since 
the 1990s, the stock market capitalization, in spite of increasing listings, 
fluctuated heavily over the same time period. Especially from 2000 to 2005, 
albeit the number of listed firms blew up by about one-third and the issued 
shares doubled, the market capitalization shrank apparently due to collaps-
ing stock prices. In identifying the causes for this conjuncture, the attention 
of the market regulators and participants was soon directed to the deficien-
cies of the corporate governance practices in China. 
More precisely, it was several unveiled Enron-alike scandals as well as 
capital tunneling by controlling shareholders that stroke the overall inves-
tors’ confidence at the Chinese stock market. Two cases illustrate these 
problems.22 One involved the one-time top performer, North China-based 
firm Yinguangxia (YGX), whose stock price leaped by about 440% in 2000. 
Barely one year later, two journalists called YGX’s brilliant achievements 
into question and disclosed that YGX had been forging documents and mis-
representing information. The official investigation by the CSRC in 2002 
fixed a total fraudulent profit of 770 million RMB by YGX from 1998 to 
2001 (cf. Guo 2007). The other example relates to Sanjiu Pharma who in-
adequately disclosed transactions with related parties, including the control-
ling shareholder and other subsidiaries of it, and created fictitious transac-
tions in order to raise cash from banks (cf. Chen et al. 2005). The CSRC 
investigation revealed that Sanjiu Pharma had been extracted as much as 2.5 
billion RMB, about 96% of the firm’s equity, through related transactions 
(cf. CSRC 2001). 
                                                          
22  For more information on the two cases see CHEN ET AL. (2005). 
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Although the conception of corporate governance had been introduced to 
China as early as in the mid-1990s,23 it did not arouse much interest until 
during the long lasting bear market from 2000 to 2005. Both the Chinese 
government and the stock market regulators are now aware of the impor-
tance of good corporate governance practices. 
2. Why Does Corporate Governance Matter? 
a) Social Stability 
The young stock market in China has brought forth a tremendous number of 
shareholders from individuals over institutional investors to state agencies. 
According to China Securities Depository and Clearing Corporation, more 
than 140 million investment accounts (stocks and investment funds totally), 
overwhelmingly held by small individual investors, had been opened until 
the end of 2007 (cf. CSDCC 2008, p. 14-15). If every account was indeed 
owned by one person,24 it would correspond to one tenth of China’s whole 
population or one fourth of its urban population directly engaging in the 
stock transactions. As for institutional investors who manage the wealth of 
individuals, there are more than 350 mutual funds, over 50 QFIIs, several 
large domestic insurers as well as the National Social Security Fund trading 
actively on the market. Moreover, an unknown, but large amount of banks 
loans have been flowing into the stock market through gray or illegal chan-
nels (cf. Liu 2006, p. 416). Notably, the central and local governments who 
are managing state assets on behalf of Chinese people still maintain the 
lion’s share in many listed firms through their asset management admini-
strations. The number of directly and indirectly involved small shareholders 
is so large that a thorough breakdown of the stock market would very likely 
rock the boat. Therefore, it is not difficult to understand that the central gov-
ernment as well as other state agencies and exchanges warned loudly of an 
overheated market for several times as the stock prices were skyrocketing in 
                                                          
23  For example, Masahiko Aoki and Hyung-Ki Kim published in 1995 the book “Corpo-
rate Governance in Transition Economies” (cf. AOKI/KIM 1995). 
24  It appears that in reality a number of these accounts are old, inactive, fake, or controlled 
by some institutions. Nonetheless, the number of small Chinese shareholders is im-
mense. 
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2007.25 A failed stock market may cause social uncertainty that remains one 
of the government’s primary concerns.26 
b) Capital Competition 
The more integrated China becomes in the world economy, the more af-
fected will it be by international rules and conventions which have mainly 
been set down by developed countries. Hoping international investors to buy 
and hold their shares, Chinese listed firms have to adjust themselves to those 
corporate governance practices preferred by global investors. The interna-
tionalization of the capital markets is nevertheless a two-edged sword for all 
developing economies: capital can as easily flow out from a market with 
weak investor protection as into it. The East Asian financial crisis in late 
1990s demonstrates that opened capital markets without well-developed 
corporate governance mechanisms can be easily abandoned by capital 
flows. Even though China’s extraordinary achievements in the last three 
decades and the internationally broadly recognized prospect for the near 
future may keep the interest of foreign investors high – the list of QFIIs is 
constantly getting longer – and in this way compensate the negative impacts 
of its weak corporate governance practices, this is not expected going to 
work in the long run. It is thus in China’s interest to make its corporate gov-
ernance practices attractive for foreign investors. 
c) Further Transition 
China’s economic transition toward a Chinese “socialist market economy” 
is still ongoing and the current, in 1990s launched round of SOE reforms 
has not finished yet (see Section 4 for more details). Only part of the former 
SOEs are listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen. The remaining ones are waiting 
for an initial public offering as a vital channel for their future fund-raising. 
Hence, the central and local governments who mostly hold claims on SOEs 
have sufficient incentives to maintain the stock market as a well-functioning 
                                                          
25  For example, the Guidelines of Shanghai Stock Exchange on Individual Investors’ Be-
havior (SSE 2008b), which was issued in July 2007, insists on the principle of caveat 
emptor. 
26  For example, Deng noted in 1989: “In China the overriding need is for stability. With-
out a stable environment, we can accomplish nothing and may even lose what we have 
gained” (DENG XIAOPING 1989/1994). 
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platform for financing SOEs. It should also be mentioned that the estab-
lishment of a stock market is the first step to complete the capital markets in 
China, whereas the stock market itself still needs to complete its functions 
as well as to diversify its investment product line. The success of the follow-
ing steps, say, derivative products including stock index futures and a corpo-
rate bond market, will depend on the success of the stock market. They 
could not be executed, if the firstly built stock market already collapsed. 
China’s further transition and capital markets development cannot afford a 
failed stock market. 
3. What Has Been Done to Improve Corporate Governance? 
In dealing with the deficiencies at the stock market, the Chinese government 
commenced to improve its corporate governance framework by enacting 
and revising a series of governance-related guidelines and laws. After the 
first corporate governance code for listed companies had been issued by the 
CSRC in 2002, both the Company Law and the Securities Law were revised 
by the National People’s Congress (NPC) in 2005. The new regulations ad-
dress some problems at the stock market, including the independence of the 
boards of directors, firms’ information disclosure, and expropriation of 
small shareholders.  
With respect to investigation of illegal activities at the capital market, the 
CSRC did not set up a law enforcement bureau (Bureau I) until 1995. It fur-
ther established subordinate local enforcement bureaus in several big cities. 
In 2002, the CSRC instituted another law enforcement bureau (Bureau II) 
for investigation of market manipulation and insider trading, while Bureau I 
took the responsibility to investigate fraud in securities issuances, dishon-
esty in statements, and other offences. In 2003, the Ministry of Public Secu-
rity established the Securities Crime Investigation Bureau to cooperate with 
the CSRC for investigation of offences at the securities market. In 2007, the 
CSRC instituted the Sanction Committee, Chief Enforcement Officer, and 
the Law Enforcement Task Force in its headquarters to lead the enforcement 
system. Meanwhile, local enforcement bureaus were reinforced with a larger 
work force. From 2003 to 2007, the CSRC investigated 736 cases, for-
warded 104 of them for criminal charges, imposed sanctions on 212 cases 
involving 180 entities and 987 individuals, and banned the entry of 165 pro-
fessionals and executives into the securities market for extended periods (cf. 
CSRC 2008, p. 22). 
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At present, all of the public firms have, in accordance with the CSRC, in-
troduced independent directors as an internal monitoring mechanism into 
the board, as required by the CSRC. More chairmen are now separated from 
the CEO function. Listed firms are obliged to make clear statements on their 
efforts in improving governance structure and revealing information on 
compensations for the board members and executives. The relations of the 
board members to the controlling shareholder are defined in annual closures. 
The regulators and exchanges are making efforts in oversight of affiliated 
transactions between listed firms and their controlling shareholders among 
which tunneling of assets had usually taken place. These alterations in cor-
porate governance have let the public firms become more transparent for 
investors as previously. 
4. How Different is the Chinese Model? 
a) Classical Models 
Corporate governance models vary across countries. Yet researchers tend to 
identify two prevailing corporate governance models: the Anglo-American 
market-based shareholder model and the insider models of, say, Germany 
and Japan (cf. Shleifer/Vishny 1997; La Porta et al. 1998, 1999; 
Bebchuck/Roe 1999). The preference for one of the two types of models is 
mainly attributable to each country’s economic success in 1980s and 1990s, 
respectively (cf. Becht et al. 2002, p. 32). 
In the Anglo-American model, public equity is widely dispersed, while 
directors make all the decisions or have an exclusive power to initiate them 
(cf. Enriques/Volpin 2007, p. 127). In spite of several accounting scandals 
unveiled at the turn of the century in the USA, the listed firms in this model 
still face strictest legal restrictions and enforcement in respect of minority 
shareholder protection;27 and there is a highly competitive product market to 
boost the firms’ performance. Whilst the external mechanisms for investor 
protection are strong in this model, the internal governance structure is no 
more than a principal-agent relation set between shareholders and the board 
of directors through the general meeting. Both the management and moni-
toring functions at the corporate level are combined in the board of direc-
tors. By contrast, the equity of public firms in the German and Japanese 
                                                          
27  See for example ROE (2003) for more details of US securities regulation. 
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models is more concentrated. Although the market mechanisms are less 
strong than in the US model, 28  the German and Japanese models have 
evolved into a more sophisticated internal governance structure that takes in 
other stakeholders such as labor unions, banks, and employees as co-
principals of the firms. 
b) Chinese Model in Comparison 
Figure 4.1 illustrates in a simplified sense the corporate governance models 
in the USA, Germany, and China. The dot-dash frame symbolizes the exter-
nal governance-related environments at the national level. A bolder frame 
indicates that an economy is by and large equipped with more developed 
capital markets, a stronger legal system with more effective enforcement, 
and a more competitive product market, whereas a more thinly lined frame 
matches a weaker governance environment. Compared with the USA and 
the German models, the Chinese corporate governance model has a weak 
external environment with regard to market and legal mechanisms. This fact 
is not surprising in consideration of China’s ongoing process of transition to 
a market economy and corresponding constructing of its rule of law. 
                                                          
28  For example, LA PORTA ET AL. (1998) found that “common law countries generally 
have the strongest, and French civil law countries the weakest, legal protections of in-
vestors, with German and Scandinavian civil law countries located in the middle” (p. 
1113). Yet SHLEIFER/VISHNY (1997) concluded that “the differences between them 
[USA, Germany, Japan] are probably small relative to their differences from other 
countries” (pp. 737f.). In the last two decades, Germany has made a lot of efforts in em-
powering shareholders, enhancing disclosure and strengthening public enforcement. 
Thus, its external mechanisms are moving towards the market-based model. 
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Figure 4.1: Corporate Governance Models in the USA, Germany, 
and China 
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Source: Own figure 
A) External Aspects 
Product Market 
Product market competition drives producers and service suppliers to im-
prove their performance. However, the Chinese product market lacks of 
competition in some industries: The central government considers industries 
such as utilities, transportation, telecommunication, banking, oil, and steel 
to be of strategic importance and keeps the entry of other suppliers under 
strict control. Therefore, it is big SOEs who dominate in these industries. 
Another cause of weak competition is local protectionism for the sake of 
regional economic development. In their procurement process, provincial 
and municipal governments usually favor local products and encourage lo-
cal enterprises to purchase locally manufactured materials and products. 
This is becoming more obvious in dealing with the current world financial 
crisis since 2007: while planning a huge amount of spending in order to 
guarantee economic growth, ten provincial governments have issued docu-
ments on purchasing local products including electrical appliances, vehicles, 
and steels (cf. 21CBH 2009). 
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Capital Market 
The Chinese stock market is dynamic in terms of a rapidly increasing num-
ber of investors and market capitalization. Yet it is so far underdeveloped in 
other more important aspects. First, the entire financial system in China is 
dominated by a large, state-controlled bank system, implying that the fi-
nancing through the Chinese stock market is limited. The limits usually re-
sult from the government’s tight control in the number and size of public 
issuances and in the choice of firms to be listed: the authorities prefer the 
state sector. Second, the Chinese stock market lacks of alternative invest-
ment products. Third, the stock market is rather a domestic one than an in-
ternational one. By now, it is to a limited extent opened to a small number 
of foreign institutional investors. Similarly, domestic investors barely have 
any access to overseas stock markets except for a few products of QDIIs. 
Listings of foreign-invested firms have been announced29 to accelerate the 
market internationalization. However, no rules or schedule have been made 
yet.  
Legal Institutions 
The legal institutions in China provide an interesting picture. On the one 
hand, the Chinese legal system represents sufficient shareholder protection. 
Using the measures of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(LLSV) (1998) on legal provisions for publicly traded firms, Allen, Qian, 
and Qian (2005) compared the shareholder protection in China with that in 
LLSV countries. They found out that China reaches the average level of all 
LLSV countries. China’s score falls in between the English-origin countries 
that have the highest measures of protection and German-origin countries 
that have the poorest protection. With measures drawn from independent 
international rating agencies, they further compared the law enforcement in 
China with that in LLSV countries. This time, they came to a very different 
result: China’s law enforcement is significantly below the average level of 
                                                          
29  After the third round of China-U.S. Strategic Economic Dialogue in December 2007, 
both sides promised to further open up its financial markets to the other. China agreed 
to allow, in accordance with relevant prudential regulations, qualified foreign-invested 
companies, including banks, to issue RMB-denominated stocks; qualified listed compa-
nies to issue RMB denominated corporate bonds; and qualified incorporated foreign 
banks to issue RMB denominated financial bonds. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE 
TREASURY (2007). 
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all LLSV countries. The inconsistent results suggest that China’s share-
holder protection is relatively strong on paper, but weak in practice. The 
reasons that the laws are not effectively being enforced in China are (1) lack 
of qualified legal professionals, and (2) conflict of interest between fair play 
in practicing law and the monopoly power of the single ruling party (cf. 
Allen et al. 2005, p. 11). 
B) Internal Aspects 
Governance Structure 
As to the internal governance structure, the Chinese model looks, at first 
appearance, quite similar to the two-tier board system of the German model. 
In Germany, the public firm is governed by a management board (Vorstand) 
and a supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat). The managing board is in charge of 
the daily operations of the firm, while the supervisory board is responsible 
for appointing, supervising, and advising the management board and di-
rectly involved in developing strategies of the firm (cf. Mallin 2007). In the 
Chinese model, management and monitoring tasks are delegated to the 
board of directors and the board of supervisors, respectively. The Chinese 
board of supervisors also takes in employee representatives, which makes it 
more like the German way of co-determination (Mitbestimmung). However, 
there is no such hierarchical relationship between the board of directors and 
the board of supervisors as in the German model. While the German super-
visory board has the authority to appoint and, if necessary, even dismiss the 
members of the management board, the two boards in the Chinese model are 
running on the same level, and the directors and supervisors are all ap-
pointed or dismissed by shareholder action. In view of this structural ar-
rangement, it is doubtful whether the board of supervisors have enough 
power to conduct the supervising work effectively. 
Overall Ownership Structure 
The ownership structure at the Chinese stock market is deeply characterized 
by the state’s design. Typically, former SOEs were approved to go public, 
and the share distribution was regulated by the central government. A large 
proportion of the shares was prevented from being transacted at the ex-
changes. Until 2005, Chinese shares were divided into two types: non-
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tradable shares that were not allowed to be publicly traded, and tradable 
shares that were entitled to transactions at the exchanges. Each type was 
further divided into different classes, depending on their shareholder or list-
ing location.  
Non-tradable shares mainly comprised state-owned shares and legal person 
shares. State-owned shares were in the possession of the central and local 
governments through their underlying asset management agencies, while 
legal person shares are those owned by entities with a legal person status. 
The legal persons referred to domestic sponsors, foreign companies, and 
other legal entities who had taken part in a non-public offering of the rele-
vant firms.30 Other untradeable shares were in the hands of employees or 
private individuals.  
Table 4.1: Ownership Structure of Chinese Public Firms 2005 
Year 2005   Shares (bn.) 
% of 
total 
Non-tradable State-owned shares 343.3 44.82 
  Sponsor's legal person shares 55.2 7.21 
  Foreign legal person's shares 22.6 2.95 
  Private placement of legal person's shares 24.3 3.17 
  Employee shares 0.4 0.05 
  Others 28.7 3.75 
Tradable A-shares 228.1 29.78 
  B-Shares 21.8 2.84 
  H-Shares 41.6 5.43 
Source: CSRC (2006), http://www.wind.com.cn/ 
 
Table 4.1 provides a snapshot of Chinese public firms’ overall share struc-
ture in 2005. At the year end, about two-thirds of the shares at the Chinese 
stock market were non-tradable. Among them, state-owned shares have the 
dominant proportion of approximately 45%. Since domestic sponsors of 
public firms are usually former SOEs under control of the state’s agencies, 
the state indeed controlled more than half of all shares of the listed firms. By 
contrast, tradable A- and B-shares which were dispersed among private and 
                                                          
30  By 1994, many Chinese joint-stock companies had been founded through non-public 
offering by 1994. Yet this is not allowed since the Company Law was brought into ef-
fect in July 1994. 
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institutional investors summed up to slightly over 30%. Therefore, the Chi-
nese stock market is state-dominated. 
Before 2005, the only legal channel of transacting non-tradable shares 
was equity transfer between enterprises, provided that the agreement had 
been approved by relevant authorities and regulators. In 2005, the regulators 
launched a reform of non-tradable shares in order to make them tradable. 
Against compensation in cash or stocks, shareholders of the one-time non-
tradable shares have gained the right to sell them after certain lockup peri-
ods (12-24 months) have expired. 
Although the 2005 non-tradable shares reform has enhanced the equity 
liquidity of the listed firms in China, it has not significantly changed the 
market’s ownership structure and the state’s dominance. Even though the 
state’s directly and indirectly controlled shares are now entitled to market 
transfer, the state and its agencies need not do so. Consequently, the state’s 
role in the governance structure has not changed. 
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V. Evolvement of Corporate Governance Practices in China 
Shleifer & Vishny (1997) argued that the Anglo-American and the Ger-
man/Japanese corporate governance models are efficient, because they have 
a good complementarity between the level of legal protection and ownership 
concentration. Countries with poor investor protection typically exhibit 
more concentrated control of firms than countries with good investor protec-
tion (La Porta et al. 1998, 1999, Claessens et al. 2000). 
In reference to these theoretical and empirical works, one may argue that 
China’s weak legal protection for shareholders has given rise to a concen-
trated ownership structure. However, this logic does not really match the 
situation in China. The main reason is that in China, the state has been play-
ing a decisive role in both the formation of the legislation, including legal 
protection for investors, and the establishment of a corporate governance 
structure that emerged in the 1990s. Hence, both the general legal protection 
for investors and the ownership structure at the Chinese stock market rather 
reflect the will of the central government than build up certain causality by 
themselves.  
The corporate governance model been , the causality in the formation of 
the Chinese model is still unclear, if legal protection for investors is not a 
drive. How did the Chinese model evolve over the past decades? What 
backed every big change in its evolution? These questions are crucial for a 
good understanding of the corporate governance model in China. 
 
Since most listed firms at the Chinese stock market have SOE back-
grounds, it makes sense to look back at Chinese SOEs’ development proc-
ess, and to trace the roots of the Chinese corporate governance model. In 
doing so, the author utilizes the distinction between the content of change 
and process of change in the organizational change studies (Van De Ven, 
2009), and principal-agent relationships as the overall framework of this 
survey. 
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1. Corporate Governance Practices in Chinese SOEs: 
Content of Change 
In the planned economy before 1978, state ownership was considered the 
sole legal form of enterprises.31 This concept provided justification for state 
planners to mobilize human and financial resources and allowed them to 
assess production and distribution demands. The state did not only own the 
property rights of, but operated the SOEs through its officials who were 
executing the managerial powers. This model served as an organizer of eco-
nomic resources and activities as well as a tool binding the state, SOEs, and 
employees to each other (cf. Shipani/Liu 2002, p. 8). That is to say, SOEs 
were operating on the state’s coffers as the sole financial input, while em-
ployees were living on salaries earned at the SOEs. Therefore, SOEs had 
some social security functions other than just production units. A job at a 
certain SOE was once called an “iron rice bowl” that symbolized a secured 
life with salary, housing, medical treatment, and pension offered by the 
SOE.  
Having learned a bitter lesson from abolishing the development of the na-
tional economy during the ten years long lasting Cultural Revolution and 
seen the economic success in the developed countries, the central govern-
ment intended to increase productivity and raise living standards in 1978 by 
reforming its economic model systematically into a more competitive one. 
On the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Chinese Communist Party Congress at 
the end of 1978, the Party set to shift its focus from class struggles to eco-
nomic development (cf. CPC 1978). Following this ideological turning, the 
Chinese reform era began. 
Depending on the central government’s major policies for reforming 
SOEs and their management, we identify three governance stages of Chi-
nese SOEs since 1978: (1) the incentive stage from 1978 to 1983, (2) the 
contracting model from 1984 to 1992 and (3) the corporatization model 
since 1993. As summarized in Figure 5.1, governance practices at the three 
stages differentiate in their features with regard to the goal of relevant poli-
cies and the roles of the state as well as SOEs and their executives (manag-
ers) as participants. 
                                                          
31  Article 15 of the Chinese Constitution of 1982 declared, “The state practices economic 
planning on the basis of socialist public ownership”. 
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a) The Incentive Stage (1978-1983) 
The experiment of SOE reform had started even shortly before the Third 
Plenum of the Eleventh Chinese Communist Party Congress was held. In 
autumn 1978, six SOEs in the Sichuan Province were selected by the local 
government to be the first ones to undertake an experiment along the lines 
of “expanding enterprise autonomy and introducing profit retention” (Qian 
1999a, p. 8). In 1979, the number of experimenting SOEs in Sichuan was 
increased to about 100. The selected SOEs were given more autonomy in a 
way that they could produce and sell goods to the external free market32 and 
retain some profits in case they had fulfilled the plan quotas. They were also 
authorized to promote some middle-level managers, who still had to be ap-
proved by the government. 
In summer 1979, the central government issued Some Provisions on 
Enlarging Industrial SOEs’ Autonomy (cf. CPC 1979) and other four docu-
ments to extend the SOE reform experiments to other provinces. By 1980, 
more than half of Chinese SOEs (in terms of output value) were involved in 
the experiments and obtained some limited autonomy in production plan-
ning, material purchasing, employment, sales, and use of retained profits.33 
These incentives had an active effect on SOEs’ performance of that time. 
Compared with 1978, the delivered profits of all SOEs to the state grew in 
1979 by 10.1%. The government deficit of 1 billion RMB in 1978 was re-
placed by a surplus of 13.5 billion RMB in 1979. The income from SOEs 
rose by 7.5% as against the previous year (cf. Wang 2006, p. 10). 
However, these practices were de facto no change of the dominating 
planned system, but a cautious testing of a profit-orientation of the SOEs. 
Planned production quotas still took priority on SOEs’ task lists. Only those 
who were able to complete their production plans and to mobilize surplus 
human and financial resources, could enjoy the profit retention. Although 
the state shared some decision rights with SOEs, it remained pervasive in 
SOEs’ operations. It owned all the enterprises on behalf of the Chinese peo-
ple and delegated officials to manage SOEs’ operations. At the same time, it 
assessed production and distribution demands, formed production schemes 
for SOEs, and monitored the realization of these schemes. Apart from mate-
                                                          
32  The external free market was established as the government allowed peasants to sell 
their surplus products. 
33  The central government required SOEs to split their retained profits into funds for hous-
ing, bonuses for employees and funds for production development, while the govern-
ment would not interfere with the use of these funds. 
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rial resources, the state furthermore supplied funds to finance SOEs’ opera-
tions. In fact, the state provided all SOEs with the input resources and dis-
tributed their output according to its plans. In this context, SOEs were rather 
“production units” or factories, as they were often called in Chinese, than 
real business enterprises with an orientation to increase returns and profits 
for their investors via active management. SOEs were not regarded as inde-
pendent legal persons. Unsurprisingly, the term legal person never existed in 
the central-planning period. In nature, the governance practices in SOEs had 
not changed much in comparison with those in the planned system. 
b) The Contracting Stage (1984-1992) 
A) Dual-Track System 
It was not until 1984, as the government issued On Regulations of Further 
Expanding Autonomy of SOEs and officially permitted a market track along-
side with the planned track for industrial goods, that the SOE reform in 
China got a new push. Under the dual-track system, which was officially 
activated in early 1985 for all economic agents, SOEs were to sell industrial 
goods up to an appointed quota quantity to the state at a planned price, while 
any surplus products were allowed to be sold at the market and priced 
freely. Consequently, any kind of good was priced twofold with a planned 
price and an unregulated one. Chinese SOEs were now for the first time 
linked with the market. Due to decreasing market prices mainly caused by 
tight monetary policy in 1990, the price difference between the planned and 
the market track became insignificant. By the mid-1990s, most provinces 
had undertaken liberalization in prices and the planned-price track had al-
most ended for most industrial goods. 
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Figure 5.1 Corporate Governance Practices since 1978 
 
 
Source: Own figure 
B) Contracting for SOEs 
More importantly in this phase, the central government launched the Con-
tract Responsibility System at the beginning of 1987, trying to separate the 
state from the management of SOEs and to encourage the latter to expand 
production and earn profits. Under this system, the director of a SOE signed 
a contract, which governed the relationship between the SOE and its factory 
director, with the local government for a period of time of at least three 
years,34 so that he or she would be fully responsible for the SOE’s operation 
and gained consequently more control rights over the enterprise’s operation 
than before. The focus of such a contract rested mainly with the profit shar-
ing between the government and the SOE: The SOE as an entity should con-
tribute a fixed proportion or a minimum amount of profit to the government, 
while the total income of managers and employees were dependent on the 
operational performance – the rest of the profit after tax. The contract re-
                                                          
34  The proportion of profit retention was to be bargained yearly in the incentive model. 
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sponsibility system had a political advantage because the government, man-
agers, and workers could all derive a benefit, if the SOE performed well.35 
Hence, the incentive effect was high for all these parties. By 1989, almost 
all SOEs were subject to a responsibility contract. In 1992, this practice was 
promoted through the issue of Regulations on Transforming the Manage-
ment Mechanism of State-Owned Industrial Enterprises that granted SOE 
managers more control rights in areas of foreign trade, investment, em-
ployment, wages, etc. 
C) Roles of the State 
At this contracting stage, the state began to loosen its control over SOEs and 
cut its roles in the SOEs’ governance from owner, manager, planner, super-
visor, and finance provider down to three: owner, supervisor, and finance 
provider. The “State-owned Industrial Enterprises Law of China” (SOEs 
law) prescribed that the local organization of the Chinese Communist Party 
should guarantee and supervise the implementation of the Party’s and the 
state’s guiding principles and policies, so that the SOEs’ supervision by the 
state became actually localized. This was particularly important with regard 
to the state’s new financial policies referring to SOEs.  
The new financial policies, which intended to strengthen constraints for 
SOEs, stepwise introduced a tax system to replace the former way of profit 
retention. As mentioned, in the incentive stage SOEs had gained full free-
dom in using their retained profits. However, the proportion or sum of re-
tained profits remained dependent on the quota and therefore arbitrary. Ad-
dressing this problem, the State Council approved in 1983 On Methods of 
Promoting SOE Taxation instead of Profit Retention, according to which 
big- and medium-sized SOEs should be taxed by 55% upon their incomes, 
while small-sized SOEs were subject to a progressive tax rate from 7% to 
55%. In the light of differences in industries, the second step tax reform was 
carried out after the Provisional Regulations of the People's Republic of 
China on Enterprises Income Tax had been issued in late 1984. New tax 
items, such as tax on industrial products, sales tax, value added tax, city 
planning tax, real estate tax, and resource tax, were introduced. As a result, 
the state made an advance in governing SOEs, for it tried to replace an arbi-
                                                          
35  However, in case the SOEs had not achieved a satisfying profit, they were still liable for 
paying the fixed amount to the state. 
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trary administrative control (setting the retained profits) with clear law pro-
visions (tax rates).  
In addition, the way SOEs obtained financing altered along with the fis-
cal reform of banks. As early as in 1970, local governments were made re-
sponsible for material allocation and fixed investment. With the fiscal de-
centralization in 1980, provincial governments could not only share their 
budgetary income revenue, but had the authority to determine the structure 
of their expenditures including the financing of SOEs. In 1983, the state 
strengthened the financial constraints for SOEs by introducing bank loans 
instead of appropriations for SOEs’ circulating capital. Now, alongside the 
contractual system in force, local governments gained great influence over 
credit decisions of the regional branches of the central bank and state spe-
cialized banks for SOEs and even had the authority to determine whether a 
loan should be paid back by the relevant SOEs. 
D) Roles of SOEs 
At this stage, the Chinese government set up big enterprise groups which 
should link SOEs vertically and horizontally. This policy aimed at promot-
ing a more rational production structure, technological development, and 
intra-group cross-financing as well as creating large conglomerates. Accord-
ingly, there came into being a new level in the governance structure between 
the state/government and a number of SOEs. As was stated in a Party’s 
document from 1984,36 SOEs themselves were to be transformed into legal 
entities whose management should enjoy full management authority and full 
responsibilities for their own profits and losses. With the SOEs Law, that 
was adopted in 1988, a legal person status was granted to SOEs by law.  
The factory director acted now as the legal representative and exercised 
leadership in the operation of the enterprise. For the first time in Chinese 
SOE history, the factory director occupied the central position in the enter-
prise operation. According to the SOEs Law, the director should be selected 
through a “competitive process”. Although no details were issued on how to 
fulfill this requirement, it provided incentives to select a higher qualified 
director for the enterprise. Besides, some measures were introduced to fa-
cilitate SOEs’ management. For example, SOEs were allowed, through the 
                                                          
36  See the the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party’s “Decision on Reform 
of the Economic Structure” (CPC 1984). 
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employees’ congress and other forms, to practice “democratic manage-
ment”, while employees might take part in the management and its supervi-
sion. The SOEs Law also required the establishment of a management 
committee or a similar consulting body to assist the director with decision-
making on important issues.  
c) The Corporatization Stage (since 1993) 
A) Unsuccessful Contracting 
Despite the major reform efforts made for the state sector since 1978, it still 
proved to be uncompetitive in contrast to the private sector that expanded 
impressively in the first 15 years of China’s reform and opening-up policies. 
There was steady increase in SOE losses since the managements obtained 
more decision-making power (cf. Sachs/Woo 1997, p. 24). Even though no 
SOE had ever been closed down, the state sector was not any longer the 
main strength of the national economy by the end of 1993. The share of the 
state sector in the industrial output descended from 78% in 1978 to 43% in 
1993 (cf. Qian 1999a, p. 15). Even its share in total non-farm employment 
was down from 60% to about 30% in the same time period (cf. ibid., p. 15). 
The contracting system did not help SOEs to expand and function well 
due to some deficiencies in its design. As far as profit retention is con-
cerned, it was difficult to fix a reasonable minimum profit for the SOEs to 
pay to the state. The responsibility system was itself experimental, which 
means there was no ready-made standard for setting the minimum propor-
tion or sum of profits. In addition, the contracting system said nothing about 
what to do, when SOEs could not make a desired profit or suffered a loss. 
Nonetheless, the profit paid to the state was obligatory. With regard to the 
entire reform policies, the state leadership had not planned to establish a 
rule-based market through their first reform attempts. For this reason, the 
contracting system rather aimed at stimulating improving efforts from inside 
SOEs than to generate incentives and to enhance constraints through outside 
forces like more competitive environment and stricter legislation. Besides, 
neither the ownership nor the property rights issues were included in the 
contracting system. Logically, the state would undertake all the losses of its 
SOEs in the end to avoid SOEs’ bankruptcy, which actually reduced the 
incentives for SOEs’ efforts to make more profits. As a result, some incen-
tives for the SOEs per se were either short-term or got reduced in view of 
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the state’s soft budget constraints. To solve these problems, SOE reform 
entered a new Corporatization phase compatible with the establishment of a 
market economy by the government.  
B) SOE Corporatization and Restructuring 
In 1993, the Third Plenum of the Fourteenth Party Congress adopted the 
“Decision on Issues Concerning the Establishment of a Socialist Market 
Economic Structure”. The Decision formulated clear goals in the areas of 
the reform strategy (coherent package and appropriate sequencing of re-
forms), a rule-based system (unified foreign exchange rate and tax rates and 
accounting rules for all enterprises regardless of ownership), market-
supporting institutions (formal fiscal federalism, centralized monetary sys-
tem, social safety net), and property rights and ownership (transforming 
SOEs), respectively (cf. Qian 1999b, pp. 23f.).  
Unlike at the incentive and contracting stages, which centered on the ex-
tension of SOEs’ autonomy and profit sharing, the Decision addressed SOE 
reforms in terms of property and ownership rights in several ways. First, it 
intended to transform SOEs into modern enterprises with “clear property 
right, clarified rights and responsibilities, separation of enterprises from the 
government, and scientific management” (CPC 1993).37 Second, the Deci-
sion implied the privatization of small SOEs: 
With regard to small SOEs, the management of some can be contracted out or 
leased; others can be shifted to the partnership system in the form of stock sharing 
or sold to collectives and individuals (ibid.). 
Third, the Decision supported the development of a financial market, ad-
vocating “[s]tandardizing issuances and listings of shares, and gradually 
enlarging the scale” (ibid.). Through this policy, the Chinese stock market 
was combined with SOE reforms. 
                                                          
37  Shareholders of modern SOEs are entitled to enjoy their shareholders’ rights in propor-
tion to their shares and are obligated to transfer ownership of their investment to the 
corporation. Rights, obligations, and liabilities between and among the corporation, 
shareholders, employees, creditors, consumers, and other stakeholders should be deline-
ated clearly. The government should separate itself from SOEs’ operation. SOEs should 
avoid random decision-making, relaxed management, undisciplined job performances, 
and low-level managerial abilities and implement democratic decision-making proc-
esses, efficient execution, and strong supervision over decision-making. 
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In 1993, the “Company Law” was enacted to facilitate the new policies in 
SOE reform. In 1995, the new SOE reform guidelines were brought into 
action. After local governments in Shandong, Guangdong, and Sichuan had 
conducted first experiments, small SOEs were privatized and employees 
laid off nationwide on a large scale. The central government promoted the 
restructuring of the state sector with the slogan “grasping the large and let-
ting go the small”.38 “Small” SOEs had played a very important role in 
China’s planned economy, for the Chinese state sector was made up domi-
nantly by small- and medium-sized enterprises. In 1993, they still accounted 
for 95% in number, 57% in employment and 43% in output of the state in-
dustrial sector (cf. Cao et al. 1999, p. 109). By the end of 1996, some 70% 
of small SOEs had been privatized in several pioneering provinces and 
about half were privatized in many other provinces. From 1996 to 1997, 
over 20 million SOE employees were laid off throughout China. Until 2005, 
another 20 million SOE employees were laid off. After reaching a peak of 
112.6 million in 1995, the total state sector employment shrank to 64.3 mil-
lion in 2006 (cf. NBSC 1996, 2007a). Even no large SOE was privatized, 
the share of state industry was reduced by almost half through releasing the 
small- and medium-sized SOEs (cf. Qian/Wu 2000, p. 39).  
“Grasping the large” referred to keeping a number of backbone large and 
medium-sized SOEs, particularly those in some strategic industries such as 
transportation, telecom, banking, oil, steel, etc. Based on the provisions in 
the Company Law, “to be grasped” large and medium-sized traditional 
SOEs were “corporatized” instead of following a privatization process, that 
is, converted into different western-type corporate entities predominantly in 
the form of limited liability companies and joint-stock companies,39 while 
the state still maintained its control. The new corporation forms of SOEs 
vary from their predecessors in their better-defined ownership structure, 
                                                          
38  The slogan emerged in the central government’s work report at the Ninth NPC. Yet the 
practices had been ongoing for a period of time. At the last few Plenums of the Eighth, 
the concept had already been implicitly expressed in the central government’s work re-
ports. 
39  These corporate entities include wholly state-owned corporations, closely held corpora-
tions, and publicly held corporations. According to the Company Law of 1993, a wholly 
state-owned corporation is a limited liability corporation invested and established solely 
by the state-authorized investment institutions or government agencies. A closely held 
corporation is a small company with few shareholders and of small capital size. A pub-
licly held corporation, also called a joint stock limited company, is a corporation whose 
total capital is divided into equal shares, and is owned by shareholders who assume li-
ability towards the company to the extent of their respective shareholdings. 
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shareholder rights, and management accountability. With corporate entities 
officially coming into being in People’s Republic of China, the term “corpo-
rate governance” is since then relevant for the governance issues of Chinese 
firms. Before, there had been no “corporate” governance, but governance 
issues or practices of SOEs. However, to the government’s disappointment, 
SOEs’ performance continued to decline in the 1990s (cf. Qian 1999b, p. 
30). 
The Fourth Plenum of the Fifteenth Party Central Committee in 1999 
adopted more aggressive policies for the SOE reform. One of them was the 
“readjustment of the layout of the state economy” (CPC 1999, section III) in 
the sense to narrow the state sector. Specifically, the state decided to con-
centrate its control over four main types of industries – industries related to 
national security, natural monopolies, industries providing important public 
goods and services, pillar industries as well as backbone enterprises in high 
and new technology industries, while withdrawing from other areas. Com-
mitting the government to withdrawing from most industrial and services 
sectors was a significant and encouraging step forward in transforming the 
state sector in the economy. Obviously, these types were vaguely defined. 
That being the case, obstacles to privatization in areas other than the core 
industries could arise, say, due to local governments’ interest there. None-
theless, this deficiency might slow down but not prevent the privatization 
process of small SOEs, compared to its potential speed. 
Another policy adopted at the Fourth Plenum of the Fifteenth Party Cen-
tral Committee was the diversification of ownership structure for those en-
terprises still under state control. Except for a few enterprises solely funded 
by the state, all other enterprises should become joint stock companies with 
multiple owners involving private investors or foreign investors. This policy 
accelerated listings of SOEs both inland and abroad. China Telecom, China 
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China Petrolchemical Corporation 
(SINOPEC), and the Legend Group are some examples. Another new policy 
concerned the establishment of a corporate governance system. The term 
“corporate governance” appeared in a Party document for the very first 
time. 
C) Roles of the State and SOEs 
At the current corporatization stage, the state has changed its role from the 
only owner of SOEs to the shareholder possessing property rights over the 
state-owned part of a corporatized SOE’s assets. The state continually acts 
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as the supervisor of SOEs, but the way it finances them has changed a lot, 
and it has relegated the job to the capital markets. SOEs have changed into 
different types of companies and introduced, indispensably according to the 
Company Law, three corporate governing bodies: shareholders, the board of 
directors, and the board of supervisors.40 Some new functions such as the 
chair of the board of directors and the chief manager in the sense of a Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) have been introduced as well. The Chinese corpo-
rate governance model has been built up. 
Today, registered SOEs accounted for about 5% of all industrial compa-
nies and about 15% of the total output value.41 Large scale SOEs still consti-
tute the backbone of the economy. The state sector continues to place a dis-
proportionally large claim on economic resources, for instance, bank lend-
ing. 
2. Driving Forces in China’s Corporate Governance 
Evolution: Process of Change 
While the most advanced economies – Western Europe, the United States, 
and Japan – have converged in economies, business practices, and living 
standards over the last few decades, their corporate ownership and govern-
ance remained different, and different degrees of ownership concentration 
and labor influence have persisted. In identifying the rationale behind the 
different corporate ownership and governance patterns, Bebchuk and Roe 
developed in 1999 a theory of the path dependence of corporate structure. 
They argued that  
a country’s pattern of ownership structures at any point in time depends partly on 
the patterns it had earlier. Consequently, when countries had different ownership 
structures at earlier points in time – because of their different circumstances at the 
time, or even because of historical accidents – these differences might persist at 
later points in time even if their economies have otherwise become quite similar. 
(Bebchuck/Roe 1999, p. 127) 
Although Bebchuck and Roe have the most developed countries in their 
sights, in our opinion, the consistency of the state’s dominance in Chinese 
SOEs’ ownership structure demonstrates a clear path-dependent process as 
well. That is, how the Chinese SOEs were owned at the starting point af-
                                                          
40  In case of small firms with few shareholders, the boards are not indispensable, but a 
CEO is required. 
41  Calculated with data of NBSC (2007a). 
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fected much the way they would be owned later. Every important change 
happened in Chinese SOEs’ corporate governance was carried out on the 
basis of the existing ownership structure and did not mean to replace it with 
a different model, for example, a dispersed or a bank-based ownership. 
It is worth noting that Bebchuck and Roe (1999) argued in their path-
dependence theory that there exist a structure- and a rule-driven path de-
pendence. In this article, however, we mainly take the structure-driven path, 
i.e., how the governance structure of SOEs has evolved, into account, as 
official rules (laws, regulations) on SOE reforms have typically been 
brought into effect to support those structural changes. For example, the 
Company Law was enacted after the central government decided to trans-
form traditional SOEs into modern enterprises. Therefore, the rule-driven 
path dependence in SOE reforms is de facto in keeping with the structure-
driven one. 
One may argue that the SOE ownership is self-evident, for the term of 
state-ownership already literally describes the ownership structure. This 
view is correct as far as the owner or blockholder of SOEs is concerned. 
However, the term of state ownership alone conceals any significant infor-
mation on the structural changes in Chinese SOEs’ governance. Neither 
does it reflect what differences occurred in SOEs’ ownership structure and 
control along the reform path, as described in section 4, nor does it imply 
the driving forces behind such changes. In the following, we highlight sev-
eral historical and environmental factors during China’s transition to a mar-
ket economy, which have had significant impacts on the evolvement of the 
SOE reforms. 
a) Two Radical Campaigns 
Two radical campaigns that had hit China’s economy very hard took place 
in the first three decades of the People’s Republic of China. The first one 
happened shortly after China’s planned economy had been established by 
1957. The initial planned system followed the former Soviet model that fea-
tured concentration of authority in the central government. Yet Mao Zedong 
was doubtful of the validity of the Soviet-style (cf. Qian 1999a, p. 24). Un-
der his leadership, China began to restructure the Soviet planning model 
only one year after its establishment. In 1958, the Great Leap Forward 
(GLF), as the radical reform was called, was initiated to realize an acceler-
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ated and infeasible industrialization.42 However, the unrealistic economic 
expansion and continuously unfavorable weather conditions led to a disas-
trous famine, causing millions of deaths43 in rural areas during 1959-1961. 
At the same time, China’s light industry output and national income de-
clined annually by 2% and 3.1%, respectively (cf. Qian 1999a, p. 25) due to 
overemphasis of heavy industry, especially steel output (cf. Luo 2004, pp. 
25f.). 
The second big-bang campaign began as Mao initiated the Cultural 
Revolution in 1966, aiming at “a further revolution under proletarian dicta-
torship”.44 Although the national economy still grew moderately during the 
ten years (1966-1976) of this mass movement, the growth was slower than 
in the 14 years before and the 6 years after it (cf. Chen 2008), implying that 
the radical movement suppressed the potential of China’s economy. Big 
problems during the Cultural Revolution included serious imbalance of the 
proportions among the sectors of the national economy and of the propor-
tions between reserves and expenses, greatly lowered economic perform-
ance, and appearance of government deficit. Also the central government 
admitted later that the national economy suffered huge losses during these 
ten years (cf. CPC 1981).  
The Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution were accompanied 
by two waves of administrative decentralizations, which have taken great 
influences on China’s transition path. Both of the two decentralization 
waves took place under Mao’s leadership. For Mao, centralization would 
offer little incentives for people’s initiatives,45 and he preferred decentrali-
zation of government authority to local levels (cf. Qian 1999a, p. 24). Mao’s 
preference was not purely personal, but backed by the communists’ long-
time experience in time of war (cf. CPC 1981). In those days, the revolu-
tionary bases of the communists had been run in separate rural areas, and 
                                                          
42  The plan of this mass movement was that the industrial output of China should surpass 
that of Great Britain and the United States within fifteen years. See LUO (2004, pp. 
25f.). 
43  Surveys of Chinese scholars assess the number to be in the range of 17 and 40 millions. 
See LI (2006). 
44  So was it explained in the “Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party 
Since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China” (CPC 1981). 
45  As summarized in “Resolution on Certain  Issues in the History of Our Party Since the 
Founding of the People’s Republic of China” (CPC 1981), one of Mao’s core thoughts 
was following the mass line (zou qun zhong lu xian). 
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mobilization of local incentives for production in each base had been the 
main concerns of communists (cf. ibid.).  
The first wave of decentralization occurred alongside the Great Leap 
Forward. Two institutional changes were made with regard to restructuring 
the planning system. On the one hand, the central government deputed the 
control over most SOEs as well as the planning authority to local govern-
ments (cf. Qian 1999a, p. 25). While there had been 9,300 SOEs subordi-
nated to the central government in 1957, there were only 1,200 in 1958 (cf. 
ibid., p. 24). The local government gained the authority to make most deci-
sions on regional fixed investments, material allocation, and expenditures. 
On the other hand, China established numerous People’s Communes, which 
served as local authorities and were responsible for agricultural production, 
commerce, bank affairs, education, and public health in the rural areas. 
Within a few months after the movement initiation, 99% of the peasants 
were organized in about 24,000 People’s Communes, with an average size 
of 5,000 households (cf. ibid., p. 25). With the communes established, a 
large number of so-called commune and brigade enterprises were founded 
to expand non-agricultural activities. 
The disaster caused by the Great Leap Forward forced the central gov-
ernment to correct its 1958 policy. In the urban areas, recentralization of the 
planning system began. From 1961 on, all large and medium-sized indus-
trial enterprises were again subordinated to the central government (cf. ibid., 
p. 26). Between 1959 and 1965, SOEs under the control of the central gov-
ernment increased from 2,400 to 10,533 (cf. ibid., p. 26). In rural areas, the 
central government carried out a more liberal policy: communes were sus-
tained, but became a less powerful institution; production teams consisting 
of 40-50 households became the basic production units; peasants were al-
lowed to cultivate small private plots, run sideline productions, and open 
rural free markets (cf. ibid., p. 25). 
During the Cultural Revolution, a second wave of administrative decen-
tralization began in China due to a goal of high growth in the Fourth Five 
Year Plan (1971-1975)46 and the preparation for war.47 From 1970 on, the 
                                                          
46  For example, steel production was required to double within five years (cf. QIAN 1999a, 
p. 27). To achieve the goal of high growth, the central government believed that local 
initiative must be mobilized through decentralization. 
47  Mao assessed that a Soviet invasion and the beginning of World War III was nearing. In 
consequence, the government proposed dividing the country into 10 cooperative re-
gions, each of which should be a relatively complete and self sufficient industrial sys-
tem to deal with the war (cf. QIAN 1999a, p. 27). 
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economic planning was mainly conducted on regional levels. The 1970 
wave of decentralization was similar to the 1958 one, but went much fur-
ther. The control over most large SOEs as well as some planning authority 
in material allocation and fixed investment was again delegated to the local 
governments. After the decentralization, the central government supervised 
barely 142 SOEs, down from 10,533 in 1965. The types of material allo-
cated through the central government were reduced from 579 in 1966 to 217 
in 1971. The share of within-budget fixed investment by local governments 
rose from 14% in 1969 to 27% in 1971 (cf. ibid., p. 27). For a second time, 
however, the administrative decentralization caused disarray and some re-
centralization measures were taken by the central government in 1973 under 
the name of consolidation (cf. Qian 1999b, pp. 25f.). Yet in comparison 
with 1958, the extent of 1970 decentralization was greater, whereas the re-
centralization afterwards was much weaker (cf. Qian 1999a, p. 26). 
b) Incremental Reforms in the Non-State Sector 
After the Cultural Revolution came to an end, the reformers, who could be 
divided into moderate and radical groups (cf. Guo 2004, p. 396), took con-
trol of the central government. Moderate and radical reformers all agreed on 
the necessity of economic reforms,48 but disagreed on the content, scope, 
and pace or extent of reforms (cf. ibid., p. 396). Moderate reformers insisted 
on maintaining basic socialist principles (such as planned economy, public 
ownership, and distribution according to labor). They were cautious and 
skeptical about dramatic departures from the planned economy and looked 
on the market as a supplementary mechanism for the allocation of resources 
and determination of prices to help establish a planned commodity economy 
(cf. ibid., p. 396). They favored a slow, gradual, and experimental approach 
to reforms, through which imbalances generated by reforms could be re-
paired during readjustment periods (cf. ibid., p. 396f.). 
In contrast, radical reformers favored a much less restrictive definition of 
socialist principles that should exclude the planned economy and remold the 
principle of public ownership more flexibly, so as to promote a diversified 
ownership structure while maintaining the dominant position of public own-
ership (cf. Harding 1987, pp. 78-83). They wished to launch a market econ-
                                                          
48  The “Communiqué of the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee” 
(CPC 1978) stated, “The Plenum decided that (…) from 1979 on, the work of the CPC 
should focus on the socialist modernizations.” 
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omy and favored a rapid and comprehensive structural reform to quickly 
remove the inefficiencies and rigidities of the traditional planned economy 
(cf. Guo 2004, p. 396).  
After three decades of economic transition, most of those reform ideas 
from radical reformers have been realized in today’s China. Interestingly, 
the path of China’s transition has been one that was suggested by moderate 
reformers. In late 1970s, the central government under Deng Xiaoping at 
last chose to go a gradual reform path and to change the national economy 
slowly in stages. Under the dual-track system, the market track facilitated 
several reforms in form of regional experimentations, including agricultural 
contracting, establishment of non-state enterprises, and special economic 
zones (SEZs). Without touching the existing ownership structure under tight 
governmental control, these reforms were incremental to the planning sys-
tem. 
A) Agricultural Household Contract Responsibility System 
Before the dual-track system covered SOEs in 1984 (see 4.2.1), it had 
started in rural areas, with rapid and comprehensive liberalization of the 
agricultural sector. In 1978, as the rest of the Chinese rural areas were still 
operating under the collective farming system, several households in the 
Fengyang County of the Anhui Province began to contract with the local 
government for delivering a fixed quota of grain in exchange for farming on 
a household basis. This practice was soon imitated by other counties in the 
province and promoted by the provincial government. In 1980, the experi-
mentation in Anhui was promoted by the central government through the 
official introduction of the Agricultural Household Contracting Responsible 
System (cf. CPC 1980) to replace the commune-bridge system of collective 
farming.  
Under the Agricultural Household Contracting Responsible System, in-
dividual peasant households were allowed to lease the former commune 
land by signing a contract. With the contract signed, the peasant households 
would take the full responsibility for the piece of land allocated for their 
use.49 Although these households remained obliged to fulfill the grain quota 
                                                          
49  In China, land in rural areas is collectively owned, while land in urban areas is state-
owned. Before the reform era, pieces of land were allotted by administrative authorities 
for agricultural and industrial use. Since the 1980s, local governments in urban areas 
transfer rights of land’s use for a determined period against compensation. 
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as set by the state, they obtained residual claims and control rights over the 
production on their land, say, cultivating more valuable crops and selling the 
surplus goods on the free market. By 1984, almost all peasant households 
across China had adopted the contracting method. 
This contracting reform in the rural areas turned out to be a huge success. 
During the period of 1978-1994, growth in agriculture provided the major 
impetus to the Chinese economy (cf. Sachs/Woo 1997, p. 10). Shortly after 
the launch of the reform, the national grain productions grew by 8.7% in 
1982 and by 9.2% in 1983 (cf. NBSC 1982, 1983). From 1978 to 1984, the 
per capita real income in the rural areas increased by more than 50% (cf. 
Qian 1999a, p. 9). In the same period, the per capita consumption doubled in 
real terms (cf. Sachs/Woo 1997, p. 30). 
However, this growth turned out to be rather temporary. From 1985 on-
ward, the growth in the rural areas stagnated due to (1) farmers’ uncertainty 
about future land use rights, (2) state procurement prices not being raised in 
line with the increases in input prices, and (3) large reductions in state in-
vestment in agricultural infrastructure (cf. ibid., pp. 31f.). 
B) Rural Enterprises 
Under the dual-track system in the 1980s, a few important relaxation poli-
cies in favor of free markets and the non-state sector were adopted. For ex-
ample, all the previous black markets were now legal. Regulations on the 
registration and supervision of non-state enterprises were less strict than 
before. Private enterprises were allowed to employ more than eight people, 
which was illegal before 1984. The governments in rural areas encouraged 
collectives and peasants to invest in or to pool their funds to jointly set up 
various kinds of enterprises. Fiscal decentralization in this period, which 
primarily aimed at the state sector, also provided incentives for local gov-
ernments to develop non-state enterprises, since the local governments did 
not have to share taxes generated through the non-state sector within the 
planning system (cf. Qian 1999a, p. 11). These measures were greatly con-
ductive to the emergence and growth of the rural enterprises. Between 1983 
and 1988, total rural enterprise output increased by more than fivefold (cf. 
Qian 1999a, p. 12). 
In non-agricultural areas, most of the impetus has been coming from so-
called township and village enterprises (TVEs). From 1983 to 1984, the 
former People’s Communes were changed into townships, and the erstwhile 
commune and brigade enterprises were renamed as TVEs. They were 
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mostly owned directly by township and village governments and collec-
tively by members of a village, and in some cases by private persons. Local 
governments enthusiastically supported TVEs, because (1) previous admin-
istrative restrictions against rural enterprise entry and expansion were re-
moved from almost all industries due to liberalization policies on rural in-
dustrialization, and (2) they themselves relied heavily on the development of 
rural industry as the way to generate their revenue (cf. Qian 1999a, p. 12). 
Since their emergence, TVEs have been expanding at a remarkable rate and 
dominating in the non-agricultural growth. Their share in total employment 
in China increased from 7% in 1978, to 11% in 1984, and further to 21% in 
1995 (cf. Sachs/Woo 1997, p. 33). In 1987, TVEs were allowed to take part 
in foreign trade. Since then, TVE exports have experienced a dramatic 
growth, with a share of overall exports rising from 9.2% in 1986 to more 
than 40% in 1996 (cf. ibid., p. 33). 
The governance features of TVEs are quite different from those of SOEs. 
For example, TVEs’ ownership and property rights are clearly defined as 
held by the local governments or individuals (cf. Lin 2001, p. 11). Another 
feature of TVEs is that they face hard budget constraints. In the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, the total size of the SOE industrial output was about twice 
that of TVEs, while loans to SOEs and TVEs accounted for about 86% and 
8%, respectively (cf. Qian 1999b, p. 16). In case of a deficit, the local gov-
ernment cannot finance it without the approval of the central government. 
Since local governments are in deed involved in TVEs as owners, they logi-
cally have incentives to ensure TVEs’ efficiency and profitability by im-
proving management (cf. Lin 2001, p. 11). 
C) Opening-Up 
The dual-track approach was also adopted to gradually open up China to the 
outside world and to attract foreign investment. In 1980, the central gov-
ernment chose four cities in the coastal areas in South China (Shenzhen, 
Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen) to be the first four special economic zones 
(SEZs). The SEZs were export-oriented and had a special institutional envi-
ronment. The local governments were granted the authority over their own 
economic development. They were allowed to approve foreign investment 
projects up to 30 million USD and to remain 70% of the increased foreign 
exchanges from exports. Foreign enterprises were subject to lower taxes 
than elsewhere in China. The SEZs were also allowed to become market 
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economies dominated by private ownership, while the rest of China was still 
under strict central planning and public ownership.  
In 1984, the central government declared another fourteen coastal cities50 
as “coastal open cities”, which began to enjoy authority similar to that of the 
first SEZs. Each of these cities gained broader authorities in approving for-
eign investment projects and setting up development zones, where they 
could implement more liberal tax and foreign exchange policies for attract-
ing foreign capital and technology. In 1988, Hainan became a separate prov-
ince and was added as the largest SEZ. In 1992, five additional cities51 along 
the Yangtze River, thirteen border cities and towns,52 and eleven provincial 
capitals53 were granted special privileges as coastal cities. 
As shown by statistical data (cf. NBSC 1991, 1992, 1993), China’s ex-
tensive opening-up policies in early 1990s immediately boosted foreign in-
vestment and exports: Foreign direct investment (FDI) increased by 160% 
to 11.1 billion USD in 1992 and further by 130% to 25.8 billion USD in 
1993. Registered enterprises with foreign investment expanded from 37 
thousand in 1991 to 84 thousand in 1992, and further to 167.5 thousand in 
1993. The value of exports in 1992 was 85.0 billion USD, up 18.2%, and 
that in 1993 was 91.8 billion USD, up 8%. In contrast, China’s exports in 
1980, as the first SEZs were established, merely reached 27.2 billion RMB 
(1 USD equalized 1.5 RMB in 1980 and 8.7 RMB in 1993). More notably, 
enterprises with foreign investment raised their share in exports from 16.8% 
in 1991 to 20.4% in 1992 and further to 27.5% in 1993. 
D) Overall Performance of the Non-State Sector 
Under the dual-track system, the total non-state sector, including household 
agriculture, rural industries, private enterprises, urban collective, and joint 
ventures, had been outperforming the state sector and changed the economy 
structure in China. Accordingly, the share of SOE production fell from 78% 
in 1978 to 69% in 1984, and further to 43% in 1993; while SOEs’ share in 
                                                          
50  Tianjin, Shanghai, Dalian, Qinhuangdao, Yantai, Qingdao, Lianyungang, Nantong, 
Ningbo, Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Zhanjiang, and Beihai. 
51  Wuhu, Jiujiang, Yueyang, Wuhan, and Chongqing. 
52  Heihe, Suifenhe, Huichun, Manzhouli, Pingxiang, Dongxing, Hekou, Wanding, Ruili, 
Yining, Tacheng, Bole, and Erlianhaote. 
53  Taiyuan, Hefei, Nanchang, Zhengzhou, Changsha, Chengdu, Guiyang, Xi’an, Lanzhou, 
Xining, and Yinchuan. 
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commerce was down from 55% in 1978 to 40% by 1993 (cf. Sachs/Woo 
1997, p. 10; Qian/Wu 2000, p. 5). As no SOE had been privatized by 1993, 
the changes of the relative weight of the state sector were solely caused by 
the rapid growth of the non-state sector. 
c) Learning Process in SOE Reforms 
Figure 5.1 demonstrates the connections between the SOE reforms and the 
historical and environmental factors, i.e., the knowledge and experiences 
that the Chinese government gained before and during the transition has 
mainly backed its choice of the reform path for SOEs. The boxes marked 
with PRC (for the People’s Republic of China) over the time axis symbolize 
the path dependence of China’s SOE reforms at different stages since 1949 
(see section 4). Being dominated by the state ownership, changes on this 
path are accompanied and affected by factors described under 5.1 and 5.2, 
shown in the boxes under the time axis. In the following, we discuss how 
these factors affected the starting point of SOEs’ ownership structure and its 
later changes. 
 
Figure 5.2 Path Dependence in China’s SOE Reforms 
 
Source: Own figure 
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This choice can be attributed to the central government’s concerns about the 
potential losses due to radical reforms. At that moment, it must be difficult 
for the central government to answer the question whether replacing the 
planned system and public ownership structure with a market economy and 
a diversified ownership structure, as radical reformers put it forward, would 
largely improve China’s economy. After all, there had been no experiences 
about how a market economy would function in China. Neither were there 
transition examples for China to learn from at that time.  
Interestingly, if we look further back along the time axis in Figure 5.1, 
we will find another path dependence of ownership structure in China’s his-
tory since 1900. Before the foundation of the People’s Republic of China, 
private ownership of enterprises had existed in the Qing Dynasty and been 
protected by the Dynasty’s “Company Act” promulgated in 1903. The Re-
public of China, followed by the authorities in Taiwan, continued this path. 
In mainland China, however, this path was discontinued by the socialization 
process beginning in 1956. Such a break-off was not directly responsible for 
the later disasters during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolu-
tion, but it had excluded all existing private ownership and facilitated a total 
deviation from the former economy model to a state ownership model. The 
risks of such a total deviation were evidenced by the economy development 
during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, implicating that 
the government should be cautious with radical economic reforms. Under 
concerns about failures and uncertainty of success, it was rational and low-
risk for the central government to start with incremental reforms. 
Our analysis echoes Bebchuck and Roe’s (1999) path dependence theory, 
in which the two authors define efficiency as one of the major reasons why 
prior ownership structures in an economy might affect subsequent struc-
tures. In a simplified sense, efficiency concerns the profits and costs of re-
building the existing ownership structures or enacting a set of legal rules 
that support different ownership structures. Although a different type of 
ownership structure could appear more efficient from today’s perspective, a 
total reconstruction of the current system would be, in view of its potential 
profits, too costly to be realized. In their paper, Bebchuck and Roe give a 
numerical example of how companies will compare the potential profits and 
costs and decide not to restructure the existing ownership model into a dif-
ferent one. In contrast, at the beginning of China’s reform era, no such cal-
culation was feasible. Thus, lessons learned in the previous radical cam-
paigns might have helped the central government to make its choice of the 
reform path. 
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B) Pre-Reform Institutional Bases 
In both of the two waves of decentralization and the recentralization meas-
ures afterwards, the changes mainly adjusted the relationship between the 
central and local governments and not the relationship between the state and 
SOEs. On the one side, the de- and recentralizing policies dealt with the 
issue which governmental level should directly take the leadership in SOE 
operations. In other words, it was about how to allocate the SOE property 
rights within the administrative structure of the Chinese government. On the 
other side, SOEs had not become autonomous economic entities, but re-
mained subject to production instructions from either the central or the local 
governments. Consequently, the governmental control over SOEs was tight 
throughout the first three decades of the People’s Republic of China (cf. 
Qian 1999a, p. 28). 
Nonetheless, the two waves of decentralization had exerted a big influ-
ence on the structure of China’s planning system, making it not as centrally 
organized as in the Soviet model. Unlike the Soviet model, the Chinese 
planning system performed not through the central government granting 
power to subordinate local agencies to carry out its plans, but to a great ex-
tent directly on regional levels. Hence, a complete administrative centraliza-
tion hardly ever existed in the Chinese planning system, except for the very 
beginning. Local governments and their agencies practically exerted much 
control, which made it easier to launch reforms on local bases, especially 
where the bureaucratic interests were weak (cf. ibid., p. 5). 
In Bebchuck and Roe’s (1999) path dependence theory, another source of 
power for the persistence of old ownership are rent-seeking activities, prac-
ticed by the interest groups who have been enjoying the rents provided by 
their positions in the actual ownership structure. If a new ownership system 
pattern, however efficient it is supposed to be for a single firm or the whole 
economy, noticeably reduces their current rents, those interest groups would 
have incentives to impede the efforts to introduce such a pattern as well as 
the supporting legal rules for it.  
In a rent-seeking context, the structural character of China’s planning 
system could explain why real reforms did not initially took place in SOEs 
in urban areas, but in rural areas. Provided that the central government had 
been thinking about a radical SOE reform (for example a diversification of 
the ownership) in the 1970s, there could have been much resistance against 
it from those agencies and persons who had been controlling SOEs for a 
long time, because their control would be reduced, and the profits of the 
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reform were not certain. Compared to that in urban areas, governmental 
control in the rural areas was, on the one side, less tight after the first wave 
of decentralization. On the other side, bureaucratic interests in the agricul-
tural sector were weak, and the vested interests of local officials at the 
commune and the brigade levels were not well organized (cf. Qian 1999a, p. 
6). Wan Li, the former party secretary in the Anhui province, who led the 
first rural reform in the late 1970s, once confirmed the situation: 
Why did reform make its first breakthrough in the rural area? This is by no means 
an accident and has historical reasons. This is because peasants suffered the most 
under the old rigid system and thus had the strongest desire for reform. At the same 
time, rural areas were the weak sector in the old system, and became the break-
through point of reform. (ibid., p. 5) 
C) Learning from the Non-State Sector 
As we have discussed under 5.3.1 and 5.3.2, pre-reform mistakes and exist-
ing institutions bases can explain why China’s reforms started in areas out-
side of the planning system. After China’s transition began, experimentation 
with relaxation over the non-state sector has been providing abundant and 
exemplary experiences with other forms of ownership and governance struc-
ture for SOEs to learn from. Such a method has been useful for China’s 
transition, because, as argued by Qian (1999b, p. 8), reform was a highly 
uncertain event and the government’s knowledge about it had been very 
limited. Considering the high uncertainty, experimentation is a way to 
minimize costs through structured learning.  
Experiences gained with those incremental reforms in the non-state sec-
tor have practically backed the SOE reforms. Seeing the impressive agricul-
tural growth in the early 1980s, decision-makers in the central government 
firstly borrowed the idea of contracting from the agricultural reform to 
launch a similar system for the state sector. However, the contracting ap-
proach did not function well for the state sector, suggesting that the gov-
ernment should not only provide incentives, but also reform the entire state 
sector.  
The rise of the non-state enterprises had helped to establish and to 
strengthen market forces in China. In the early 1990s, the planned track was 
largely phased out, and prices were mostly determined by the market rather 
than the state. SOEs were facing direct competition in a number of indus-
tries. This environmental change facilitated not only the launch of a market 
economy in China, but the corporatization and the restructuring of the state 
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sector as well. On the one hand, it was more efficient for the state to draw 
back from where SOEs had been uncompetitive and to focus on a few indus-
tries where the state has been enjoying a monopoly status. On the other 
hand, rent-seeking activities by interest groups became much less in those 
uncompetitive SOEs. As a result, reforms were easier due to less resistance. 
More importantly, the experiences gained in the non-agricultural sector out-
side of the state-sector could further be utilized by SOEs in their reforms. 
Among the non-state enterprises, especially the huge success of TVEs im-
pressed the leadership in Beijing. Deng Xiaoping said on 12 June 1987 
In the rural reform our greatest success – and it is one we had by no means antici-
pated – has been the emergence of a large number of enterprises run by villages and 
townships (…). Their annual output value has been increasing by more than 20 per-
cent a year for the last several years. This increase in TVEs, particularly industrial 
enterprises, has provided jobs for 50 percent of the surplus labor in the countryside. 
Instead of flocking into the cities, the peasants have been building villages and 
townships of a new type (…). Our success in rural reform increased our confidence, 
and, applying the experience we had gained in the countryside, we began a reform 
of the entire economic structure, focused on the cities. (Deng Xiaoping 1987/1994, 
p. 236) 
Deng Xiaoping’s statements showed that the central government had been 
thinking about transplanting the experiences in the non-state sector to SOEs. 
In fact, the SOE reforms at the corporatization stage since 1993 have ab-
sorbed a few important elements of TVE’s governance. Both owner-
ship/property rights and hard budget constraints have been taken in by the 
SOE corporatization policies to enhance SOEs’ efficiency. 
With respect to China’s opening-up practices, we believe that they have 
not only exceedingly contributed to the growth of FDI and exports, but also 
to the changes of SOE governance. For one thing, the boost of foreign en-
terprises and joint ventures are themselves vivid examples of how modern 
enterprises look like and how to manage them efficiently. For another, 
China’s increasing exchanges with developed countries have helped the 
Chinese to master know-hows in management as well as modern firm theo-
ries. Slogans like “separation of enterprises from the government” and “sci-
entific management” demonstrated that the SOE corporatization process has 
been learning from the opened environment. 
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3. Conclusions 
It can be concluded that the state’s dominance in the SOE governance 
was determined at the beginning of the reform era, as the Chinese govern-
ment chose to start with incremental reforms in the non-state sector instead 
of restructuring the state sector. Two radical campaigns, the Great Leap 
Forward and the Cultural Revolution, had significantly affected this choice. 
On the one hand, the disasters caused by the two movements taught the 
Chinese government a bitter lesson that they must be cautious with radical 
reforms. On the other hand, two waves of decentralization during the two 
campaigns facilitated local reforms on experimental basis rather than radical 
reforms of the entire planned economy.  
Another conclusion is that further SOE reforms at contracting and corpo-
ratization stages, which led to changes in SOE governance, were largely 
backed by a learning process during the transition. Experiences gained in 
successful reforms of the non-state sector, including agriculture, rural indus-
tries, and foreign investment, were utilized in the SOE reforms by the gov-
ernment. 
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VI. Empirical Research 
This chapter is devoted to the empirical investigation of three research 
questions relevant to corporate governance of listed firms at China’s stock 
market. Firstly, how do corporate governance practices affect the stock val-
uation over a certain time period? Secondly, do corporate governance prac-
tices in a certain time period affect the stock valuation in the following 
years? Thirdly, does the link between corporate governance practices and 
the stock valuation differ from industry to industry? 
1. Research Methodology 
a) Implications of the Corporate Governance Evolvement in China 
In the existing empirical literature on China’s corporate governance, eco-
nometric models from the Anglo-Saxon literature, especially linear regres-
sion models with panel data, have been widely used to test the effects of 
various governance mechanisms on the accounting or the stock market per-
formance of Chinese listed firms. Although historical, institutional, and 
market peculiarities in China have been mentioned to interpret the empirical 
results, they have been rarely taken into account by the models themselves. 
Since corporate governance in China, as discussed in Chapter V, has been 
evolving along a very different path and is still undergoing changes at a rap-
id pace, it is questionable whether a research methodology from the western 
literature, originally designed for the western corporate governance context, 
is directly applicable to researches on corporate governance in China. Un-
fortunately, the existing literature appears keen on complicated models 
without elaborating on their applicability to China’s corporate governance 
context. 
However, we believe that even a simple empirical approach can be a 
suitable one for researches on China’s corporate governance, as long as his-
torical, institutional, and market factors in China are thoughtfully incorpo-
rated into it. Chapter IV and V do not only help to better understand corpo-
rate governance practices at China’s stock market, but provide some impor-
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tant facts, as listed below, to be considered in the empirical methodology 
designing as well. 
FACT 1: Over the past years, corporate governance in China has been 
evolving at a rapid pace. The corporate governance practices can change a 
lot from year to year, as the current corporate governance framework is still 
weak and regulators have been trying to enhance its quality by introducing 
more external and internal mechanisms and strengthening the legal regula-
tions. 
FACT 2: China’s stock market has a very strong link to the state, and so 
do corporate governance practices at the stock market. Most listed firms at 
the Shanghai and the Shenzhen Exchanges are former SOEs. The state, 
through its central or local governmental functions, still holds a big stake in 
these corporatized firms and plays a leading role in changing corporate gov-
ernance practices of listed firms in China. In this context, the introduction or 
choice of corporate governance mechanisms by listed firms are rather af-
fected by the state’s policies than by accounting performance. 
FACT 3: The state’s influence on listed firms differs from industry to in-
dustry. The state keeps its tight control over those industries which it con-
siders being of strategic importance and has withdrawn from other indus-
tries. Thus, listed firms in China are subject to different product market en-
vironments. In those industries of strategic importance, there are barely any 
non-state competitors, and state-controlled firms are quasi monopolists, at 
least at the local market. Other industries are more competitive so that both 
state-controlled and non-state firms have to face many other rivals. 
b) Regression Models 
According to the prevailing principal agent perspective, good corporate 
governance consists of a set of mechanisms which guarantee an adequate 
return to a firm’s finance suppliers, and risk-averse investors are willing to 
pay a premium for those firms with better corporate governance. Thus, firms 
with better corporate governance should be valued higher at the stock mar-
ket. In existing empirical works on corporate governance in China, the mul-
tiple linear regression analysis has been mostly conducted to investigate the 
relationship between corporate governance and market valuation of listed 
firms (e.g. Bai et al. 2003; Zhang 2006; Wang 2006). Analogous to those 
works, the basic regression model run in this empirical research is as fol-
lows: 
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 (6.01) 
This basic regression model is utilized to test both the effects of single 
corporate governance mechanisms and the effect of the overall corporate 
governance performance on a firm’s market valuation. In this equation, Q is 
the widely used Tobin’s Q to measure the market valuation of a listed firm. 
CorporateGovernance is here the explanatory variable and stands for (1) 
different corporate governance mechanisms employed in a listed firm or (2) 
the overall corporate governance performance of a listed firm, being valued 
with a standardized score. ControlVariables denote control variables made 
of several firm characteristics such as return on assets, debt structure, 
growth ratio, and firm size. 
The existing empirical literature on corporate governance in China most-
ly utilizes panel data to run regressions, suggesting that a firm’s accounting 
or market performance is directly linked to its corporate governance prac-
tices in the same accounting period. However, it is doubtful whether a 
change of a certain governance practice can take effect on a firm’s account-
ing performance or be recognized by the stock market in a short term. 
FACT 1 demonstrates that in China, a listed firm’s corporate governance 
practices can vary much from those in the past year, for instance due to a 
new policy taken by the regulators, but this does not necessarily mean its 
corporate governance quality can be enhanced in a short time as well. Panel 
data on yearly base seem not very suitable for corporate governance prac-
tices in China. To avoid this problem, we make use of average data in pref-
erence to annual data of several observation years to investigate the link 
between corporate governance practices and stock market valuation of listed 
firms in China. In doing so, the basic regression model is modified into the 
following equation, in which Tobin’s Q, governance mechanism variables, 
and control variables are all measured on an average: 
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Besides, regression models using panel data ignore a very interesting 
question, at least from the view of investors at a stock market: Does a link 
between the quality of listed firms’ corporate governance practices and their 
future market performance exist? If evidence can be found that such a link 
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exists, corporate governance practices can provide reference for stock in-
vestments. To accomplish this task, we extend the regression model (6.02) 
into the following one: 
 
iti
titi
iablesControlVaraverage
overnanceCorporateGaverageQaverage




0
00
)(
)()(
2
10
 
(6.03) 
iti
titi
iablesControlVar
overnanceCorporateGaverageQaverage






12
101
0
00
)(
)()(
 
(6.04) 
itititi CVGMaverageQaverage    22102 000 )()()(  
(6.05) 
 
In nature, equations (6.03) is the same as equation (6.02), being used to 
investigate the average effects of single corporate governance mechanisms 
and the overall corporate governance performance on Chinese listed firms’ 
market valuation over the same time period. The subscript t0 indicates a time 
interval of several observation years. Equations (6.04) and (6.05) are em-
ployed to test the link between the overall corporate governance perform-
ance over the time period t0 and the listed firms’ market valuation in the 
following two years, respectively. The subscripts t0+1 and t0+2 characterize 
the first and the second years following the time interval t0, respectively. 
All the regression models exclude the endogeneity problem, namely the 
reverse effect of firms’ accounting or market performance on their corporate 
governance practices. Based on FACT (2), we believe that the regression 
models for listed firms at China’s stock market can hardly have any reverse 
causality. 
c) Industry Clustering 
The existing empirical literature on corporate governance in China sel-
domly takes external mechanisms such as the legal environment and the 
product market into account. The rationale behind this is that most of the 
empirical works are comparative researches involving different countries 
and investigate purely listed Chinese firms, supposing that all industries are 
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under the same institutional and market circumstances. Nevertheless, ac-
cording to FACT (3), different industries in China do have more or less 
competitive product market environments. In consideration of de facto dif-
ferent market environments, it is interesting to examine whether the same 
corporate governance practices perform differently in different industries or 
industry clusters. 
Although limited researches (e.g. Wang 2006) run regressions with the 
industry factor as a control variable and provide evidence that the industry 
variable significantly affects listed firms’ performance, they fail to clearly 
describe and explain the link between industry and corporate governance. 
To check the possible differences in the effects of corporate governance 
practices between industries, we divide all the industries of listed firms into 
some main clusters and run regressions with data from each of the industry 
clusters. 
This empirical analysis involves a total of 21 industries as defined by the 
stock market regulator CSRC (China Securities Regulatory Commission). 
The clustering of all these industries is to be carried out prior to the regres-
sions and along two dimensions - the political dimension and the market 
dimension. The political dimension qualitatively measures the state’s con-
trol over an industry in the light of industrial policies by the central govern-
ment. The market dimension quantitatively measures the market share of 
SOEs in different industrials, according to the total assets, equities, and 
main business turnovers. 
Finally, the political and the market dimensions are used together to iden-
tify a “Monopoly” cluster with the least competitive industries and a “Com-
petition” cluster with the most competitive industries. Those industries 
which include both competitive and incompetitive sub-industries belong to 
the “mix” cluster. In this chapter, we report regression results for the listed 
firms from the industries in the “mix” cluster as well, but they serve merely 
as a reference instead of a research object. After all, these industries are 
“mixed” with respect to market competition, and the results can thus not 
lead to convincing conclusions. 
d) Choice of Observation Period 
In the existing empirical literature on China’s stock market, most descrip-
tions of selected data do not explain why a certain time period has been cho-
sen for observation, showing that the choices of time periods are more or 
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less arbitrary. This problem can be attributed to the very short history of the 
Chines stock market. To date, stock observations of listed firms in China are 
available for at most 18 years (1992-2010). In addition, not much attention 
had been paid to information disclosure until corporate governance recently 
became a top issue at China’s stock market. Thus, it is not difficult to under-
stand that very limited data on firm-level corporate governance practices are 
available for relevant researches. 
For the empirical research, we use listed firms’ data from the accounting 
years 2000-2004. The reasons are the following: Firstly, data from the first 
five years in the twenty-first century are not only more relevant to the ongo-
ing corporate governance practices in China, but of higher quality than those 
from the earlier years. The improvements came from the amendment of Ac-
counting Law in 1999, emphasizing the “True and Complete” principle for 
accounting information, and from the promulgation of “Enterprise Financial 
Reporting Regulation” in 2000, redefining the components of financial 
statements in compliance with the conceptual framework of the IASC and 
specifying the responsibilities and liabilities for parties involved in account-
ing, reporting and auditing. 
Secondly, the time period 2000-2004 covers the years when corporate 
governance issues began to attract attention from the public and regulators 
and new regulations on firms’ governance were introduced. Since listed 
firms did not fulfill new regulation at the same pace, differences in firm-
level corporate governance practices can be clearly derived from these data. 
Thirdly, the stock indices in Shanghai and Shenzhen performed, in spite 
of the descending tendency, smoothly during the period 2000 - 2004, as 
shown in Figure 6.01. In contrast, the indices took a roller coaster ride in the 
next few years, mainly driven by the reform of non-tradable shares since 
2005 and the global financial crisis that bursted out in 2008. We believe that 
stock valuations in China will distort during strong market fluctuations, be-
cause local individual investors who dominate at China’s stock market are 
prone to excessive speculation. Thus, the years 2000-2004 rather than the 
following ones must have witnessed more credible stock valuations of do-
mestic listed firms. 
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Figure 6.01 Shanghai & Shenzhen Indices 2000-2008 
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Data source: CSRC (2008) 
e) Sampling and Regression Data Sources 
In accordance to the chosen observation period, the sample firstly con-
siders all the non-financial firms that went public at China’s A-share stock 
market prior to the year 2000. The sample excludes financial firms such as 
banks, insurance and securities companies, because their asset/liability 
structures essentially differ from those firms in non-financial industries. The 
sample next excludes those firms who had been suspended or delisted dur-
ing the observation period. Those listed firms whose equity had been nega-
tive during the observation period were excluded as well. As a result, the 
sample includes 746 listed firms distributed in 21 industries defined by the 
CSRC) as demonstrated by Figure 6.02. 
The sampling process does not distinguish where Chinese firms are 
listed, but regards the two Chinese stock exchanges together as parts of one 
stock market. The reason lies in the similar characteristics of the two stock 
exchanges. On one hand, the regulators did until recently.not clearly differ-
entiate the two stock exchanges.54 The main boards for A-Shares at the two 
exchanges have been functioning very similarly. On the other hand, the in-
dex performances of the two exchanges are highly correlated. For example, 
it can be easily concluded from the previous Figure 6.01 that the stock indi-
                                                          
54 Nowadays, most IPOs of smaller firms take place at the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, 
while the Shanghai Stock Exchange still focuses on bigger IPOs. 
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ces of the two exchanges moved quite in the same manner from 2000 to 
2008. More precisely, a Pearson correlation analysis of the monthly index 
performances in the same period results in a significantly high correlation of 
0.98.  
Figure 6.02 Industry Distribution of the Sample 
Industry Distribution of the Sample
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Source: http://www.wind.com.cn/ 
 
The input data for the regression models have two main sources. One of 
them is the Wind Info, a leading provider of financial data in Mainland Chi-
na, who serves over 80% of domestic financial institutions and about 60% 
of Qualified Foreign Investment Institutions (QFIIs). During a two-week 
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trial of Wind Info in May 2007, we collected the financial data of the Chi-
nese listed firms for the observation period 2000-2004. 
The other source of regression data are listed firms’ annual reports.55 
Since the data base of Wind Info did not contain any information on impor-
tant governance elements such as board composition and compensation 
packages, respectively, we manually collected and calculated these data 
from the 746 listed firms’ annual reports for the 5-year observation period. 
f) Regression Variables 
All the variables employed in the regression models are listed as follows, 
with a description of their definition, calculation (if necessary), and data 
source. For most variables, an abbreviation is given in the parenthesis. 
A) Dependent Variables 
Tobin’s Q (Q) 
Definition: Market value of a firm’s assets over replacement value of the 
firm’s assets 
Calculation: Given the fact that Chinese shares were for a big part not 
tradable until 2005, the calculation of Q is simplified as sum of the market 
value of tradable shares and book value of the non-tradable shares over 
book value of total assets 
Data source: Calculated with financial data from Wind Info 
B) Control Variables 
Return on Assets (ROA) 
Definition: Net profits over total assets 
Data source: Wind Info 
 
Asset/Liability Ratio (Debt) 
Definition: Total liabilities over total assets 
                                                          
55  To mention are the Chinese websites: www.stockstar.com, www.hexun.com, 
www.jrj.com.cn, www.windin.com. 
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Data source: Wind Info 
 
Main Business Growth (Growth) 
Definition: Growth of main business income over a year 
Data source: Calculated with financial data from Wind Info 
 
Firm Size (Size) 
Definition: Adjusted measure of firm assets 
Calculation: Base-10 logarithm of total assets in 100 Mio. RMB 
Data source: Calculated with financial data from Wind Info 
C) Independent Variables 
Blockholder A 
Definition: Dummy variable of the blockholder 
Calculation: 0, if blockholder is the (local) government; 1 otherwise 
Data source: Manually collected from annual reports 
 
Blockholder B 
Definition: Dummy variable of the blockholder 
Calculation: 0, if blockholder is the (local) government or a SOE;  
1 otherwise 
Data source: Manually collected from annual reports 
 
Blockholding 
Definition: Blockholder’s shareholding in percent 
Data source: Wind Info 
 
Shareholding 2-10 
Definition: Relative sum of shareholding of the second to tenth biggest  
shareholders in percent 
Data source: Calculated with financial data from Wind Info 
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Liquidity of Shares (Liquidity) 
Definition: Proportion of tradable shares 
Data source: Wind Info 
 
Blockholder Change 
Definition: Times of blockholder changes within the observation period 
Data source: Manually collected from annual reports 
 
Board Size 
Definition: Number of directors in the board 
Data source: Manually collected from annual reports 
 
Independent Director Proportion (Independent_proportion) 
Definition: Proportion of independent directors in the board 
Data source: Manually collected and calculated from annual reports 
 
Executive Director Proportion (Executive_proportion) 
Definition: Proportion of executive directors in the board 
Data source: Manually collected and calculated from annual reports 
 
Director Positioning at Blockholder Proportion (DPAB_proportion) 
Definition: Proportion of directors in the board who hold a position at  
the blockholder 
Data source: Manually collected and calculated from annual reports 
 
Female Director Proportion (Female_D_proportion) 
Definition: Proportion of female directors in board 
Data source: Manually collected and calculated from annual reports 
 
CEO/Chair Duality 
Definition: Dummy variable of CEO/Chair position duality 
Calculation: 0, if CEO also holds the chair position of the board;  
1, otherwise 
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Data source: Manually collected from annual reports 
 
Supervisory Board Size 
Definition: Number of supervisors 
Data source: Manually collected from annual reports 
 
Supervisor/Director Size Ratio (S/D Ratio) 
Definition: Supervisory board size over board size 
Data source: Calculated with manually collected data 
 
Female Supervisor Proportion (Female_S_proportion) 
Definition:Proportion of female supervisors 
Data source:Manually collected and calculated from annual reports 
 
Adjusted Highest 3 Director Remunerations (Adjusted_H3D) 
Definition: Industry-adjusted sum of the 3 highest director  
remunerations in Mio. RMB 
Data source: Manually collected and calculated from annual reports 
 
Non-Paid (Non-Independent) Director Proportion 
 (Non_Paid_D_proportion) 
Definition: Proportion of non-independent directors who receive no  
remuneration from the listed firm 
Data source: Manually collected and calculated from annual reports 
 
Director Shareholder Proportion (D_Shareholder_proportion) 
Definition: Proportion of directors who possess shares of the listed firm 
Data source: Manually collected and calculated from annual reports 
 
Director Shareholding Proportion (D_Shareholding_proportiion) 
Definition: Proportion of directors’ shareholding of the listed firm 
Data source: Manually collected and calculated from annual reports 
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Non-Paid Supervisor Proportion (Non_Paid_S_proportion) 
Definition: Proportion of supervisors who receive no remuneration from  
the listed firm 
Data source: Manually collected and calculated from annual reports 
 
Supervisor Shareholding Proportion (S_Shareholding_proportion) 
Definition: Proportion of supervisors’ shareholding of the listed firm 
Data source: Manually collected and calculated from annual reports 
 
CEO Turnover 
Definition: Dummy variable of CEO turnover 
Calculation: 0, if CEO stays on the position; 1 otherwise 
Data source: Manually collected from annual reports 
 
Adjusted Highest 3 Management Remunerations (Adjusted_H3M) 
Definition: Industry-adjusted sum of the 3 highest management  
remunerations in Mio. RMB 
Data source: Manually collected and calculated from annual reports 
 
Managerment Shareholding Proportion (M_Shareholding_proportion) 
Definition: Proportion of management’s shareholding of the listed firm 
Data source: Manually collected and calculated from annual reports 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses to be tested 
a) Blockholding 
A) Theories 
Ownership structure, i.e. the identities of a firm’s shareholders and the 
sizes of their holdings, varies from country to country. Publicly traded 
firms’ ownership in Anglo-Saxon economies is typically widely diffused 
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among a large number of individual shareholders. With their very small 
fractions of a firm’s shares, individual shareholders rarely have incentives to 
expand significant resources to monitor management or influence their deci-
sion-making. In addition, the free-rider problem reduces the incentives for 
these small shareholders to coordinate their actions (Denis & McConnell 
2003). 
Blockholding or concentrated ownership, however, is more prevalent in a 
firm’s ownership structure around the world. Majluf et al. (1998) provide 
evidence that the largest shareholders in Chile control over 40% of the eq-
uity of the largest companies. La Porta et al. (1999) survey the largest 20 
publicly traded firms in 27 wealthy economies and report that of all the 
sample firms, 36% were widely-held, 30% were family-controlled, 18% 
were state-controlled, and the remaining 15% exhibited a variety of other 
ownership structures. Becht & Röell (1999) document that blockholding 
prevails in firms domiciled in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
Spain and The Netherlands. Faccio & Lang (2002) examine western Euro-
pean countries and report that family-owned listed firms are common in 
continental Europe. Prowse (1992) provides evidence that over 30% of 
Japanese listed firms’ equity are owned by the top five shareholders. Claes-
sens et al. (2000) conclude for their East Asia sample that 75% of the listed 
firms are associated with business groups. 
A concentrated ownership can be of great benefit to large shareholders in 
a few ways. Firstly, blockholding facilitates takeovers by large shareholders 
(Grossman & Hart 1980; Shleifer & Vishny 1986). Secondly, a risk-averse 
entrepreneur may retain a large stake in the listed firm after its IPO such as 
to manage the firm well himself (Leland & Pyle 1977). Thirdly, blockhold-
ing enables a risk-averse shareholder to monitor management well (Admati 
et al. 1994; Huddar 1993). Fourthly, shareholders with a big stock block 
may gain an informational advantage over other market participants, which 
makes it easier for them to speculate at the secondary market (Kahn & Win-
ton 1998). 
Blockholding has costs as well. One of its most important problems is 
that the monitoring of the management by large shareholders can be insuffi-
cient. Hirschman (1970) points out that at liquid secondary markets, block-
holders tend not to monitor management actively. Indeed, shareholders at 
highly liquid US secondary markets rarely have incentives to monitor man-
agement (Mayer 1988; Black 1990; Coffee 1991; Roe 1994; Bhide 1993). 
Another problem is overmonitoring by the blockholder: A number of theo-
retical studies argue that in case of overmonitoring by the large shareholder, 
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the management may be discouraged from making costly firm specific in-
vestments (Aghion & Tirole 1997; Burkart et al. 1997; Pagano & Röell 
1998).  
The most significant set of problems with blockholding, however, are 
conflicts of interests between blockholders and minority shareholders. La 
Porta et al. (1998) point out that in a concentrated ownership, conflicts of 
interest as are common in Anglo-Saxon countries are no more meaningful. 
The reason lies in that large shareholders have both the incentive and the 
ability to control the management. But a blockholder’s interests, as argued 
by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), must not coincide with the interests of other 
shareholders in the same firm. While using his control rights to maximize 
his own welfare, a blockholder can act contrarily to small shareholders’ in-
terests. Especially when the blockholder has more voting rights than cash-
flow rights, expropriation of minority shareholders tend to be more often 
(Zingales 1994; Bianco et al. 1997; Burkart et al. 1997, La Porta et al. 1998; 
Wolfenzon 1999; Bebchuk 1999; Bebchuk et al. 2000; Claessens et al. 
2002).  
To prevent blockholder overmonitoring or expropriation, some research-
ers suggest that it is often possible to design the corporate ownership struc-
ture or charter to limit the power of the blockholder (Aghion & Tirole 1997; 
Burkart et. al 1997; Pagano & Röell 1998). Yet Bebchuk (1999) and Beb-
chuk & Roe (1999) retort that although theoretically corporate charts can 
restrain self-dealing by blockholders, in practice they are likely to be of no 
effect and therefore regulations limiting blockholder are called for. 
Apart from its benefits and problems, it has also been discussed in the lit-
erature why blockholding or concentrated ownership, instead of dispersed 
ownership, is so dominant around the world. Most of the researchers have 
associated this dominance to the local cost and regulatory factors. Black 
(1990) argues that if local regulations mainly increase the costs of hostile 
takeovers but do not substantially restrict blockholder rights then a market 
based on blockholder monitoring may arise. Bolton & von Thadden (1998) 
argue that the choice is dependent on the value of monitoring, the need for 
intervention, the demand for liquidity and the regulatory structure in place. 
La Porta et al. (1998) argue that the ways in which corporate finance and 
corporate governance evolve in a country are fundamentally determined by 
(1) the extent to which that country’s laws protect investor rights, and (2) 
the extent to which those laws are enforced. They then find evidence that 
ownership structure in countries with low investor protection tend to be 
highly concentrated. John & Kedia (2000) puts that the choice relies on un-
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derlying conditions defined by two factors: the costs of bank monitoring and 
the effectiveness of hostile takeovers. They argue that the optimal owner-
ship structure is (1) concentrated ownership, if bank monitoring is costly 
and takeovers are ineffective; (2) bank monitoring, if costs of bank monitor-
ing are low and takeovers are ineffective; or (3) diffused ownership, if 
monitoring is costly and takeovers are effective. 
B) International Empirical Researches 
In the empirical literature, many surveys directly address the link be-
tween blockholding and firm performance in different countries. In the 
USA, evidence on the relation between blockholders and the value of listed 
firms has come up mixed (Holderness 2003). However, block trades in the 
USA are typically priced at a premium to the exchange price, indicating that 
blockholders can enjoy significant private benefits of control (Barclay & 
Holderness 1989; Mikkelson & Regassa 1991; Chang & Mayers 1995). 
Kang & Shivdasani (1995) report that blockholded firms in Japan react 
more quickly to performance declines than do those without blockholders. 
In Germany, firm performance is positively related to concentrated owner-
ship (Gorton & Schmid 2000), while there is no relation between ownership 
structure and management turnover (Kaplan 1994). Claessens & Djankov 
(1999) report that in the Czech Republic, firm profitability and labor pro-
ductivity are both positively related to ownership concentration. Lins & Ser-
vaes (1999) examine the impact of concentrated ownership by insiders on 
the value of diversified firms in Germany, Japan, and the UK. They docu-
ment a positive effect of concentrated ownership on the value of diversifica-
tion in Germany, but not in the UK or Japan. 
In studying the impact of blockholding on firm performance, a number of 
researches draw a distinction between types of blockholders such as corpo-
rations, institutions, families and government. Mehran (1995) reports no 
significant relations between firm performance and the holdings by a variety 
of different types of blockholders in the USA. Claessens et al. (1998) study 
firms in nine East Asian countries and report that ownership by corporations 
is negatively related to performance, whereas ownership by the government 
has a positive impact on performance. They find no evidence that institu-
tional ownership influences firm performance in these countries. Dewenter 
& Malatesta (2001) examine Fortune magazine’s largest industrial firms 
outside the USA for the years 1975, 1985 and 1995 and report state-owned 
firms are significantly less profitable and exhibit significantly greater labor 
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intensity than privately owned firms. Morck et al. (2000) document positive 
relation between high ownership by banks and firm performance in Japan. 
Gorton & Schmid (2000) report that in case of blockholding by banks, the 
positive relation between ownership concentration and firm value is particu-
larly strong for German firms. Gibson (2003) examines firms in eight 
emerging market countries and documents that there is no relation between 
CEO turnover and firm performance when firms have a domestic block-
holder. These studies imply that the blockholder identity has a significant 
impact on firm performance. 
In the frame of blockholding, a very different set of governance-related 
empirical studies focuses on ownership change by privatization. This may 
have great reference for China, where primarily former SOEs have gone 
public at the domestic stock market. Megginson et al. (1994) examine 61 
privatized SOEs from 18 countries over the period 1979-1990 and report 
increases in profitability, efficiency and work force in those sample compa-
nies after privatization. Boubakri & Cosset (1998) compare 79 privatized 
firms in 21 developing countries to various benchmarks and report increases 
in profitability, operating efficiency, employment levels and dividends fol-
lowing privatization. Similar findings have been documented by La Porta & 
Lopez-de-Silanes (1999) for 218 Mexican firms over the period 1983-1991, 
and by Claessens & Djankov (1998) for 6354 Eastern European firms over 
the period 1992-1995.  
Overall, the empirical evidence on firm performance suggests: (1) the re-
lation between blockholding and firm performance differs according to 
blockholder identity and country; (2) concentrated ownership mostly has a 
positive effect on firm value; and (3) private ownership is associated with 
better firm performance than is state ownership. 
C) Evidence from China 
Xu & Wang (1997) examine publicly traded firms in China over the pe-
riod 1993-1995 and document that (1) there is a significantly positive rela-
tion between ownership concentration and profitability; (2) the effect of 
ownership concentration is stronger for companies dominated by legal per-
son than for those controlled by the state; (3) firms’ profitability is posi-
tively related to the fraction of legal person shares, but either negatively 
related or unrelated to the fraction of state shares and tradable A-shares held 
mostly by individuals; and (4) labor productivity tends to decline as the pro-
portion of state shares increases. 
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Hu & Goergen (2001) analyze the seven-year evolution of stock concen-
tration for 129 Chinese firms that went public in 1993. They report the fol-
lowing interesting findings. Firstly, smaller and modern industrial compa-
nies are concentrated with legal persons, employees and domestic individual 
investors, and are more widely held. Conversely, larger and traditional in-
dustrial firms are heavily concentrated with direct shareholding by the state. 
Secondly, smaller, growing and high-risk firms have a greater reduction of 
state control over the seven-year period. In comparison, the state retains 
overwhelming control in larger and strategically important firms even sever 
years after their IPO. Finally, the ownership by foreign entities displays the 
fact that the Chinese government has instituted favorable policies to support 
larger firms and given priority to them to acquire overseas funds. 
Xu et al. (2002) analyze the data drawn from a national survey of the 
ownership reform in 40,246 industrial SOEs in China, conducted by the 
National Statistical Bureau in the summer of 1998. They document that in 
contrast to shareholding by the state, foreign ownership has a positive effect 
and employee shareholding has a negative effect on firm performance, whe-
reas the effect of collective and legal person shareholding is indistinguish-
able from that of state shareholding.  
Using a sample of Chinese listed firms in the period 1998-2002, Firth et 
al. (2002) document that turnover-performance sensitivity is higher in those 
firms where the blockholder is a legal person. Similarly, Chen & Wang 
(2004) examine a sample of 773 CEO changes in Chinese listed companies 
over the period 1995-2003 and provide evidence that CEO turnover is less 
sensitive to firm performance in firms controlled by the state than in those 
controlled by SOEs as well as legal persons. 
Berkman et al. (2002) provide evidence that investors react positively to 
the announcement of the transfer of control rights from the government 
agency to a SOE. 
Tian & Estrin (2005) examine the ownership structure of Chinese listed 
firms over the period 1994-1998 with a data set of 2660 firm-year observa-
tions in 21 industries and document a few interesting findings. First, state 
shareholding generally has a negative impact on a firm’s value. Second, the 
firms with diffused ownership structure perform worse than both privately 
and state-owned firms. Third, the relation between state shareholding and 
firm value is non-monotonic. In fact, it is U-shaped, with a higher level of 
firm value with lower levels of state ownership than with higher ones. In 
other words, when the state shareholding is sufficiently large, the effect of 
government shareholding on corporate performance is marginally positive 
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in contrast to situations where private and state ownership are more equally 
balanced. 
D) Hypotheses on Blockholding 
Chinese SOEs have been subject to either direct or indirect (e.g. via state-
owned holding groups) tight governmental control. Although many of them 
have been corporatized and gone public since the 1990ies, political influ-
ences on them have not significantly decreased due to the state’s blockhold-
ing in those firms’ ownership structure. As the political interests do not nec-
essarily accord with and are sometimes against those of stock investors, we 
expect a negative correlation between the state blockholder and a listed 
firm’s market value. 
Similarily, a blockholder, either the state or a private one, does not neces-
sarily act in accordance with the interests of smaller investors and can easily 
expropriate them. Expropriation of smaller investors is more likely in China, 
where the ownership structures of listed firms are extremely concentrated 
and the extern governance mechanisms, especially the legal protection for 
smaller investors, are weak. Therefore, we expect a negative correlation 
between blockholding and a listed firm’s market value. 
A higher shareholding by other bigger shareholders (the second to the 
tenth biggest shareholders) and a higher proportion of tradable shares (li-
quidity) can lessen the blockholder’s control over the listed firm and thus 
his expropriation of other shareholders. For this reason, we expect positive 
influences of shareholding of second to tenth biggest shareholders and li-
quidity of shares on a listed firm’s market value.  
Blockholder change occurred only occasionally at China’s stock market. 
Although it said nothing about the new blockholder, blockholder change at 
least replaced the previous “bad” blockholder who could not keep a listed 
firm profitable for years. 
The hypotheses on blockholding are as follows: 
 
H1: The blockholder State has a negative impact on a listed firm’s  
market value. 
H2: Blockholding has a negative impact on a listed firm’s market value. 
H3: Shareholding of second to tenth biggest shareholders has a positive  
impact on a listed firm’s market value. 
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H4: Liquidity of shares has a positive impact on a listed firm’s market 
 value. 
H5: Blockholder change has a positive impact on a listed firm’s market  
value. 
b) Board Composition 
A) Theories 
Most corporate charters require that shareholders elect a board of direc-
tors, who selects the CEO, monitors management, and votes on important 
decisions in corporate finance such as mergers and acquisitions, changes in 
the compensation package of the CEO, changes in the firm’s capital struc-
ture like stock repurchases or new debt issues, etc. As Fama & Jensen 
(1983) put it, the board of directors is the apex of internal decision control 
systems of organizations. It controls managers’ opportunistic behavior so as 
to align shareholders’ and managers’ interests (Jensen 1993), gives expert 
views and strategic advice to management (Lorsch 1995; Dalton & Daily 
1999; Westphal 1999), and source critical resources and information (Pfef-
fer & Salancik 1978; Aldrich 1979; Dalton & Daily 1999), which can create 
sustainable competitive advantage (Conner & Prahalad 1996). In spirit, most 
corporate charters are designed to operate like a ‘shareholder democracy’, 
while the management and board serve as its executive branch and legisla-
tive branch, respectively (Becht et al. 2005).  
Although the board is an effective corporate governance mechanism in 
theory, some facts speak against its value in monitoring management. First, 
the board can be partly or in some cases mainly composed by insiders who 
are to be monitored (Denis & McConnell 2003). Second, the CEO is often at 
the same time the chairperson of the board (Denis & McConnell 2003). 
Such a CEO/chair duality is thought to lean more towards self-dealing 
(Becht et al. 2005). Third, in firms with dispersed ownership, the board is 
often captured by management (and/or CEO) and cannot function as a truly 
independent legislature checking and balancing the power of management. 
The reasons lie in: (1) management has considerable influence over the 
choice of directors; (2) directors prefer to play a less confrontational ‘advi-
sory’ role than a more critical monitoring role; (3) directors generally only 
have a very limited financial stake in the corporation (Becht et al. 2005).  
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In order to reduce management’s influence over the board, regulators in 
many countries have required that a minimum proportion of the directors 
must be composed by independent or outside directors. An independent (or 
outside) director is neither employed by the firm, nor in a business relation 
with the firm or in familial relationship with any of the firm’s employees. 
Fama & Jensen (1983) argue that boards would be more effective, it they 
are composed with more outside directors. Corporate governance in the 
USA has de facto developed toward independent boards that are mainly 
composed of independent directors (John & Senbet 1997). The rationale 
behind these regulations and changes in board composition is that directors, 
with less influence from management, are more likely to defend sharehold-
ers’ interests. 
Becht et al. (2005) summarize several weak points in this logic. First, in-
dependent directors appointed from outside the firm may lack the day-to-
day information to monitor management effectively. Second, their reap-
pointment may still be influenced by management. Third, they may not per-
form well in firms with a concentrated ownership structure. For one thing, 
directors may be dependent on both management and the controlling share-
holder. For another, they not only monitor management, but also have to 
present the interests of minority shareholders. This complicates their job. 
A few formal analyses have been conducted to model the role, effective-
ness as well as formation of the board. In the model of Hermalin & Weis-
bach (1998), board appointments are determined through negotiations be-
tween the existing board and the CEO. As the firm runs better, the CEO’s 
bargaining power grows and the independence of the board tends to dimin-
ish. As a result, the longer CEOs have been on the job, they tend to be less 
closely monitored by the board. The model of Warther (1998) assumes that 
minority directors who distaste management can be dismissed and directors 
prefer to stay on the board. Thus, it can be predicted that directors are not 
willing to oppose management, unless they are sure that a majority of the 
board members will do so. This model implies boards are active only in 
crisis situations. Adams (2001) argues in his model that the board’s moni-
toring function can restrict its ability to extract information from manage-
ment that is needed for its advisory function. The conflict between the moni-
toring and advisory roles of the board implies the possible advantages of a 
two-tier board system as is instituted in Germany. The model of Raheja 
(2002) considers project choice and CEO succession as the two types of 
board decisions and assumes that the CEO and executive directors have in-
formational advantage over independent directors. The decision on CEO 
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succession is used to induce insiders to reveal their private information 
about project characteristics. Raheja derives the board composition and size 
that best educe insider information and argues that it may vary with underly-
ing firm characteristics. 
Besides board independence issues, board size and board diversity have 
also attracted much attention. With more directors added to the board, its 
size expands and its capacity for monitoring tends to increase as well. But 
this benefit may be outweighed by the higher cost of poorer communication 
and decision-making associated with larger groups. As argued by Jensen 
(1993), larger board size, i.e. a bigger number of directors on the board, is 
considered less effective, as the directors may be (1) slower in decisions that 
require an immediate course of action, (2) less direct and decisive in their 
operation, and (3) less critical of each other. Therefore, limiting the number 
of directors on the board may improve efficiency. 
Board diversity is, compared with other board characteristics, a more re-
cent issue and has been increasingly promoted by institutional shareholders 
and shareholder activists under the assumption that greater diversity leads to 
less insular decision-making processes in the board (Westphal & Milton 
2000). According to Robinson & Dechant (1997), in the context of the fast–
growing global market, diversity tends to include differences in gender, eth-
nicity, age, physical abilities, qualities, and sexual orientation, as well as 
differences in attitudes, perspectives and background. However, the current 
theoretical framework including agency theory can not clearly explain or 
predict the link between board-specific phenomena and firm value (Herma-
lin & Weisbach 2001).  
B) International Empirical Researches 
In the empirical corporate governance literature, proportion of independ-
ent directors, CEO/chair duality and board size are the most extensively 
studied board composition characteristics. With simple regression analysis, 
these characteristics are related to performance measures like stock market 
abnormal returns, Tobin’s Q and usual accounting measures as well as dis-
cipline brought on top management like CEO turnover. 
In the USA, empirical work can not confirm the relation between board 
independence and firm performance. Fosberg (1989) report no relation be-
tween proportion of outside directors and firm performance for 200 random 
firms listed in the 1979 Moody’s Industrial Manual. Hermalin & Weisbach 
(1991) examine 142 NYSE firms for 1971-1983, but fail to find a relation 
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between board composition and stock market performance. Rosenstein & 
Wyatt (1990) document that announcements of outside director appoint-
ments in the “Wall Street Journal” over the period of 1980-1985 are signifi-
cantly associated with increase in shareholder wealth. More indirectly, 
Brickley et al. (1994) provide evidence that the stock market reacts posi-
tively to the adoption of poison pills in case of a large independent director 
fraction. 
In the rest of the world, evidence also appears inconsistent. Kaplan & 
Minton (1994) report that outside director appointments increase following 
poor stock performance and earnings losses of Japanese firms, and on aver-
age, such appointments stabilize and modestly improve corporate perform-
ance. In contrary, Kang & Shivdasani (1995) find no evidence for a defini-
tive relation between the presence of outside directors and the sensitivity of 
CEO turnover to performance for Japanese firms. Hossain et al. (2001) 
document that a higher fraction of independent directors leads to better per-
formance of New Zealand firms. Suchard et al. (2001) find that top man-
agement turnover in Australia is positively related to the presence of non-
executive directors on the board. Franks et al. (2001) examine a sample of 
poorly performing firms in the UK and find that boards dominated by out-
side directors actually impede discipline of poorly performing managers. 
Studies on the relation between CEO/chair duality and firm performance 
have shown mixed evidence, too. Daily & Dalton (1992) and Brickley et al. 
(1997) find no relationship between CEO/chair duality and firm perform-
ance. Rechner & Dalton (1991), however, document that a sample of For-
tune 500 firms with CEO/chair duality have stronger financial performance 
compared with others.  
With respect to board size, the generally tested hypothesis that smaller 
boards are more effective has been confirmed by many empirical researches. 
Hermalin & Weisbach (2001) review numerous studies in the USA and con-
clude that board size is negatively related to both general firm performance 
and the quality of decision-making. Eisenberg et al. (1998) report an inverse 
relation between board size and profitability for small and midsize firms in 
Finland. Mak & Yuanto (2002) document that board size has a negative 
impact on Tobin’s Q in Singapore and Malaysia. Carline et al. (2002) doc-
ument that board size is negatively related to operating performance im-
provements following UK mergers. 
Empirical work in reference to board diversity and firm performance is 
very limited. In probably the first research of its kind, Carter et al. (2003) 
report a significant positive relation between the percentage of women 
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and/or minority races on the boards of directors, and firm value of the For-
tune 1000 firms. Ramaswamy & Li (2001) document that greater foreign 
directorship appears to be able to influence firms by discouraging unrelated 
diversification of Indian firms. 
All in all, the empirical literature on the board characteristics indicates: 
(1) the relation between board independence and firm performance is not 
widely confirmed; (2) new appointments of independent directors, espe-
cially following poor firm performance, can positively affect the firm value; 
(3) the impact of CEO/chair duality can be positive as well as negative for 
firm performance; (4) board size is negatively related to firm performance; 
and (5) board diversity tends to increase firm value, which is however in 
need of more investigations. 
C) Evidence from China 
Tian & Lau (2001) survey 207 firms that went public in either of China’s 
two stock exchanges in 1996 and find no positive relation between the pro-
portion of independent directors on the board and firm performance over the 
period 1996-1997. However, they provide evidence that CEO/chair duality 
has positive linear relationship with firm operation efficiency (ROA and 
ROE).  
Li et al. (2001) investigate the board composition of 91 Chinese firms 
that went public in 1998 and 1999 and document that the fractions of execu-
tive and independent directors on the board have no direct link to firm per-
formance. In contrast, they find non-executive directors who are hired by 
the blockholding firm are significantly related to accounting performance of 
the firms. This relation, however, is inverse U-shaped: with more non-
executive directors on the board, firm performance increases up to a certain 
degree and then begins to decrease. 
Lü (2004) uses a sample of 584 industrial firms that are publicly traded at 
the Chinese stock market to examine the conclusions drawn by Li et al. 
(2001). He reports that there is no relation of the fractions of executive and 
non-executive directors to firm performance. In contrast to the results found 
by Li et al (2001), it is rather independent directors that have a significant 
impact on firm performance. Liu (2007) surveys the 2002 annual reports of 
74 Chinese listed firms in the utility industry and documents similar find-
ings. 
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Kato & Long (2006) study China’s publicly traded firms over the period 
1998-2002 and report that the appointment of independent directors en-
hances the link between CEO turnover and firm performance, whereas turn-
over-performance link in weaker in listed firms with their CEOs holding 
additional positions at the controlling shareholders. 
D) Hypotheses on Board Composition 
So far, there is no evidence on the link between the board size and a 
firm’s valuation in China. However, we believe that smaller boards are more 
effective, because fewer directors can communicate, make decisions and, in 
ad hoc situations, react more quickly. We expect that the size of the board of 
directors has a negative impact on a firm’s value in China. 
To improve corporate governance of Chinese listed firms, stock market 
regulators in China tried to enhance the independence of board of directors 
and promoted the separation of CEO/chair duality and introduced independ-
ent directors in the observation period. We assume these measures function 
well at China’s stock market and can increase a listed firm’s market value. 
We expect the proportion of executive directors to have a negative impact 
on a firm’s value, as it lessens the independence of the board. 
Directors positioning at the blockholder seem to impair the independence 
of the board and have a negative impact on a listed firm’s value. However, 
whether the directors hold a position at the blockholder does not change the 
fact that in China, the blockholder can have a decisive influence on the 
choice of directors. In other words, the proportion of directors who also 
have a job at the blockholder cannot actually make the board more or less 
independent. But from a different point of view, more directors working at 
the blockholder can strengthen the link between the board and the block-
holder and reinforce the monitoring of the management. So we expect a 
positive correlation between this proportion and a listed firm’s market value 
in China. 
Although a higher proportion of female directors increases the diversity 
of the board, we are neutral on their influences. In our opinion, gender is not 
a decisive factor for a director’s performance. Meanwhile, we cannot find 
any theory works or evidence for or against more female directors on the 
board. Consequently, we expect that the proportion of female directors on 
board has no impact on a listed firm’s market value. 
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The supervisory board is designed to monitor the board of directors and 
the management. However, we do not expect the supervisory board to have 
big influences on Chinese listed firms’ market performance. The supervisors 
in Chinese listed firms, unlike their counterparts in the German model, (1) 
do not enjoy a higher position in the governance structure than the directors 
so as to better monitor the directors and the management, (2) they are often 
chosen and nominated by the board of directors, and (3) they do not have 
enough information on a listed firm’s operation. In consideration of the inef-
fectivity of the supervisory board, we expect the size of supervisory board 
and supervisory board size/board of directors size to have a negative impact 
on a listed firm’s market performance. Like the case of the board of direc-
tors, we expect no impact of female supervisors on a listed firm’s market 
performance. 
 
H6: Size of the board of directors has a negative impact on a listed firm’s  
market value. 
H7: CEO/chair duality has a negative impact on a listed firm’s market  
value. 
H8: The proportion of independent directors on board has a positive  
impact on a listed firm’s market value. 
H9: The proportion of executive directors on board has a negative impact  
on a listed firm’s market value. 
H10: The proportion of directors positioning at the blockholder has a  
positive impact on a listed firm’s market value. 
 
H11: The proportion of female directors on board has no positive impact  
on a listed firm’s market value. 
H12: The size of the supervisory board has a negative impact on a listed  
firm’s market value. 
H13: S/D size ratio has a negative impact on a listed firm’s market value. 
H14: The proportion of female supervisors on supervisory board has no  
impact on a listed firm’s market value. 
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c) Executive Compensation 
A) Theories 
Besides monitoring, another often suggested internal mechanism to re-
duce inefficiency or self-dealing of management and thus to raise share-
holder protection is structuring executive compensation plans so as to align 
management’s interests with those of shareholders. Most compensation 
packages in listed firms consists of a basic salary component, an annual bo-
nus tied to short-term accounting performance, and stock options and long-
term incentive plans including restricted stock plans and multi-year account-
ing-based performance plans (Murphy 1999). 
Executive compensation in the USA has been rising continuously since 
the 1970ies. Murphy (1999) examine the compensation packages for CEOs 
in the S&P 500 over the period 1992-1996 and document that (1) CEO pay 
levels vary by industry; (2) CEO compensation increased substantially due 
to stock option grants; (3) the increase in stock options for CEOs and the 
increase in total compensation holds across size groups; and (4) not surpris-
ingly, compensation increases with company size. 
Using Tower Perrins Worldwide Total Remuneration Survey 1997 data, 
Murphy (1999) points out that US CEOs are not only paid more than their 
international counterparts, but differently than CEOs elsewhere: US CEOs 
receive a larger fraction of their pay in the form of stock options, and a low-
er fraction in the form of salaries than their international counterparts. Becht 
et al. (2005) examine the Tower Perrins Worldwide Total Remuneration 
Survey data of the year 2000 and report that US CEO salary component 
alone is higher than the total package in Germany, Spain, Sweden and Swit-
zerland, and not much lower than in France or Japan. In contrast, the total 
compensation of management other than CEO is similar across OECD 
countries and only higher in Italy than in the USA (Abowd & Kaplan 1999). 
One frequently voiced concern about high executive compensation, stock 
options in particular, is that it may, despite its incentives, be a simple and 
direct way for management to enrich themselves at the expense of decrease 
in shareholder value. In fact, practitioners consider a grant of an unusually 
large compensation package as a signal of poor corporate governance (Mi-
now 2000). However, there is no attempt in existing theoretical work to ana-
lyze the determination of executive pay along the lines of Hermalin & 
Weisbach (1998), by explicitly modeling the bargaining process between 
the CEO, the remuneration committee and the board. 
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Instead, most formal analyses on executive compensation have drawn 
general conclusions about the structure of executive pay, relying on the the-
ory of contracting under moral hazard of Mirrlees (1976, 1999), Holmström 
(1979) and Grossman & Hart (1983). It suggests that the pay for risk-averse 
and self-interested management are dependent on both firm performance 
(e.g. accounting returns) and stock-based firm value measures that provide 
useful information for shareholders to assess whether management has in-
deed taken the desired actions (Murphy 1999). It also highlights the trade-
off between risk and incentives for management: incentives will be weaker 
for more risk-averse executives, and will also be weaker the greater the un-
controllable noise in firm value (Murphy 1999). 
One complicating factor in designing compensation is that management 
is driven by both explicit and implicit incentives. Executives are concerned 
about firm performance not only because their pay is directly linked to it, 
but also because their future career opportunities are affected by it. The 
formal model of Gibbons & Murphy (1992) allows for both the explicit in-
centives from compensation contracts and the implicit incentives from ca-
reer concerns. It suggests that optimal compensation contracts neutralize 
career concern incentives by optimizing the total incentives from the com-
pensation and from career concerns: explicit contractual incentives are high 
when implicit career concern incentives are low, and vice versa. Therefore, 
explicit incentives should be strongest for management close to retirement, 
whereas implicit incentives are stronger where promotion opportunities are 
plentiful rather than scarce (Gibbons & Murphy 1992). 
B) International Empirical Researches 
The bulk of empirical literature on executive compensation has focused 
on the sensitivity of executive pay (explicit incentives) and CEO turnover or 
post-retirement board services (implicit incentives) to firm performance. 
The US research reviewed by Murphy (1999) and by Core et al. (2001) doc-
ument that the sensitivity of pay to performance in the USA has increased 
over time, while the vast majority of this sensitivity comes through execu-
tive ownership of common stock and of options on common stock. Murphy 
(1999) documents that although CEO dismissals have become more com-
monplace in the 1990s the link between CEO turnover and performance has 
declined rather than increased over the same period. Brickley et al. (1999) 
report that in the USA, CEO careers continue after retirement with 75% 
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holding at least one directorship after two years, 49.5% stay on their own 
board after retirement, and 18% function as chairman. 
The international evidence on executive compensation has also expanded 
recently. Kaplan (1994) reports that the sensitivity of top executive pay to 
stock returns and to earnings losses in Japan is similar to that in the USA. 
However, Japanese managers own less stock and stock options than do their 
counterparts in the USA. Conyon & Murphy (2000) compare executive 
compensation in the USA and the UK and document that the sensitivity of 
compensation to increases in shareholder wealth is much smaller in the UK 
than in the USA. They attribute the difference largely to greater share option 
grants in the US. Crespi et al. (2002) examine executive compensation in 
Spain and provide evidence of greater pay following increases in industry-
adjusted stock price performance. This sensitivity of pay to performance, 
however, holds only in those firms with a strong blockholding. Bryan et al. 
(2002) survey the use of equity in the compensation packages of firms in 43 
countries, reporting that firms in countries with more equity-oriented capital 
markets and firms with higher growth opportunities use more equity com-
pensation.  
Murphy (1999) reviews the limited literature on international differences 
in executive compensation practices and conclude that (1) the sensitivity of 
cash pay to company size is remarkably constant across countries; (2) the 
sensitivity of cash pay to stock price performance, and the relation between 
CEO turnover and performance is roughly comparable in the US, Japan, and 
Germany; (3) stock-based incentives from stock options and stock owner-
ship are much higher in the US than in other countries; and (4) pay levels 
and structures are converging because of an increasingly global market for 
managerial talent and exploding interest in stock options worldwide. 
C) Evidence from China 
Groves et al. (1995) examine a sample of Chinese non-listed firms and 
find that executive turnover is negatively associated to firm performance. 
Firth et al. (2002) study the replacement of chairmen in Chinese listed 
firms over a five-year period from 1998 to 2002 and report that there is a 
negative relation between chairperson turnover and a firm’s profitability, 
but no relation between chairperson turnover and stock returns in China. 
They also find no evidence that a change of the chairperson improves prof-
itability, which suggests that a firm’s governance structure is ineffective as 
 112 JUNHUA TANG 
it is unable to recruit suitable replacements that can turn around its financial 
performance. 
Kato & Long (2006) study China’s publicly traded firms over the period 
1998-2002 and report that (1) CEO turnover is negatively related to firm 
performance; (2) the link between CEO turnover and accounting perform-
ance is stronger when the blockholding is larger; (3) the relation between 
CEO turnover and stock performance is weaker when the blockholder is the 
state; (4) the appointment of independent directors enhances the turnover-
performance link; and (5) listed firms with CEOs holding additional posi-
tions in the controlling shareholders have weaker turnover-performance 
link. 
D) Hypotheses on Executive Compensation 
In China, most listed firms are transformed from former SOEs, and their 
directors and executives are usually appointed by the local governments or 
SOE holding groups who act as blockholders of the listed firms. In consid-
eration of the political interferences in management appointment, a profes-
sional manager market does not actually exist for these listed firms. It is 
doubtful, whether the listed firms have hired the best executives they can 
find and whether the executives on the job are paid more than they should 
earn. Meanwhile, executives of a listed firm are able to pay themselves very 
high, because they, on behalf of the blockholder, exercise de facto the con-
trol rights of the firm. Too much compensation, either in form of salary or 
stock, for directors and executives, expropriates smaller shareholders. We 
expect the adjusted salary of the three most paid directors (H3D) and execu-
tives (H3M) to have a negative impact on a listed firm’s market perform-
ance. Similarly, we expect higher director shareholder proportion, director 
shareholding, supervisor shareholding as well as management shareholding 
to have a negative impact on a listed firm’s market performance. We expect 
non-paid director and supervisor proportions to have a positive impact on a 
listed firm’s market value, because they are not financially bound with the 
listed firm and can better serve as monitors or supervisors. CEO turnovers 
are, as we will show in the following descriptive statistics, very common in 
China. We expect that frequent changes of CEO are a symbol of instability 
in business operation and will lead to lower market value of a listed firm. 
 
H15: Adjusted H3D has a negative impact on a listed firm’s market  
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value. 
H16: Non-paid director proportion has a positive impact on a listed  
firm’s market value. 
H17: Director shareholder proportion has a negative impact on a listed  
firm’s market value. 
H18: Director shareholding proportion has a negative impact on a listed  
firm’s market value. 
H19: Non-paid supervisor proportion has a positive impact on a listed  
firm’s market value. 
H20: Supervisor shareholding proportion has a negative impact on a  
listed firm’s market value. 
H21: CEO turnover has a negative impact on a listed firm’s market value. 
H22: Adjusted H3M has a negative impact on a listed firm’s market  
value. 
H23: Management shareholding proportion has a negative impact on a  
listed firm’s market value. 
3. Clustering of Industries 
Since the SOEs are dominant in some strategically important industries 
and have withdrawn from several others, the Chinese non-financial indus-
tries can be grouped into monopolistic and competitive industries. The aim 
of the industry clustering is to identify those monopolistic and those com-
petitive industries in China, so as to observe whether corporate governance 
mechanisms differently influence listed firms’ market value in different 
clusters. To identify those monopolistic and competitive industries, we util-
ize two dimensions – the political one as is reflected in the central govern-
ment’s industry policies and the market one as is measured by market shares 
of different participators. 
a) Political Dimension 
In February 2005, the Chinese State Council issued Some Opinions on 
Encouraging, Supporting and Guiding Non-State-Owned Economies such as 
Self-Employing and Private Sectors (Some Opinions 2005 in short), the 
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very first policy document to promote the private investments in China. In 
this document, it clearly states that non-state capitals should be allowed or 
encouraged to invest into monopolistic industries including mining, utilities, 
infrastructures, telecommunication, railway and civil aviation, financial ser-
vices, social welfare, and national defense technology. From a very indirect 
way, this document officially defines the monopolistic industries in China 
that have been dominated by SOEs until then. 
However, the policies in Some Opinions 2005 have not been fulfilled in 
the following years. One reason was that a concrete framework to realize 
these policies did not exist, making them inoperative. The private sector 
gave this phenomenon the nickname “glass gate”, through which one can 
look into, but cannot actually pass. 
Another reason lied in the paradox of the government’s policies. In 2006, 
just one year after the issuance of Some Opinions 2005, the Commission of 
State-Owned Assets enacted Guide Opinions on Promoting Adjustment of 
State-Owned Capitals and Reorganization of SOEs, which points out that 
the state-owned capitals should absolutely control important industries and 
key fields so as to increase the controlling force of the state sector. These 
industries and fields are concerned with national security, important infra-
structures and mineral resources, and big enterprises in pillar and hi-tech 
industries. In nature, this document excludes private investments in those 
monopolistic industries. 
Later, seeing that Some Opinions 2005 had been ineffective, the central 
government, again, began to draft a document on promoting private invest-
ments. In May 2010, the State Council issued Some Opinions on Encourag-
ing and Guiding the Healthy Development of Private Investments (Some 
Opinions 2010). It aims to open up basic industries and infrastructures, utili-
ties, social services, financial services, goods wholesale and modern logis-
tics, and defense technology for private investments. It also requires local 
governments to make equal and transparent policies for private investments. 
For all that, Some Opinions 2010 does not notice to break up monopolies 
in common competitive industries, and the fulfilling framework is still not 
contained in this document. Therefore, the mentioned industries in Opinions 
2005 and 2010 are very likely to be continuously controlled by SOEs. 
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b) Market Dimension 
To identify the monopolistic and competitive industries in China, we de-
fine the state sector, the foreign direct investment (FDI) sector and the pri-
vate sector as the three market participators in all industries and measure 
their market shares by total assets, equities, and main business turnovers. 
With respect to our observation period of 2000-2004, only the statistic 2004 
on the website of the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC) covers 
all the three sectors. It worth mentioning that this statistic covers only 14 
industries which are not all included in our sample for the empiric research. 
But still, this available statistic can approximately describe the competition 
degree of 14 Chinese industries over our observation period. 
Figures 6.03, 6.04 and 6.05 show, the state sector dominates in the indus-
tries of Utilities, Tobacco and Mining, while it is not very competitive in the 
industries of Timber & Furnishings, Textiles & Apparel, Stationary & Sport 
Devices, Paper & Printing, IT, Food & Beverage, and Electronics.  
More precisely, we roughly divide the 14 industries into three groups ac-
cording to the state sector’s proportion in total assets, equities and main 
business turnovers: (1) the least competitive industries in which the state 
sector’s proportion comes up to over 0.65, (2) the common competitive in-
dustries in which the state sector’s proportion accounts between 0.35 and 
0.65, and (3) the most competitive industries in which the state sector’s pro-
portion amounts to under 0.35. By doing so, we achieve the following 
groups: 
Least competitive industries: Mining, Tobacco, Utilities. 
Common competitive industries: Machinery & Devices, Metals & Non-
Metals, Petrolchemicals, Pharmaceuticals. 
Most competitive industries: Electronics, Food & Beverage, IT, Other 
Manufacturing, Paper & Printing, Recycling, Stationary & Sport Devices, 
Textiles & Apparel, Timber & Furnishing 
 116 JUNHUA TANG 
Figure 6.03 Total Assets of Different Sectors 2004 
Total Assets 2004 (100 Mio. RMB)
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Data source: NBSC (2008) 
Figure 6.04 Equities of Different Sectors 2004 
Equities 2004 (100 Mio. RMB)
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Data source: NBSC (2008) 
Figure 6.05 Main Business Turnovers of Different Sectors 2004 
Main Business Turnovers 2004 (100 Mio. RMB)
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Data source: NBSC (2008) 
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Table 6.001: Total Assets, Equities and Main Business Turnovers of Different Sectors 2004 
  Total Assets (100 Mio. RMB) Equity (100 Mio. RMB) 
Main Business Turnover 
(10 Mio. RMB) 
Industry State FDI Private 
state 
proportion State FDI Private 
state 
% State FDI Private 
state 
proportion 
Electronics 1934 3299 1418 0.29 562 1404 539 0.22 1200 4223 1966 0.16 
Food & Beverage 2746 3632 1921 0.33 1034 1553 828 0.30 1976 4479 3230 0.20 
IT 3784 10934 547 0.25 1542 3934 235 0.27 3374 18798 723 0.15 
Machinery & Devices 15851 9507 3680 0.55 5673 4538 1383 0.49 11357 10909 4809 0.42 
Metals & Non-Metals 16289 6299 5546 0.58 6336 2675 2117 0.57 12700 6434 8121 0.47 
Mining 13283 327 682 0.93 6620 189 308 0.93 8101 353 962 0.86 
Other Manufacturing 304 509 259 0.28 105 257 106 0.22 138 660 459 0.11 
Paper & Printing 1627 2269 947 0.34 623 953 361 0.32 784 1503 1127 0.23 
Petrolchemicals 11219 7163 3484 0.51 5068 3398 1330 0.52 12520 7327 4836 0.51 
Pharmaceuticals 1742 959 470 0.55 855 476 216 0.55 913 734 366 0.45 
Recycling 5 41 22 0.07 2 11 8 0.11 9 77 56 0.06 
Stationary & Sport 
Devices 74 570 177 0.09 30 277 72 0.08 42 719 293 0.04 
Tobacco 2980 16 0 0.99 1876 10 0 0.99 2538 9 0 1.00 
Textiles & Apparel 1776 5010 3718 0.17 431 2256 1321 0.11 1065 6007 5533 0.08 
Timber & Furnishing 333 924 608 0.18 123 374 282 0.16 188 1034 932 0.09 
Utilities 35764 4142 245 0.89 16598 1996 88 0.89 14528 1839 76 0.88 
Data source: NBSC (2008) 
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c) Clustering of Sample Industries 
Based on the division of industries under 3.b, we define three clusters for 
our 21 sample industries: monopoly, mix and competition. The monopoly 
cluster contains the least competitive industries which are dominated by the 
SOEs, while the competition cluster covers the most competitive industries 
in which SOEs only play a slight role. We also define a mix cluster. It com-
prises those industries whose sub-industries are partly dominated by the 
state sector and partly very competitive.  
According to the political dimension, the transportation & storage indus-
try is one of the most strategic industries for the central government and 
thus falls under the monopoly cluster. The agriculture industry is partly con-
trolled by the state sector and partly by the FDI sector. Part of the industries 
of agriculture, construction, machinery & devices, metals and non-metals 
and petrolchemicals are also of strategic importance for the central govern-
ment and thus strictly controlled by the state sector. Examples are construc-
tion of railway, ship-building and train-building, steel production, oil and 
gas production. Therefore, these industries are comprised in the mix cluster. 
All other industries in our sample, except for media and conglomerates, 
come under the competition cluster. We exclude media and conglomerates 
from the clustering, because we are not sure in which clusters these two 
should be included. According to the political dimension for clustering, the 
cultural services have been tightly controlled in China. However, the four 
listed media firms happen to be all private firms. The conglomerates indus-
try actually contains listed firms who run a compound of different indus-
tries, which make it difficult to cluster it. Nevertheless, the data of the two 
industries are still utilized, when we are doing regressions with the total 
sample. 
The clustering of our sample listed firms is as follows: 
Monopoly cluster (68 listed firms): Mining, Transportation & Storage, 
and Utilities. 
Mix cluster (296 listed firms): Agriculture, Construction, Machinery & 
Devices, Metals & Non-Metals, and Petrolchemicals. 
Competition cluster (319 listed firms): Electronics, Food & Beverage, IT, 
Other Manufacturing, Paper & Printing, Pharmaceuticals, Real Estate, So-
cial Services, Textiles & Apparel, Timber & Furnishings, and Wholesale & 
Retail. 
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4. Regression Models and Results 
a) Blockholding 
A) Description of Variables 
Dependent Variable 
Tobin’s Q 
Of all the 746 listed Chinese firms in our sample, the average Tobin’s Q 
descends from 1.34 in 2000-2002 over 0.93 in 2003 to 0.80 in 2004 (Tables 
6.003-6.005). Obviously, China’s stock market was experiencing a bear 
market in our observation period. 
 
Table 6.002: Tobin’s Q 2000-2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 1.34 1.20 0.58 0.27 6.96 
Monopoly 68 1.27 1.13 0.50 0.42 3.27 
Mix 296 1.27 1.16 0.51 0.27 3.69 
Competition 319 1.37 1.21 0.62 0.42 6.96 
 
Table 6.003: Tobin’s Q 2003 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.93 0.88 0.42 -0.18 6.49 
Monopoly 68 1.04 0.98 0.32 0.52 2.36 
Mix 296 0.90 0.87 0.32 -0.18 2.94 
Competition 319 0.92 0.84 0.49 0.18 6.49 
 
Table 6.004: Tobin’s Q 2004 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.80 0.77 0.33 -0.32 4.12 
Monopoly 68 0.90 0.86 0.28 0.48 1.86 
Mix 296 0.76 0.76 0.28 -0.32 2.55 
Competition 319 0.80 0.75 0.36 0.20 4.12 
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Control Variables 
ROA 
The average ROA is 0.03 in 2000-2002 and 0.02 in 2003 and 2004. Evi-
dently, the average ROA of the listed firms in the Monopoly cluster is high-
er than those in the Competition clusters (See Tables 6.006-6.008). As far as 
ROA is concerned, listed firms in the least competitive industries (Monop-
oly cluster) in China are more profitable than those in more competitive 
industries. 
 
Debt, Main Business Growth and Size 
The debt ratio and main business growth of the listed firms in the mo-
nopolistic industries is by far lower than those in the most competitive in-
dustries, while the firm size of listed firms in the Monopoly cluster is much 
larger than in the competition cluster (See Tables 6.009-6.017). 
It seems that the monopolistic listed firms in monopolistic industries are 
larger, more profitable and enjoying more financial resources, but growing 
more slowly than listed firms in competitive industries are. 
Table 6.005: ROA 2000-2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.03 0.03 0.05 -0.42 0.20 
Monopoly 68 0.05 0.04 0.04 -0.10 0.16 
Mix 296 0.03 0.03 0.05 -0.14 0.20 
Competition 319 0.03 0.03 0.05 -0.42 0.14 
 
Table 6.006: ROA 2003 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.02 0.02 0.06 -0.41 0.22 
Monopoly 68 0.04 0.04 0.07 -0.21 0.21 
Mix 296 0.02 0.03 0.06 -0.41 0.15 
Competition 319 0.01 0.02 0.05 -0.19 0.22 
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Table 6.007: ROA 2004 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.02 0.02 0.06 -0.46 0.21 
Monopoly 68 0.04 0.03 0.06 -0.14 0.20 
Mix 296 0.02 0.02 0.06 -0.34 0.18 
Competition 319 0.01 0.01 0.07 -0.46 0.16 
 
Table 6.008: Debt Ratio 2000-2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.45 0.45 0.16 0.02 0.89 
Monopoly 68 0.37 0.37 0.16 0.02 0.80 
Mix 296 0.45 0.44 0.15 0.10 0.89 
Competition 319 0.45 0.47 0.15 0.07 0.85 
 
Table 6.009: Debt Ratio 2003 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.49 0.50 0.18 0.01 0.94 
Monopoly 68 0.41 0.43 0.22 0.01 0.92 
Mix 296 0.49 0.50 0.17 0.05 0.94 
Competition 319 0.49 0.51 0.18 0.05 0.89 
 
Table 6.010: Debt Ratio 2004 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.51 0.52 0.18 0.01 0.97 
Monopoly 68 0.42 0.46 0.22 0.01 0.92 
Mix 296 0.52 0.52 0.17 0.06 0.94 
Competition 319 0.51 0.52 0.18 0.02 0.97 
 
Table 6.011: Main Business Growth 2000-2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.28 0.17 0.88 -0.64 18.63 
Monopoly 68 0.19 0.17 0.17 -0.27 0.78 
Mix 296 0.20 0.16 0.43 -0.64 4.74 
Competition 319 0.34 0.18 1.22 -0.54 18.63 
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Table 6.012: Main Business Growth 2003 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.41 0.16 3.20 -1.00 77.81 
Monopoly 68 0.26 0.14 0.73 -0.40 5.70 
Mix 296 0.31 0.21 1.26 -0.97 20.90 
Competition 319 0.53 0.11 4.71 -1.00 77.81 
 
Talbe 6.013: Main Business Growth 2004 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.41 0.16 3.20 -1.00 77.81 
Monopoly 68 0.26 0.14 0.73 -0.40 5.70 
Mix 296 0.31 0.21 1.26 -0.97 20.90 
Competition 319 0.53 0.11 4.71 -1.00 77.81 
 
Table 6.014: Firm Size 2000-2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 2.66 2.61 0.83 -0.18 5.65 
Monopoly 68 3.02 2.79 0.96 1.13 5.65 
Mix 296 2.67 2.59 0.85 0.62 5.50 
Competition 319 2.62 2.63 0.79 -0.18 5.17 
 
Table 6.015: Firm Size 2003 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 2.87 2.82 0.89 -0.67 5.91 
Monopoly 68 3.24 3.19 1.04 0.87 5.91 
Mix 296 2.87 2.84 0.90 0.43 5.62 
Competition 319 2.82 2.81 0.85 -0.67 5.36 
 
Table 6.016: Firm Size 2004 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 2.87 2.82 0.89 -0.67 5.91 
Monopoly 68 3.24 3.19 1.04 0.87 5.91 
Mix 296 2.87 2.84 0.90 0.43 5.62 
Competition 319 2.82 2.81 0.85 -0.67 5.36 
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Independent Variables 
 
Blockholder 
Of all our sample listed firms, about 1/3 are directly controlled by a gov-
ernmental blockholder (See Table 6.018), while only 23% are not held by 
local governments or SOEs (See Table 6.019). Since SOEs are closely asso-
ciated with the (local) governments, one can conclude that China’s stock 
market is a state-controlled one. 
 
Blockholding 
On average, blockholders own 44% of all shares at China’s stock market 
(See Table 6.020), while the next nine biggest shareholders together possess 
only 16% (See Table 6.021). Of all the shares, a bit more than 1/3 are avail-
able for transactions at the secondary market (See Table 6.022). 
 
Blockholder Change 
About 1/5 of our sample listed firms have experienced at least one 
Change of the Blockholder, whilst barely 1% have undergone two changes 
of the blockholder and very few (0.27%) have witnesses three times a 
change of the blockholder (See Tables 6.023 and 6.024). Only 10% of the 
listed firms in the Monopoly cluster saw a new blockholder during 2000-
2002 (See ibid.), displaying that the ownership structure of these firms is 
very stable. 
Table 6.017: Blockholder A 2000-2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.66 1.00 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Monopoly 68 0.54 0.83 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Mix 296 0.68 1.00 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Competition 319 0.65 1.00 0.44 0.00 1.00 
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Table 6.018: Blockholder B 2000-2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.23 0.00 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Monopoly 68 0.07 0.00 0.26 0.00 1.00 
Mix 296 0.17 0.00 0.37 0.00 1.00 
Competition 319 0.25 0.00 0.43 0.00 1.00 
 
Table 6.019: Blockholding 2000-2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.44 0.44 0.17 0.04 0.85 
Monopoly 68 0.46 0.41 0.17 0.13 0.81 
Mix 296 0.49 0.51 0.16 0.10 0.85 
Competition 319 0.42 0.40 0.16 0.06 0.80 
 
Table 6.020: Shareholding 2-10 2000-2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.16 0.12 0.13 0.00 0.56 
Monopoly 68 0.18 0.17 0.14 0.01 0.48 
Mix 296 0.14 0.09 0.13 0.00 0.56 
Competition 319 0.17 0.13 0.13 0.01 0.55 
 
Table 6.021: Liquidity 2000-2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.36 0.36 0.14 0.02 1.00 
Monopoly 68 0.32 0.32 0.12 0.05 0.58 
Mix 296 0.34 0.34 0.12 0.02 0.69 
Competition 319 0.38 0.37 0.14 0.04 1.00 
 
Table 6.022: Blockholder Change 2000-2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.20 0.00 0.44 0.00 3.00 
Monopoly 68 0.10 0.00 0.35 0.00 2.00 
Mix 296 0.18 0.00 0.39 0.00 2.00 
Competition 319 0.21 0.00 0.49 0.00 3.00 
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Table 6.023: Blockholder Change Frequency 
Industry Listings 
0 
Change 
1 
Change 
2 
Changes 
3 
Changes Total 
Total 746 81.90 16.89 0.94 0.27 100.00 
Monopoly 68 91.18 7.35 1.47  100.00 
Mix 296 82.77 16.89 0.34  100.00 
Competition 319 81.50 16.30 1.57 0.63 100.00 
 
B) Regression Models 
As Table 6.025 demonstrates, three of the dependent variables, Block-
holding, Shareholding2-10, and Liquidity are significantly correlative to 
each other. The rationale behind this is, the more shares the blockholder 
possesses, the less the smaller shareholders own and the less liquid the listed 
firm is. 
 
Table 6.024: Correlations between  
Blockholding, Shareholding 2-10, and Liquidity 
Correlations 
    Blockholding Shareholding2-10 Liquidity 
Pearson Corre-
lation 1.000 -.672
** -.428** 
Sig. (2-tailed)   .000 .000 
Blockholding 
N 746.000 746 746 
Pearson Corre-
lation -.672
** 1.000 -.138** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000   .000 
Shareholding2-
10 
N 746 746.000 746 
Pearson Corre-
lation -.428
** -.138** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000   
Liquidity 
N 746 746 746.000 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).   
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Due to this correlation between the measured variables, we build up three 
regression models to test the impacts of the three independent variables on 
the listed firms’ market value, respectively. By use of a quadratic term, we 
also expand the regression model to test the non-linear impact of blockhold-
ing on a listed firm’s market value. Since we have two different dummy 
variables to measure the nature of the blockholder, we have indeed two sim-
ilar equations for each model, which are marked with A and B. The regres-
sion models are as follows: 
 
Model Blockholding A (non-linear): 
iiiiii
iiii
SizeGrowthDebtROArChangeBlockholde
ngBlockholdingBlockholdirABlockholdeQ




87654
2
3210
(6.06) 
 
Model Blockholding B (non-linear): 
ii
iiii
iiii
Size
GrowthDebtROArChangeBlockholde
ngBlockholdingBlockholdirBBlockholdeQ






8
7654
2
3210
 
(6.07) 
 
Model Blockholding A: 
ii
iiii
iii
Size
GrowthDebtROArChangeBlockholde
ngBlockholdirABlockholdeQ






7
6543
210
 
(6.08) 
 
Model Blockholding B: 
ii
iiii
iii
Size
GrowthDebtROArChangeBlockholde
ngBlockholdirBBlockholdeQ






7
6543
210
 
(6.09) 
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Model Shareholding2-10 A: 
ii
iiii
iii
Size
GrowthDebtROArChangeBlockholde
ngShareholdirABlockholdeQ






7
6543
210 102
 
(6.10) 
 
Model Shareholding2-10 B: 
ii
iiii
iii
Size
GrowthDebtROArChangeBlockholde
ngShareholdirABlockholdeQ






7
6543
210 102
 
(6.11) 
 
 
Model Liquidity A: 
iiiii
iiii
SizeGrowthDebtROA
rChangeBlockholdeLiquidityrABlockholdeQ




7654
3210  
(6.12) 
 
Model Liquidity B: 
iiiii
iiii
SizeGrowthDebtROA
rChangeBlockholdeLiquidityrABlockholdeQ




7654
3210
 
(6.13) 
C) Regression Results 
Other variables controlled, tables 6.026-6.033 report the following results 
of the regressions on blockholding variables. 
First, blockholding generally has a significant negative impact on a listed 
firm’s market value (cf Tables 6.028 and 6.029). However, this impact in 
not linear, but inverse U-shaped. More precisely, the market value of a listed 
firm initially increases when the blockholder’s shareholding grows. After 
the blockholding reaches about 60%, a higher blockholding can only wit-
ness a lower market value (See Tables 6.026 and 6.027). It suggests that to a 
 130 JUNHUA TANG 
certain degree of blockholding, the interests of the blockholder and other 
shareholders are aligned, but extending a blockholding can finally lead to 
expropriation of smaller shareholders. 
Second, a non-state blockholder (the dummy variable equals 1) enhances 
a listed firm’s market value (See Tables 6.026-6.033). This result is signifi-
cant, when we count SOEs for state blockholders (See Tables 6.027, 6.029, 
6.031, and 6.033). Therefore, investors at China’s stock market prefer non-
state blockholders than state blockholders. 
Third, shareholding of the second to the tenth biggest shareholders might 
have a positive impact on a listed firm’s market value, but this result is not 
significant (See Tables 6.030 and 6.031). The reason could be that bigger 
shareholders might monitor or bargain with the blockholder more actively to 
protect their own interests, while smaller shareholders could take a free ride. 
Therefore, the stock market tends to give such a firm a higher valuation. It is 
also interesting to see that the coefficient of shareholding2-10 might be neg-
ative in the Monopoly cluster (See ibid.). It suggests that a dominant block-
holder is in favor of monopolistic firms. Since blockholders in these firms 
are mostly local governments or SOEs, we surmise that they could enjoy 
more political advantages than non-state blockholders. 
Fourth, the liquidity variable has a significantly positive effect on its 
market value (See Tables 6.032 and 6.033) and its coefficient is higher than 
those of other variables in our blockholding regressions, suggesting that 
investors welcome more tradable shares issued by a listed firm. Interest-
ingly, this result is significant in the Competition cluster, but not in the Mo-
nopoly cluster. We believe that the logic is as same as that in the third point. 
With more tradable shares, market participants other than the blockholder 
could have more control rights and thus better protect their own interests. In 
the monopolistic industries, however, more concentrated ownership by 
means of more non-tradable shares could consolidate the state ownership 
and gain the listed firm more advantages. 
Fifth, listed firms that have experienced a change of the blockholder en-
joy a higher market value. This result is significant for the total sample and 
again, for listed firms in the Competition cluster. It suggests that the stock 
market welcomes a new blockholder, although the change does not neces-
sarily mean that the new blockholder will do better than the former one. The 
rationale behind this could be that the blockholder change at least kicks out 
the former blockholder who could not make the listed firm profitable or as 
profitable as competitors, and the change itself became good news for the 
investors. 
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Table 6.025: Regression Results of Model Blockholding A (non-linear) 
  
Listings (Constant) ROA Debt Growth Size Blockholder 
A 
Blockholding Blockholding2 Blockholder 
Change 
Adjusted 
R2 
Total 746 2.942 0.940 
-
0.402 -0.024 
-
0.397 0.055  -1.779 1.458 0.168 0.516 
(Sig.)   0.000 0.008 0.000 0.125 0.000 0.091  0.000 0.002 0.000   
Monopoly 68 2.068 1.568 0.290 -0.186 
-
0.331 0.128  -0.001 -0.221 0.163 0.505 
(Sig.)   0.000 0.182 0.325 0.508 0.000 0.144  1.000 0.875 0.191   
Mix 296 2.854 0.116 
-
0.433 0.114 
-
0.415 0.086  -1.494 1.322 0.094 0.594 
(Sig.)   0.000 0.800 0.002 0.014 0.000 0.064  0.026 0.051 0.091   
Competition 319 2.801 1.183 
-
0.481 -0.031 
-
0.384 0.014  -1.024 0.620 0.248 0.508 
(Sig.)   0.000 0.048 0.002 0.083 0.000 0.775  0.138 0.426 0.000   
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Table 6.026: Regression Results of Model Blockholding B (non-linear) 
  Listings 
(Constant) ROA Debt Growth Size Blockholder 
B 
Blockholding Blockholding2 Blockholder 
Change 
Adjusted 
R2 
Total 746 2.922 0.887 
-
0.422 -0.023 
-
0.396 0.103  -1.648 1.390 0.155 0.520 
(Sig.)   0.000 0.012 0.000 0.145 0.000 0.004  0.000 0.002 0.000   
Monopoly 68 2.209 1.612 0.230 -0.098 
-
0.346 0.079  -0.213 0.066 0.171 0.488 
(Sig.)   0.000 0.177 0.438 0.726 0.000 0.610  0.878 0.963 0.182   
Mix 296 2.790 0.075 
-
0.440 0.121 
-
0.420 0.200  -1.173 1.141 0.069 0.606 
(Sig.)   0.000 0.868 0.002 0.009 0.000 0.000  0.079 0.087 0.213   
Competition 319 2.773 1.150 
-
0.488 -0.030 
-
0.381 0.047  -0.928 0.539 0.243 0.509 
(Sig.)   0.000 0.054 0.002 0.087 0.000 0.371  0.184 0.491 0.000   
 
 134 JUNHUA TANG 
Table 6.027: Regression Results of Model Blockholding A 
  Listings 
(Constant) ROA Debt Growth Size Blockholder 
A 
Blockholding Blockholder 
Change 
Adjusted 
R2 
Total 746 2.656 0.995 
-
0.387 -0.023 
-
0.392 0.069 -0.462 0.172 0.510 
(Sig.)   0.000 0.005 0.000 0.154 0.000 0.033 0.000 0.000   
Monopoly 68 2.118 1.548 0.283 -0.189 
-
0.331 0.125 -0.211 0.166 0.513 
(Sig.)   0.000 0.181 0.327 0.495 0.000 0.143 0.399 0.178   
Mix 296 2.544 0.111 
-
0.437 0.119 
-
0.407 0.100 -0.209 0.112 0.590 
(Sig.)   0.000 0.810 0.002 0.011 0.000 0.029 0.104 0.043   
Competition 319 2.694 1.260 
-
0.470 -0.030 
-
0.385 0.018 -0.486 0.248 0.508 
(Sig.)   0.000 0.032 0.003 0.088 0.000 0.715 0.000 0.000   
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Table 6.028: Regression Results of Model Blockholding B 
  Listings 
(Constant) ROA Debt Growth Size Blockholder 
B 
Blockholding Blockholder 
Change 
Adjusted 
R2 
Total 746 2.653 0.934 
-
0.413 -0.021 
-
0.392 0.117 -0.382 0.157 0.514 
(Sig.)   0.000 0.008 0.000 0.183 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000   
Monopoly 68 2.195 1.619 0.232 -0.096 
-
0.346 0.079 -0.150 0.170 0.497 
(Sig.)   0.000 0.169 0.426 0.726 0.000 0.604 0.558 0.177   
Mix 296 2.525 0.072 
-
0.447 0.126 
-
0.413 0.215 -0.052 0.083 0.604 
(Sig.)   0.000 0.874 0.001 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.695 0.132   
Competition 319 2.679 1.211 
-
0.479 -0.030 
-
0.382 0.052 -0.457 0.242 0.510 
(Sig.)   0.000 0.040 0.002 0.092 0.000 0.313 0.001 0.000   
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Table 6.029: Regression Results of Model Shareholding2-10 A 
  Listings 
(Constant) ROA Debt Growth Size Blockholder 
A 
Shareholding 
2-10 
Blockholder 
Change 
Adjusted 
R2 
Total 746 2.434 0.919 
-
0.342 -0.019 
-
0.401 0.067  0.095 0.208 0.491 
(Sig.)   0.000 0.011 0.001 0.236 0.000 0.042  0.410 0.000   
Monopoly 68 2.045 1.336 0.323 -0.149 
-
0.339 0.118  -0.039 0.171 0.507 
(Sig.)   0.000 0.246 0.264 0.591 0.000 0.169  0.892 0.167   
Mix 296 2.432 0.076 
-
0.442 0.124 
-
0.410 0.094  0.165 0.122 0.587 
(Sig.)   0.000 0.869 0.002 0.008 0.000 0.043  0.315 0.030   
Competition 319 2.466 1.177 
-
0.419 -0.029 
-
0.392 0.017  0.109 0.273 0.488 
(Sig.)   0.000 0.050 0.009 0.107 0.000 0.737  0.549 0.000   
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Table 6.030: Regression Results of Model Shareholding2-10 B 
  Listings 
(Constant) ROA Debt Growth Size Blockholder 
B 
Shareholding 2-
10 
Blockholder 
Change 
Adjusted 
R2 
Total 746 2.474 0.843 
-
0.375 -0.018 
-
0.399 0.159  0.004 0.183 0.502 
(Sig.)   0.000 0.018 0.000 0.261 0.000 0.000  0.975 0.000   
Monopoly 68 2.140 1.461 0.262 -0.072 
-
0.352 0.093  -0.031 0.172 0.494 
(Sig.)   0.000 0.210 0.365 0.793 0.000 0.540  0.915 0.174   
Mix 296 2.498 0.061 
-
0.445 0.127 
-
0.414 0.221  0.008 0.088 0.603 
(Sig.)   0.000 0.893 0.002 0.006 0.000 0.000  0.963 0.114   
Competition 319 2.465 1.107 
-
0.434 -0.028 
-
0.388 0.086  0.053 0.262 0.492 
(Sig.)   0.000 0.064 0.007 0.116 0.000 0.104  0.770 0.000   
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Table 6.031: Regression Results of Model Liquidity A 
  Listings (Constant) ROA Debt Growth Size Blockholder A Liquidity Blockholder Change Adjusted R2 
Total 746 2.149 0.798 -0.378 -0.014 -0.384 0.073 0.737 0.207 0.527 
(Sig.)   0.000 0.022 0.000 0.378 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.000   
Monopoly 68 1.602 1.530 0.270 -0.214 -0.282 0.163 0.809 0.215 0.541 
(Sig.)   0.000 0.167 0.332 0.424 0.000 0.058 0.040 0.078   
Mix 296 2.365 0.036 -0.429 0.123 -0.404 0.102 0.175 0.142 0.587 
(Sig.)   0.000 0.937 0.003 0.009 0.000 0.028 0.290 0.006   
Competition 319 2.207 0.959 -0.494 -0.024 -0.384 0.030 0.754 0.275 0.527 
(Sig.)   0.000 0.097 0.001 0.173 0.000 0.527 0.000 0.000   
Table 6.032: Regression Results of Model Liquidity B 
  Listings (Constant) ROA Debt Growth Size Blockholder B Liquidity Blockholder Change Adjusted R2 
Total 746 2.197 0.743 -0.413 -0.013 -0.382 0.139 0.700 0.181 0.534 
(Sig.)   0.000 0.031 0.000 0.389 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
Monopoly 68 1.786 1.672 0.193 -0.105 -0.307 0.157 0.713 0.208 0.521 
(Sig.)   0.000 0.139 0.494 0.693 0.000 0.303 0.073 0.096   
Mix 296 2.433 0.027 -0.444 0.126 -0.408 0.220 0.151 0.088 0.605 
(Sig.)   0.000 0.952 0.001 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.351 0.095   
Competition 319 2.211 0.897 -0.511 -0.023 -0.379 0.078 0.740 0.264 0.530 
(Sig.)   0.000 0.120 0.001 0.184 0.000 0.118 0.000 0.000   
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b) Board Composition 
A) Description of the Variables 
Board Size 
Article 112 of China’s Company Law 1993 stipulates that “A joint stock 
limited company shall have a board of directors composed of five to nine-
teen members” (CLPRC, Article 112). The average size of the board of di-
rectors does not change much in our observation period (See Tables 6.034-
6.037). It begins with about 9.5 directors in a board in 2000 and increases to 
10 in 2002. In the total sample, about 9.7 directors sit in a board in our 
whole observation period. The frequency statistics show that 7-, 9-, 11-, and 
13-director board size prevail in our observation period (See Tables 6.038-
6.040, Figures 6.06-6.08). 
Table 6.033: Board Size 2000 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 9.54 9.00 2.60 5.00 19.00  
Monopoly 68 9.57 9.00 2.46 5.00 17.00  
Mix 296 9.54 9.00 2.57 5.00 19.00  
Competition 319 9.49 9.00 2.68 5.00 19.00  
 
Table 6.034: Board Size 2001 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 9.47 9.00 2.50 4.00 19.00  
Monopoly 68 9.62 9.00 2.57 5.00 17.00  
Mix 296 9.44 9.00 2.40 5.00 17.00  
Competition 319 9.42 9.00 2.63 4.00 19.00  
 
Table 6.035: Board Size 2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 10.05 9.00 2.36 5.00 19.00  
Monopoly 68 10.68 10.00 2.75 5.00 19.00  
Mix 296 9.97 9.00 2.28 5.00 19.00  
Competition 319 9.94 9.00 2.36 6.00 19.00  
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Table 6.036: Board Size 2000-2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 9.69 9.33 2.28 5.00 19.00  
Monopoly 68 9.96 9.67 2.46 5.00 17.67  
Mix 296 9.65 9.50 2.19 5.00 17.00  
Competition 319 9.62 9.33 2.34 5.00 19.00  
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Table 6.037: Frequency Statistics Board Size 2000 
Industry Listings 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Total 
Total 746 4.16 2.41 19.57 5.90 28.95 4.83 16.76  2.95  7.64 1.74 2.82 0.40 1.07 0.27 0.54 100.00 
Monopoly 68 5.88 1.47 11.76 8.82 32.35 5.88 16.18  4.41  7.35 1.47 2.94  1.47   100.00 
Mix 296 3.72 2.36 20.95 5.74 27.03 5.07 17.91  3.04  7.43 1.35 3.38 0.68 0.68 0.34 0.34 100.00 
Competition 319 4.39 2.82 20.69 4.70 29.78 5.02 15.67  2.82  7.21 1.88 2.19   1.57 0.31 0.94 100.00 
 
Table 6.038: Frequency Statistics Board Size 2001 
Industry Listings 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Total 
Total 746 0.13 3.89 2.82 20.38 4.96 28.15 4.96 18.77 2.55 7.24 2.14 2.41 0.27 0.94 0.13 0.27 100.00  
Monopoly 68  7.35 4.41 8.82 4.41 29.41 10.29 19.12 1.47 7.35 2.94 2.94  1.47   100.00  
Mix 296  4.05 2.03 20.27 5.07 30.41 3.72 19.93 2.03 6.76 1.35 3.38 0.34 0.68   100.00  
Competition 319 0.31 3.45 3.13 24.14 5.64 23.51 5.02 18.50 2.51 7.52 2.51 1.25 0.31 1.25 0.31 0.63 100.00  
 
Table 6.039: Frequency Statistics Board Size 2002 
Industry Listings 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 19 Total 
Total 746 1.07 1.34 10.32 8.45 32.71 4.83 19.44 6.03 8.45 2.01 3.22 0.67 0.80 0.67 100.00
Monopoly 68 1.47 1.47 7.35 5.88 25.00 11.76 17.65 4.41 10.29 11.76 1.47 1.47 100.00
Mix 296 2.36 0.34 8.78 10.81 31.76 4.39 21.62 6.08 6.08 3.38 3.38 0.68 0.34 100.00
Competition 319 2.51 12.23 7.52 35.42 4.08 17.55 5.02 10.34 1.25 0.94 1.25 0.94 0.94 100.00

 144 JUNHUA TANG 
Figure 6.06: Frequency of Board Size 2000 
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Figure 6.07: Frequency of Board Size 2001 
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Figure 6.08: Frequency of Board Size 2002 
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Independent Directors 
In our observation period, the independent director number increases rapidly from 
0.14 in 2000 over 0.58 in 2001 to 2.27 in 2002 (See Tables 6.041-6.044). Tables 
6.045-6.047 report that in 2000, more than 90% of all listed firms in our sample do 
not have any independent director, and in 2001, over 70% still have no independent 
director (See Tables 6.045 and 6.046, Figures 6.09 and 6.10). But in 2002, the inde-
pendent director number booms. More than 95% of the sample firms have at least two 
independent directors. (See Table 6.047, Figure 6.11). Accordingly, the proportion of 
independent directors in the board rises speedily from 0.01 in 2000 and 0.06 in 2001 
to 0.23 in 2002 (See Tables 6.048-6.051). 
The push for independent directors comes from the in 2002 issued Code of Corpo-
rate Governance for Listed Companies in China in which Article 49 states: “A listed 
company shall introduce independent directors to its board of directors in accordance 
with relevant regulations” (CSRC 2002). Therefore, the big boost of independent di-
rectors in 2002 was indeed a reaction to new corporate governance regulations. 
Table 6.040: Independent Director Number 2000 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.14 0.00 0.54 0.00 4.00  
Monopoly 68 0.10 0.00 0.46 0.00 3.00  
Mix 296 0.15 0.00 0.59 0.00 4.00  
Competition 319 0.14 0.00 0.52 0.00 3.00  
 
Table 6.041: Independent Director Number 2001 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.58 0.00 1.02 0.00 6.00  
Monopoly 68 0.32 0.00 0.80 0.00 4.00  
Mix 296 0.60 0.00 1.08 0.00 6.00  
Competition 319 0.61 0.00 0.98 0.00 5.00  
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Table 6.042: Independent Director Number 2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 2.27 2.00 0.73 0.00 6.00  
Monopoly 68 2.28 2.00 0.59 1.00 5.00  
Mix 296 2.29 2.00 0.70 0.00 5.00  
Competition 319 2.24 2.00 0.78 0.00 6.00  
 
Table 6.043: Independent Director Number 2000-2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.99 0.67 0.58 0.00 4.33  
Monopoly 68 0.90 0.67 0.50 0.33 3.33  
Mix 296 1.01 0.67 0.62 0.00 4.33  
Competition 319 1.00 0.67 0.56 0.00 3.00  
 
Table 6.044: Frequency Statistics Independent Director 2000 
Industry Listings 0 1 2 3 4 Total 
Total 746 92.76 2.28 3.62 1.07 0.27 100.00  
Monopoly 68 94.12 2.94 1.47 1.47  100.00  
Mix 296 92.57 2.70 2.70 1.35 0.68 100.00  
Competition 319 92.16 1.88 5.33 0.63 100.00  
 
Table 6.045: Frequency Statistics Independent Director 2001 
Industry Listings 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total 
Total 746 70.91 8.71 14.08 4.96 0.94 0.27 0.13 100.00 
Monopoly 68 82.35 7.35 7.35 1.47 1.47  100.00 
Mix 296 71.62 6.76 13.51 6.76 0.68 0.34 0.34 100.00 
Competition 319 67.40 10.66 16.93 4.08 0.63 0.31  100.00 
 
Table 6.046: Frequency Statistics Independent Director 2002 
Industry Listings 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total 
Total 746 2.14 1.74 70.38 19.84 4.83 0.80 0.27 100.00 
Monopoly 68 1.47 73.53 22.06 1.47 1.47  100.00 
Mix 296 1.69 1.35 70.61 20.27 5.07 1.01  100.00 
Competition 319 3.45 0.94 72.10 17.24 5.33 0.31 0.63 100.00 
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Figure 6.09: Frequency of Independent Director Number 2000 
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Figure 6.10: Frequency of Independent Director Number 2001 
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Figure 6.11: Frequency of Independent Director Number 2002 
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Table 6.047: Independent Director Proportion 2000 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.43  
Monopoly 68 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.27  
Mix 296 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.33  
Competition 319 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.33  
 
Table 6.048: Independent Director Proportion 2001 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.06 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.50  
Monopoly 68 0.03 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.40  
Mix 296 0.06 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.44  
Competition 319 0.06 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.50  
 
Table 6.049: Independent Director Proportion 2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.23 0.22 0.08 0.00 0.67  
Monopoly 68 0.23 0.22 0.07 0.10 0.40  
Mix 296 0.24 0.22 0.07 0.00 0.50  
Competition 319 0.23 0.22 0.08 0.00 0.67  
 
Table 6.050: Independent Director Proportion 2000-2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.39  
Monopoly 68 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.30  
Mix 296 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.33  
Competition 319 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.39  
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Executive Directors 
In our observation period, the executive director number stays stable between two 
and three, while most sample listed firms have one to three executive directors sitting 
in the board (See Tables 6.052-6.058, Figures 6.12-6.14). Over the same period, the 
proportion of executive directors in the board is about 1/4 (See Tables 6.059-6.062). 
However, with more independent directors in the board, the proportion of executive 
directors decreases in 2002 (See Table 6.062). 
Table 6.051: Executive Director Number 2000 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 2.45 2.00 1.47 0.00 9.00  
Monopoly 68 2.22 2.00 1.41 0.00 6.00  
Mix 296 2.42 2.00 1.58 0.00 9.00  
Competition 319 2.50 2.00 1.36 0.00 8.00  
 
Table 6.052: Executive Director Number 2001 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 2.31 2.00 1.46 0.00 10.00  
Monopoly 68 2.07 2.00 1.34 0.00 6.00  
Mix 296 2.23 2.00 1.49 0.00 8.00  
Competition 319 2.42 2.00 1.45 0.00 10.00  
 
Table 6.053: Executive Director Number 2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 2.07 2.00 1.30 0.00 7.00  
Monopoly 68 1.81 2.00 1.08 0.00 5.00  
Mix 296 2.06 2.00 1.29 0.00 7.00  
Competition 319 2.10 2.00 1.31 0.00 7.00  
 
Table 6.054: Executive Director Number 2000-2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 2.28 2.00 1.24 0.00 8.00  
Monopoly 68 2.03 2.00 1.12 0.00 4.67  
Mix 296 2.23 2.00 1.27 0.00 7.33  
Competition 319 2.34 2.00 1.19 0.00 8.00  
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Table 6.055: Frequency Statistics Executive Director Number 2000 
Industry Listings 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total 
Total 746 4.29 26.01 26.27 20.51 14.08 5.90  1.74 0.80 0.27 0.13 100.00 
Monopoly 68 5.88 32.35 22.06 23.53 8.82 4.41  2.94    100.00 
Mix 296 6.42 28.72 22.30 17.91 13.85 7.43  2.36 0.68  0.34 100.00 
Competition 319 2.82 21.94 30.41 22.88 15.36 4.39  0.63 1.25 0.31   100.00 
 
Table 6.056: Frequency Statistics Executive Director Number 2001 
Industry Listings 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 10 Total 
Total 746 6.30 26.68 28.02 20.11 11.13 5.50  1.21 0.40 0.54 0.13 100.00 
Monopoly 68 8.82 30.88 25.00 20.59 10.29 2.94  1.47    100.00 
Mix 296 9.46 26.35 26.01 19.26 11.15 5.74  1.35  0.68  100.00 
Competition 319 4.08 24.14 31.03 21.00 10.97 6.58  0.94 0.63 0.31 0.31 100.00 
 
Table 6.057: Frequency Statistics Executive Director Number 2002 
Industry Listings 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total 
Total 746 7.64 29.49 29.89 20.91 7.64  2.55 1.34 0.54 100.00 
Monopoly 68 8.82 32.35 36.76 14.71 5.88  1.47   100.00 
Mix 296 9.46 27.03 29.39 21.96 8.45  2.36 1.01 0.34 100.00 
Competition 319 6.58 30.41 29.78 20.38 7.84  2.82 1.88 0.31 100.00 
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Figure 6.12: Frequency of Executive Director Number 2000 
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Figure 6.13: Frequency of Executive Director Number 2001 
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Figure 6.14: Frequency of Executive Director Number 2002 
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Table 6.058: Executive Director Proportion 2000 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.26 0.25 0.15 0.00 0.80  
Monopoly 68 0.24 0.22 0.15 0.00 0.71  
Mix 296 0.26 0.22 0.16 0.00 0.80  
Competition 319 0.27 0.27 0.14 0.00 0.67  
 
Table 6.059: Executive Director Proportion 2001 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.25 0.22 0.15 0.00 0.80  
Monopoly 68 0.22 0.21 0.15 0.00 0.67  
Mix 296 0.24 0.22 0.16 0.00 0.80  
Competition 319 0.26 0.23 0.14 0.00 0.71  
 
Table 6.060: Executive Director Proportion 2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.21 0.20 0.13 0.00 0.70  
Monopoly 68 0.17 0.15 0.10 0.00 0.44  
Mix 296 0.21 0.22 0.13 0.00 0.70  
Competition 319 0.21 0.20 0.13 0.00 0.64  
 
Table 6.061: Executive Director Proportion 2000-2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.24 0.22 0.12 0.00 0.73  
Monopoly 68 0.21 0.18 0.12 0.00 0.59  
Mix 296 0.24 0.22 0.13 0.00 0.73  
Competition 319 0.25 0.23 0.11 0.00 0.63  
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Directors Positioning at Blockholder (DPAB)1 
In the period of 2001-2002, about 2.7 directors in each listed firm also hold a posi-
tion at the blockholder (See Tables 6.063-6.065). The number of DPAB is almost eq-
uably distributed in one, two, three, or four (See Tables 6.066 and 6.067, Figures 6.15 
and 6.16). About 28% of all the directors in our sample listed firms hold a position at 
the blockholder (See Tables 6.068-6.070). Directors of listed firms in the Monopoly 
cluster are more likely to possess a position at the blockholder (See ibid.). The reason 
could be that the government or SOE who is the blockholder of a listed firm prefers to 
choose representatives from inside the government or SOE to sit in the board of direc-
tors. 
Table 6.062: Director Positioning at Blockholder Number 2001 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 2.80 2.50 2.22 0.00 13.00  
Monopoly 68 3.09 3.00 2.33 0.00 13.00  
Mix 296 3.11 3.00 2.26 0.00 11.00  
Competition 319 2.53 2.00 2.21 0.00 11.00  
 
Table 6.063: Director Positioning at Blockholder Number 2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 2.61 2.00 2.06 0.00 13.00  
Monopoly 68 2.99 2.00 2.38 0.00 13.00  
Mix 296 2.86 3.00 2.07 0.00 12.00  
Competition 319 2.40 2.00 2.02 0.00 11.00  
 
Table 6.064: Director Positioning at Blockholder Number 2001-2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 2.70 2.50 2.07 0.00 13.00  
Monopoly 68 3.04 2.50 2.25 0.00 13.00  
Mix 296 2.99 3.00 2.08 0.00 11.50  
Competition 319 2.46 2.00 2.05 0.00 11.00  
 
                                                          
1 Information on directors who also hold a position at the blockholder was not available in the annual 
reports of Chinese listed firms until 2001. For this reason, we do not provide the 2000 statistics here 
or involve them in the regressions. Instead, we employ the average data of 2001 and 2002. It is 
similar for a few other variables in the following parts of this dissertation. 
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Table 6.065: Frequency Statistics Director Positioning at Blockholder Number 2001 
Industry Listings 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 13 Total 
Total 746 13.54 20.64 15.82 17.29 12.73 9.65 4.42  1.61 2.41 0.40 0.94 0.40 0.13 100.00 
Monopoly 68 7.35 23.53 14.71 13.24 17.65 14.71 2.94   4.41    1.47 100.00 
Mix 296 11.15 17.23 15.54 15.54 14.86 11.82 7.77  1.69 2.36 0.34 1.01 0.68  100.00 
Competition 319 17.24 22.88 15.05 18.18 10.34 7.84 2.51  1.88 1.88 0.63 1.25 0.31   100.00 
 
Table 6.066: Frequency Statistics Director Positioning at Blockholder Number 2002 
Industry Listings 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Total 
Total 746 13.56 20.94 19.06 17.85 13.02 7.11 3.89  2.15 1.07 0.27 0.54 0.27 0.13 0.13 100.00 
Monopoly 68 7.35 23.53 22.06 8.82 16.18 13.24 2.94  1.47 1.47  1.47   1.47 100.00 
Mix 296 11.49 17.57 19.26 15.88 16.22 9.46 5.41  2.36 1.35 0.34  0.34 0.34  100.00 
Competition 319 16.35 22.96 16.67 22.33 9.12 5.03 3.46  1.57 0.94 0.31 0.94 0.31     100.00 
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Figure 6.15: Frequency of Director Positioning at Blockholder Number 2001 
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Figure 6.16: Frequency of Director Positioning at Blockholder Number 2002 
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Table 6.067: Director Positioning at Blockholder Proportion 2001 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.30 0.28 0.23 0.00 1.00  
Monopoly 68 0.33 0.33 0.23 0.00 0.89  
Mix 296 0.34 0.33 0.24 0.00 1.00  
Competition 319 0.27 0.23 0.22 0.00 1.00  
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Table 6.068: Director Positioning at Blockholder Proportion 2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.26 0.23 0.19 0.00 0.89  
Monopoly 68 0.27 0.23 0.18 0.00 0.70  
Mix 296 0.29 0.27 0.20 0.00 0.89  
Competition 319 0.24 0.22 0.19 0.00 0.83  
 
Table 6.069: Director Positioning at Blockholder Proportion 2001-2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.28 0.26 0.20 0.00 0.89  
Monopoly 68 0.30 0.28 0.20 0.00 0.79  
Mix 296 0.31 0.29 0.21 0.00 0.89  
Competition 319 0.26 0.24 0.20 0.00 0.86  
 
Female Directors 
Chinese listed firms have very few women directors sitting in the board. On aver-
age, each board has less than one female director (See Tables 6.071-6.074). Barely 
half of all the boards have no women director at all (See Tables 6.075-6.077, Figures 
6.17-6.19). However, listed firms in the Competition cluster are more likely to wel-
come women in the board: On average, each listed firm in the Competition cluster has 
one female director, whilst the number of female directors in the monopolistic listed 
firms is only 0.66 (See Table 6.074). About 10% of all directors in our smaple listed 
firms are females (Tables 6.078-6.081). 
 
Table 6.070: Female Director Number 2000 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.86 1.00 1.06 0.00 7.00  
Monopoly 68 0.60 0.50 0.67 0.00 2.00  
Mix 296 0.63 0.00 0.87 0.00 4.00  
Competition 319 1.09 1.00 1.21 0.00 7.00  
 
Table 6.071: Female Director Number 2001 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.83 1.00 1.02 0.00 7.00  
Monopoly 68 0.60 0.00 0.72 0.00 3.00  
Mix 296 0.63 0.00 0.87 0.00 4.00  
Competition 319 1.04 1.00 1.15 0.00 7.00  
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Table 6.072: Female Director Number 2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.90 1.00 1.03 0.00 7.00  
Monopoly 68 0.78 1.00 0.88 0.00 3.00  
Mix 296 0.72 0.00 0.89 0.00 5.00  
Competition 319 1.09 1.00 1.14 0.00 7.00  
 
Table 6.073: Female Director Number 2000-2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.86 0.67 0.94 0.00 6.33  
Monopoly 68 0.66 0.50 0.69 0.00 2.67  
Mix 296 0.66 0.33 0.79 0.00 4.00  
Competition 319 1.07 1.00 1.06 0.00 6.33  
 
Table 6.074: Frequency Statistics Female Director Number 2000 
Industry Listings 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total 
Total 746 46.65  32.57 13.54 4.42 1.88 0.67 0.13  0.13  100.00  
Monopoly 68 50.00  39.71 10.29      100.00  
Mix 296 56.76  28.04 11.49 2.70 1.01    100.00  
Competition 319 37.62  34.80 15.99 6.90 2.51 1.57 0.31  0.31  100.00  
 
Table 6.075: Frequency Statistics Female Director Number 2001 
Industry Listings 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total 
Total 746 47.32  32.57 12.73 5.36 1.47 0.27 0.13  0.13  100.00  
Monopoly 68 51.47  38.24 8.82 1.47     100.00  
Mix 296 56.76  28.72 9.80 4.05 0.68    100.00  
Competition 319 38.56  35.42 15.05 7.52 2.19 0.63 0.31  0.31  100.00  
 
Table 6.076: Frequency Statistics Female Director Number 2002 
Industry Listings 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total 
Total 746 41.96  37.00 13.14 5.76 1.34 0.54 0.13  0.13  100.00  
Monopoly 68 45.59  36.76 11.76 5.88     100.00  
Mix 296 50.34  33.78 11.15 3.72 0.68 0.34   100.00  
Competition 319 33.86  40.44 15.05 6.90 2.19 0.94 0.31  0.31  100.00  
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Figure 6.17: Frequency of Female Director Number 2000 
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Figure 6.18: Frequency of Female Director Number 2001 
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Figure 6.19: Frequency of Female Director Number 2002 
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Table 6.077: Female Director Proportion 2000 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.00 0.64  
Monopoly 68 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.25  
Mix 296 0.07 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.50  
Competition 319 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.00 0.64  
 
Table 6.078: Female Director Proportion 2001 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.00 0.64  
Monopoly 68 0.07 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.33  
Mix 296 0.07 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.60  
Competition 319 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.00 0.64  
 
Table 6.079: Female Director Proportion 2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.00 0.57  
Monopoly 68 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.00 0.33  
Mix 296 0.07 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.44  
Competition 319 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.57  
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AT CHINA’S STOCK MARKET 163
Table 6.080: Female Director Proportion 2000-2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.00 0.58  
Monopoly 68 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.29  
Mix 296 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.43  
Competition 319 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.00 0.58  
 
CEO/Chair Duality 2000 
In about 90% of all the sample listed firms, the CEO and the board chair positions 
are separately held by two persons (See Tables 6.082-6.085). The proportion is higher 
in the Monopoly cluster than in the Competition cluster (See ibid.), suggesting that 
non-state-controlled listed firms are more likely to integrate the two positions into 
one.  
Table 6.081: CEO/Chair Duality 2000 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.85 1.00 0.36 0.00 1.00  
Monopoly 68 0.94 1.00 0.24 0.00 1.00  
Mix 296 0.88 1.00 0.32 0.00 1.00  
Competition 319 0.82 1.00 0.39 0.00 1.00  
 
Table 6.082: CEO/Chair Duality 2001 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.88 1.00 0.32 0.00 1.00  
Monopoly 68 0.93 1.00 0.26 0.00 1.00  
Mix 296 0.91 1.00 0.29 0.00 1.00  
Competition 319 0.86 1.00 0.35 0.00 1.00  
 
Table 6.083: CEO/Chair Duality 2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.90 1.00 0.30 0.00 1.00  
Monopoly 68 0.96 1.00 0.21 0.00 1.00  
Mix 296 0.93 1.00 0.26 0.00 1.00  
Competition 319 0.88 1.00 0.33 0.00 1.00  
 
Table 6.084: CEO/Chair Duality 2000-2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.88 1.00 0.29 0.00 1.00  
Monopoly 68 0.94 1.00 0.22 0.00 1.00  
Mix 296 0.91 1.00 0.25 0.00 1.00  
Competition 319 0.85 1.00 0.31 0.00 1.00  
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Supervisory Board Size 
On average, about 4.3 supervisors are conducting the supervising function in a 
Chinese listed firm (See Tables 6.086-6.089). Listed firms in the Monopoly cluster 
tend to have more supervisors than those in the Competition cluster do. Usually, the 
listed firms have three or five supervisors (See Tables 6.090-6.092, Figures 6.20-
6.22). This setup comes from Article 52 of China’s Company Law 1993 which stipu-
lates that “A limited liability company with a relatively large-scale business shall have 
a supervisory board composed of no less than three members” (CLPRC, Article 52). 
The listed firms in the Monopoly cluster tend to have more supervisors than those in 
the Competition cluster do (See Tables 6.090-6.092). The reason could be that the 
monopolistic firms are much bigger and hire more employees including supervisors. 
 
Table 6.085: Supervisory Board Size 2000 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 4.34 5.00 1.40 2.00 13.00  
Monopoly 68 4.66 5.00 1.42 3.00 9.00  
Mix 296 4.47 5.00 1.44 2.00 13.00  
Competition 319 4.17 4.00 1.36 2.00 9.00  
 
Table 6.086: Supervisory Board Size 2001 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 4.37 5.00 1.39 2.00 11.00  
Monopoly 68 4.87 5.00 1.39 3.00 9.00  
Mix 296 4.50 5.00 1.49 2.00 11.00  
Competition 319 4.17 4.00 1.30 2.00 9.00  
 
Table 6.087: Supervisory Board Size 2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 4.32 5.00 1.37 2.00 10.00  
Monopoly 68 4.85 5.00 1.41 3.00 9.00  
Mix 296 4.40 5.00 1.40 2.00 10.00  
Competition 319 4.17 4.00 1.35 2.00 9.00  
 
Table 6.088: Supervisory Board Size 2000-2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 4.34 4.67 1.32 2.33 9.33  
Monopoly 68 4.79 5.00 1.34 3.00 9.00  
Mix 296 4.45 5.00 1.35 2.67 9.33  
Competition 319 4.17 4.33 1.28 2.33 9.00  
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Table 6.089: Frequency Statistics Supervisory Board Size 2000 
Industry Listings 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 11 13 Total 
Total 746 0.54 41.42 4.69 42.76 2.55 6.17  0.40 1.21 0.13 0.13 100.00 
Monopoly 68  30.88 8.82 39.71 7.35 11.76   1.47   100.00 
Mix 296 0.34 37.16 3.72 46.96 3.04 7.09  0.34 0.68 0.34 0.34 100.00 
Competition 319 0.94 47.34 5.33 37.93 1.25 5.02  0.63 1.57     100.00 
 
Table 6.090: Frequency Statistics Supervisory Board Size 2001 
Industry Listings 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Total 
Total 746 0.54 40.62 4.16 43.70 2.01 6.97  0.80 0.80 0.27 0.13 100.00 
Monopoly 68  25.00 5.88 44.12 10.29 13.24   1.47   100.00 
Mix 296 0.34 38.18 3.38 45.27 1.35 8.45  1.35 0.68 0.68 0.34 100.00 
Competition 319 0.94 45.77 5.02 40.75 0.94 5.02  0.63 0.94     100.00 
 
Table 6.091: Frequency Statistics Supervisory Board Size 2002 
Industry Listings 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total 
Total 746 0.40 42.76 4.02 42.36 2.28  6.17 0.54 1.34 0.13 100.00 
Monopoly 68  26.47 4.41 44.12 10.29  13.24  1.47  100.00 
Mix 296 0.34 40.20 3.38 44.93 2.03  6.76 0.68 1.35 0.34 100.00 
Competition 319 0.31 48.28 4.08 39.50 0.94  4.70 0.63 1.57   100.00 
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Figure 6.20: Frequency of Supervisory Board Size 2000 
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Figure 6.21: Frequency of Supervisory Board Size 2001 
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Figure 6.22: Frequency of Supervisory Board Size 2002 
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Supervisor/Director Ratio (S/D Ratio) 
In our sample listed firms, the size of the supervisory board is nearly half of the 
size of board of directors (See Tables 6.093-6.096).  
Table 6.092: Supervisor/Director Ratio 2000 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.48 0.45 0.16 0.16 1.20  
Monopoly 68 0.51 0.50 0.17 0.23 1.00  
Mix 296 0.49 0.45 0.16 0.18 1.20  
Competition 319 0.46 0.43 0.16 0.16 1.00  
 
Table 6.093: Supervisor/Director Ratio 2001 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.48 0.45 0.16 0.16 1.40  
Monopoly 68 0.53 0.56 0.18 0.23 1.00  
Mix 296 0.49 0.45 0.17 0.18 1.40  
Competition 319 0.47 0.43 0.16 0.16 1.00  
 
Table 6.094: Supervisor/Director Ratio 2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.44 0.43 0.14 0.16 1.00  
Monopoly 68 0.47 0.45 0.14 0.20 0.83  
Mix 296 0.45 0.45 0.14 0.18 1.00  
Competition 319 0.43 0.43 0.14 0.16 1.00  
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Table 6.095: Supervisor/Director Ratio 2000-2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.47 0.45 0.14 0.16 1.20  
Monopoly 68 0.51 0.50 0.15 0.22 0.90  
Mix 296 0.48 0.45 0.14 0.18 1.20  
Competition 319 0.45 0.43 0.14 0.16 0.94  
 
Female Supervisors 
Similar to the situation of female directors, Chinese listed firms generally have ap-
proximately only one female supervisor on average (See Tables 6.097-6.100, Figures 
6.23-6.25), while listed firms in the Competition cluster are likely to employ a few 
more female supervisors (See ibid.). The listed firms have mostly one or two female 
supervisors, if they have any (See Tables 6.101-6.103, Figures 6.23-6.25). The female 
supervisor proportion is a bit more than 1/5 (See Tables 6.106-6.107). Since listed 
firms in the Competition cluster have more female supervisors, the proportion of them 
is higher than in the Monopoly cluster (See ibid.). 
Table 6.096: Female Supervisor Number 2000 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.94 1.00 1.04 0.00 9.00  
Monopoly 68 0.84 1.00 0.89 0.00 3.00  
Mix 296 0.74 1.00 0.85 0.00 4.00  
Competition 319 1.17 1.00 1.18 0.00 9.00  
 
Table 6.097: Female Supervisor Number 2001 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.95 1.00 1.04 0.00 9.00  
Monopoly 68 0.88 1.00 0.99 0.00 4.00  
Mix 296 0.75 1.00 0.87 0.00 4.00  
Competition 319 1.16 1.00 1.16 0.00 9.00  
 
Table 6.098: Female Supervisor Number 2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.96 1.00 1.03 0.00 9.00  
Monopoly 68 0.91 1.00 0.96 0.00 4.00  
Mix 296 0.76 1.00 0.86 0.00 5.00  
Competition 319 1.13 1.00 1.15 0.00 9.00  
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Table 6.099: Female Supervisor Number 2000-2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.95 1.00 0.96 0.00 9.00  
Monopoly 68 0.88 1.00 0.89 0.00 3.33  
Mix 296 0.75 0.67 0.78 0.00 3.67  
Competition 319 1.15 1.00 1.09 0.00 9.00  
 
Table 6.100: Frequency Statistics Female Supervisor Number 2000 
Industry Listings 0 1 2 3 4 6 9 Total 
Total 746 40.48 35.66 16.35 5.23 2.01 0.13 0.13  100.00  
Monopoly 68 44.12 32.35 19.12 4.41    100.00  
Mix 296 47.97 34.80 13.51 3.04 0.68   100.00  
Competition 319 32.29 37.30 18.50 7.52 3.76 0.31 0.31  100.00  
 
Table 6.101: Frequency Statistics Female Supervisor Number 2001 
Industry Listings 0 1 2 3 4 5 9 Total 
Total 746 39.14 37.94 15.15 5.09 2.28 0.27 0.13  100.00  
Monopoly 68 42.65 36.76 11.76 7.35 1.47   100.00  
Mix 296 46.62 37.50 11.15 3.72 1.01   100.00  
Competition 319 31.35 38.56 19.75 5.96 3.45 0.63 0.31  100.00  
 
Table 6.102: Frequency Statistics Female Supervisor Number 2002 
Industry Listings 0 1 2 3 4 5 7 9 Total 
Total 746 37.80  39.68 14.88 5.63 1.47 0.27 0.13  0.13  100.00  
Monopoly 68 39.71  38.24 14.71 5.88 1.47    100.00  
Mix 296 45.27  38.51 12.16 3.38 0.34 0.34   100.00  
Competition 319 31.35  40.44 17.87 7.21 2.19 0.31 0.31  0.31  100.00  
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Figure 6.23: Frequency of Female Supervisor Number 2000 
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Figure 6.24: Frequency of Female Supervisor Number 2001 
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Figure 6.25: Frequency of Female Supervisor Number 2002 
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Table 6.103: Female Supervisor Proportion 2000 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.22 0.20 0.25 0.00 3.00  
Monopoly 68 0.18 0.20 0.19 0.00 0.67  
Mix 296 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.00 0.80  
Competition 319 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.00 3.00  
 
Table 6.104: Female Supervisor Proportion 2001 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.22 0.20 0.24 0.00 3.00  
Monopoly 68 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.00 0.67  
Mix 296 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.00 0.80  
Competition 319 0.27 0.25 0.28 0.00 3.00  
 
Table 6.105: Female Supervisor Proportion 2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.23 0.20 0.25 0.00 3.00  
Monopoly 68 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.00 0.67  
Mix 296 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.00 1.00  
Competition 319 0.27 0.20 0.28 0.00 3.00  
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Table 6.106: Female Supervisor Proportion 2000-2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.22 0.20 0.23 0.00 3.00  
Monopoly 68 0.19 0.14 0.18 0.00 0.67  
Mix 296 0.17 0.14 0.17 0.00 0.78  
Competition 319 0.27 0.23 0.27 0.00 3.00  
 
B) Regression Models 
Since the two variables Blockholder B and Blockholding have significant impact 
on a listed firm’s market value (See 4.a.C), we add them to regression models as 
complementary control variables. The regression models of the board of directors and 
the supervisory board are as follows: 
 
Model Board of Directors 
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(6.14) 
 
Model Supervisory Board 
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C) Regression Results 
Other variables controlled, tables 6.108-6.110 represent the results of the regres-
sions on blockholding variables. 
First, the size of the board of directors and the size of the supervisory board might 
have no impact on a listed firm’s market value (See Tables 6.109 and 6.110). The 
rationale could be that the quality instead of the number of board members is decisive 
for the boards’ impacts on a listed firm’s value. Yet the results are not significant. 
Second, as we expect in the hypotheses, the proportion of independent directors 
and the proportion of directors positioning at the blockholder (DPAB) might be me-
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chanisms which positively affect a listed firm’s market value (See Table 6.109), while 
the S/D ratio might have a negative impact on a listed firm’s market value (See Table 
6.110). Again, these results are not significant.  
Third, to our big surprise, the female proportion of directors does not have a neu-
tral, but a significantly negative impact on a listed firm’s market value (See Table 
6.109). Especially for the listed firms in the Competition cluster which actually have 
more women directors, the coefficient is even higher (See ibid.). Similarly, the female 
proportion of the supervisory board might have a negative influence on a listed firm’s 
market value as well, although this result is not significant (See Table 6.110). As pre-
viously mentioned, the link between gender diversity and firm value is not explain-
able or predictable by the current theoretical framework, and there is only very limited 
empirical work on this topic. The regression result, however, provides new evidence 
on the impact of female directorship on a firm’s value which differs from that docu-
mented by Carter et al. (2003). We would argue that the negative impact of female 
directorship could be attributed to the educational disadvantages for females born 
before 1979, the year in which the one-child policy was enacted. Suppose that a girl 
was born before 1979 in China and she was as clever as her elder brothers and sisters. 
In this situation, the odds that she went to college when she grew up was quite low. 
One reason is that during the plan economy phase, most of the Chinese families could 
not afford several college students who practically only expended and did not earn 
their families any income. If the family could only afford one college student, the par-
ents would prefer sending a boy instead of a girl to college, for sons had been re-
garded as familial hares. Another reason is that the entrance examination for colleges 
ceased during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) and was not relaunched until 
1977, which made it more impossible for women born before 1979 to have best edu-
cation. In comparison, a girl who came into the world after 1979 is the one and only 
child in the family and would be supported by the whole family to study at college. 
Since female directors currently sitting in a board of the listed firms are very likely to 
have been born before 1979, the average qualification of this generation could be seen 
as poor due to educational disadvantages. We expect that female directorship would 
not have a negative impact on listed firms’ market value, for the younger generations 
will not have educational disadvantages anymore. However, we believe that the phe-
nomenon needs more research work. 
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Table 6.107: Regression Results of Model Board of Directors 
  Listings (Constant) ROA Debt Growth Size Blockholder B Blockholding 
Total 746 2.775 0.776 -0.381 -0.018  -0.424 0.135 -0.506 
(Sig.)   0.000 0.030 0.000 0.252  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Monopoly 68 2.011 0.734 0.122 0.033  -0.392 0.087 -0.312 
(Sig.)   0.000 0.550 0.703 0.908  0.000 0.584 0.327 
Mix 296 2.640 -0.051 -0.388 0.130  -0.439 0.228 -0.124 
(Sig.)   0.000 0.910 0.006 0.005  0.000 0.000 0.366 
Competition 319 2.948 0.803 -0.391 -0.029  -0.431 0.063 -0.623 
(Sig.)   0.000 0.182 0.016 0.103  0.000 0.235 0.000 
 
Table 6.108: Regression Results of Model Board of Directors (Continuation) 
  
D Board 
Size 
CEO/Chair 
Duality 
Independent 
Proportion 
Executive 
Proportion 
DPAB 
Proportion 
Female 
Proportion 
Adjusted R2 
Total 0.004 -0.007 0.426 -0.075  0.083 -0.467 0.508 
(Sig.) 0.564 0.884 0.090 0.547  0.290 0.002   
Monopoly 0.024 0.026 1.628 0.237  0.143 -0.450 0.483 
(Sig.) 0.199 0.899 0.103 0.551  0.568 0.438   
Mix 0.001 -0.021 0.331 -0.266  0.114 -0.350 0.605 
(Sig.) 0.874 0.796 0.325 0.091  0.269 0.124   
Competition 0.004 -0.036 0.180 -0.037  0.071 -0.805 0.489 
(Sig.) 0.645 0.615 0.645 0.857  0.569 0.000   
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Table 6.109: Regression Results of Model Supervisory Board 
  
Listings (Constant) ROA Debt Growth Size Blockholder B Blockholding Supervisory 
Board Size 
S/D 
Ratio 
Female 
Proportion 
Adjusted R2 
Total 746 2.870  0.861 -0.377 -0.018 -0.412 0.132 -0.465 -0.008 -0.116 -0.115 0.504  
(Sig.)   0.000  0.016 0.000 0.255 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.615 0.391 0.060   
Monopoly 68 2.500  0.938 0.216 -0.055 -0.350 0.055 -0.169 0.007 -0.392 -0.392 0.511  
(Sig.)   0.000  0.413 0.457 0.837 0.000 0.714 0.505 0.855 0.239 0.090   
Mix 296 2.594  0.076 -0.419 0.130 -0.425 0.236 -0.097 0.006 -0.072 -0.077 0.599  
(Sig.)   0.000  0.868 0.003 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.458 0.751 0.702 0.488   
Competition 319 2.988  0.982 -0.381 -0.026 -0.427 0.062 -0.554 -0.011 -0.083 -0.208 0.479  
(Sig.)   0.000  0.105 0.018 0.147 0.000 0.255 0.000 0.638 0.697 0.011   
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c) Executive Compensation 
A) Description of Variables 
In alignment with Chinese listed firms’ annual reports, we count directors, the 
management and supervisors to a firm’s executives. We define remuneration and 
shareholding as part of the compensation package for the executives. Although the 
CEO Turnover is not a certain payment for the CEO, we regard it as an incentive tool 
which has similar functions as the executive compensation does. Hereby, we include 
CEO turnover in this point. 
Unlike in the former points, we employ here only the average data. There are two 
reasons. On one hand, Chinese listed firms did not publish detailed compensation in-
formation until 2001. Therefore, only the 2001 and 2002 data are available in the an-
nual reports of the listed firms. On the other hand, compensation can be very fluctuate 
from year to year due to fluctuations in a firm’s own business operation or in factors 
(e.g. policies by the government, demand by consumers) that can affect the whole 
industry. 
On average, a Chinese listed firm in our total sample pays about one million RMB 
to all its executives (See Table 6.111). The firms in the Competition cluster pay more 
to their executives than those in the Monopoly cluster do (See ibid.). Comparably, 
total of the three highest remunerations for directors, managers, and supervisors are 
higher in the Competition cluster than in the Monopoly cluster as well (See Tables 
6.112 and 6.118). The rationale behind this could be that there exists a professional 
manager market for listed firms in the Competition cluster where they have to pay a 
higher compensation to compete for qualified executives on the job market. The ap-
pointment of executives in the Monopoly cluster, however, is more or less influenced 
by the political functions that also tend to restrict compensation packages in SOEs. 
In our total sample, 45% of all non-independent directors are not paid by the listed 
firms (See Table 4.113). This is comprehensible, for 28% of all the directors already 
hold a position at the blockholder (See former sections), the rest could come from 
other bigger shareholders. 38% of all supervisors are not paid by the listed firms (See 
Table 6.120). Similarly, these non-paid supervisors come from the blockholder or 
other bigger shareholders. 
With regard to shareholding by the executives, each listed firm has about 3.6 direc-
tors who own the firm’s shares (See Table 6.114). That is about 38% of all directors 
(Table 6.115). But the shareholding by the executives is quite low in China. All direc-
tors possess 0.028% of all the shares issued by the listed firms in our total sample, 
whilst all the managers and supervisors own 0.014% and 0.007%, respectively. That 
the executives own very limited shares of the firms they serve is because equity incen-
tives have been rarely used by Chinese listed firms. It was not until 2008 that the 
Sate-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council 
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(SASAC) issued the first document to regulate equity incentives of state-controlled 
listed firms (SASAC 2008).  
On average, each listed firm in our total sample experiences 0.29 CEO Turnover in 
a year (See Table 6.117). That means, approximately, a Chinese listed firm will have 
a new CEO every three years. As shown in Table 6.117, listed firms in the Monopoly 
cluster have less often CEO Turnover than those in the Competition cluster do. This 
difference could be rooted in the different competition environments for the two clus-
ters. Those monopolistic firms enjoy more comfortable market environments and do 
not need to often reorganize the management, while the listed firms in the competitive 
industries would have to frequently adjust the management to new market situations. 
Annual reports 2001 and 2002 of the listed firms in our sample also provide infor-
mation on how much salary the most paid three directors and three managers earn. 
The former earn about 0.33 million RMB, whereas the latter are paid 0.35 million 
RMB (See Tables 6.112 and 6.118). Considering that salary levels differ from indus-
try to industry, we employ in the regressions data which are obtained by dividing 
original data through the industry average. 
 
Table 6.110: Total Remuneration (Mio. RMB) 
 of Boards and Management 2001-2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.96 0.71 0.84 0.10 7.06  
Monopoly 68 0.97 0.69 0.72 0.16 3.70  
Mix 296 0.78 0.57 0.67 0.10 4.89  
Competition 319 1.11 0.80 0.98 0.13 7.06  
 
Table 6.111: Total of Highest 3 Director Remunerations (Mio. RMB) 
2001-2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.33 0.24 0.31 0.00 2.62  
Monopoly 68 0.30 0.22 0.22 0.04 0.97  
Mix 296 0.26 0.17 0.28 0.00 2.62  
Competition 319 0.38 0.28 0.34 0.00 2.15  
 
Table 6.112: Non-Paid (Non-Independent) Director Proportion 2001-2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.45 0.46 0.26 0.00 1.33  
Monopoly 68 0.46 0.52 0.29 0.00 0.97  
Mix 296 0.45 0.44 0.27 0.00 1.23  
Competition 319 0.45 0.46 0.25 0.00 1.07  
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Table 6.113: Director Shareholder Number 2000-2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 3.63 3.33 2.80 0.00 13.67  
Monopoly 68 3.73 4.00 2.64 0.00 10.33  
Mix 296 3.97 3.67 2.95 0.00 13.67  
Competition 319 3.40 3.00 2.70 0.00 11.00  
 
Table 6.114: Director Shareholder Proportion 2000-2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.38 0.37 0.27 0.00 1.00  
Monopoly 68 0.38 0.36 0.26 0.00 0.90  
Mix 296 0.42 0.41 0.29 0.00 0.96  
Competition 319 0.35 0.36 0.26 0.00 1.00  
 
Table 6.115: Director Shareholding Proportion 2000-2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.00028 0.00011 0.00075 0.00000 0.01261  
Monopoly 68 0.00015 0.00009 0.00019 0.00000 0.00102  
Mix 296 0.00020 0.00009 0.00034 0.00000 0.00228  
Competition 319 0.00034 0.00014 0.00080 0.00000 0.00714  
 
Table 6.116: CEO Turnover 2000-2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.29 0.33 0.25 0.00 1.00  
Monopoly 68 0.22 0.33 0.23 0.00 0.67  
Mix 296 0.30 0.33 0.24 0.00 1.00  
Competition 319 0.30 0.33 0.25 0.00 1.00  
 
Table 6.117: Total of Highest 3 Manager Remunerations (Mio. RMB) 
2001-2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.35 0.26 0.31 0.02 2.50  
Monopoly 68 0.36 0.30 0.28 0.05 1.74  
Mix 296 0.27 0.19 0.28 0.02 2.50  
Competition 319 0.40 0.30 0.33 0.03 2.15  
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Table 6.118: Manager Shareholding Proportion 2000-2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.00014 0.00004 0.00035 0.00000 0.00434  
Monopoly 68 0.00009 0.00003 0.00014 0.00000 0.00083  
Mix 296 0.00011 0.00004 0.00022 0.00000 0.00209  
Competition 319 0.00017 0.00005 0.00044 0.00000 0.00434  
 
Table 6.119: Non-Paid Supervisor Proportion 2000-2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.38 0.40 0.27 0.00 1.44  
Monopoly 68 0.41 0.45 0.27 0.00 1.00  
Mix 296 0.39 0.40 0.27 0.00 1.44  
Competition 319 0.37 0.33 0.27 0.00 1.00  
 
Table 6.120: Supervisor Shareholding Proportion 2000-2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.00007 0.00003 0.00016 0.00000 0.00238  
Monopoly 68 0.00005 0.00002 0.00007 0.00000 0.00031  
Mix 296 0.00005 0.00003 0.00009 0.00000 0.00093  
Competition 319 0.00008 0.00003 0.00020 0.00000 0.00238  
 
B) Regression Models 
We build up three regression models to test how the disclosed compensation pack-
ages for directors, managers, and supervisors influence the listed firms’ market value, 
respectively. 
 
Model Director Compensation: 
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Model Management Compensation: 
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C) Regression Results 
Fist, Higher executive compensation in form of remuneration and shareholding 
might have a negative impact on a listed firm’s market value, while non-paid director 
and supervisor proportions might have a positive impact (See Tables 6.122-6.125). As 
we have expected in the hypotheses, the stock market seems to worry about too much 
pay for the executives which could militate against the interests of shareholders. 
However, these results are not significant. The reason could be that the compensation 
packages for executives were generally low in our observation period. 
Second, CEO turnover might negatively affect a listed firm’s market value (See 
Table 6.124). As we have explained in the hypotheses, higher CEO turnover fre-
quency is a symbol of instability of a listed firm and could lower its market value. 
Again, this result is not significant. 
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Table 6.121: Regression Results of Model Director Compensation 
  Listings (Constant) ROA Debt Growth Size Blockholder B Blockholding 
Total 746 2.739 0.899 -0.388 -0.020  -0.404 0.141 -0.450 
(Sig.) 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.207  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Monopoly 68 2.273 0.777 0.214 -0.047  -0.382 0.093 -0.118 
(Sig.) 0.000 0.561 0.484 0.870  0.000 0.564 0.665 
Mix 296 2.552 0.165 -0.402 0.128  -0.419 0.241 -0.116 
(Sig.) 0.000 0.725 0.005 0.006  0.000 0.000 0.375 
Competition 319 2.819 1.112 -0.404 -0.030  -0.412 0.068 -0.540 
(Sig.) 0.000 0.075 0.013 0.102  0.000 0.217 0.000 
 
Table 6.122 Regression Results of Model Director Compensation (Continuation):  
  
Adjusted 
H3D 
Non-Paid D 
Proportion 
D Shareholder 
Proportion 
D Shareholdinging 
Proportion 
Adjusted R2 
Total -0.035 0.030 -0.052  -6.055 0.500 
(Sig.) 0.510 0.597 0.351  0.759 
Monopoly 0.204 0.063 0.160  -141.326 0.465 
(Sig.) 0.370 0.688 0.442  0.625 
Mix -0.067 0.052 -0.013  -45.845 0.600 
(Sig.) 0.380 0.488 0.859  0.446 
Competition -0.025 0.074 -0.125  5.205 0.469 
(Sig.) 0.746 0.444 0.183  0.859 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AT CHINA’S STOCK MARKET 185 
Table 6.123: Regression Results of Model Management Compensation 
  
Listings (Constant) ROA Debt Growth Size Blockholder 
B 
Blockholding CEO 
Turnover 
Adjusted 
H3M 
M Shareholdinging 
Proportion 
Adjusted R2 
Total 746 2.745  0.891 -0.381 -0.018 -0.406 0.147 -0.466 -0.015 -0.044 -3.301 0.500  
(Sig.)  0.000  0.015 0.000 0.273 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.795 0.405 0.938  
Monopoly 68 2.332  0.635 0.143 -0.068 -0.362 0.101 -0.120 -0.037 0.171 -65.673 0.472  
(Sig.)  0.000  0.644 0.656 0.810 0.000 0.517 0.660 0.856 0.332 0.830  
Mix 296 2.616  0.123 -0.408 0.135 -0.422 0.243 -0.144 -0.068 -0.024 -120.829 0.601  
(Sig.)  0.000  0.793 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.278 0.406 0.755 0.180  
Competition 319 2.782  1.007 -0.414 -0.027 -0.410 0.092 -0.545 0.062 -0.058 32.589 0.468  
(Sig.)  0.000  0.107 0.012 0.144 0.000 0.086 0.000 0.503 0.464 0.536  
 
Table 6.124: Regression Results of Model Supervisor Compensation 
  
Listings (Constant) ROA Debt Growth Size Blockholder B Blockholding Non-Paid S 
Proportion 
S Shareholdinging 
Proportion 
Adjusted R2 
Total 746 2.745  0.844 -0.388 -0.020 -0.410 0.143  -0.462 0.036 -47.057 0.500  
Sig.  0.000  0.018 0.000 0.226 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.492 0.595  
Monopoly 68 2.173  1.264 0.211 -0.028 -0.356 0.096  -0.138 0.169 50.442 0.483  
Sig.  0.000  0.286 0.476 0.923 0.000 0.535  0.595 0.265 0.933  
Mix 296 2.602  0.098 -0.427 0.131 -0.422 0.226  -0.120 -0.018 -184.565 0.600  
Sig.  0.000  0.830 0.002 0.005 0.000 0.000  0.351 0.798 0.381  
Competition 319 2.821  0.980 -0.403 -0.029 -0.422 0.081  -0.565 0.071 -0.832 0.469  
Sig.  0.000  0.114 0.013 0.115 0.000 0.140  0.000 0.396 0.994  
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d) Overall Corporate Governance Rating 
A) Description of the Rating Index 
By far, we have done a series of regressions to examine the correlation between 
single corporate governance mechanisms and a listed firm’s market value. As shown 
by the regression results in the previous points, large part of the corporate governance 
mechanisms is not significantly correlated with a firm’s market value. These mecha-
nisms appear not to draw much attention from the investors. But this does not neces-
sarily mean that these mechanisms are not effective at all. We believe that such minor 
mechanisms can still contribute to a cumulative impact on a listed firm’s market val-
ue. 
Based on our hypotheses on the link between corporate governance and a Chinese 
listed firm’s market value (See Section 2 of this chapter) as well as empirical results 
in this chapter, we develop an index of corporate governance mechanisms to rate the 
overall corporate governance quality of a listed firm in China. 
Table 6.126 presents the 21 mechanisms in our corporate governance index for 
Chinese listed firms. Since the corporate governance literature does not document 
which mechanism is more important than the others are, we give for each of the first 
20 mechanisms an equal full note of 0.05. The last mechanism, blockholder change, is 
an extra component of the index which is given a full note of 0.02. We do this, be-
cause block change might have a positive impact on the market value those listed 
firms that have experienced it, but does not mean the other firms without it should 
have a worse governance performance. Therefore, we give firms with a blockholder 
change in our observation period only a plus note of 0.02.  
The impacts of single corporate governance mechanisms accord with our hypothe-
ses except for the female proportion in the board of directors and the supervisory 
board. Although we are neutral on women directorship and have no doubt that women 
directors can do an excellent job in listed firms, we accept the fact that China’s stock 
market might dislike female directors, at least in our observation period.  
For mechanisms that might have a positive impact on a listed firm’s market value, 
we multiply the mechanism value by 0.05 to obtain the mechanism score. For mecha-
nisms that might be negatively linked to a listed firm’s market value, we utilize the 
scoring formula (1-value)*0.05. 
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Table 6.125: Corporate Governance Index for Chinese listed firms 
Corporate Governance Mechanisms  Impact (+ for positive, - for negative) Scoring Formula 
Blockholder B + value*0.05 
Blockholding - (1- value)*0.05 
Shareholding2-10 + value*0.05 
Liquidity + value*0.05 
CEO/Chair Duality + value*0.05 
Independent Director Proportion + value*0.05 
Executive Director Proportion - (1- value)*0.05 
Director Positioning at Blockholder 
Proportion + value*0.05 
Female Director Proportion - (1- value)*0.05 
S/D Board Ratio - (1- value)*0.05 
Female Supervisor Proportion - (1- value)*0.05 
Adjusted H3D - (1- value)*0.05 
Non-Paid Director Proportion + value*0.05 
Director Shareholder Proportion - (1- value)*0.05 
Director Shareholding Proportion - (1- value)*0.05 
CEO Turnover - (1- value)*0.05 
Adjusted H3M - (1- value)*0.05 
Management Shareholding Propor-
tion - (1- value)*0.05 
Non-Paid Supervisor Proportion + value*0.05 
Supervisor Shareholding Proportion - (1- value)*0.05 
Blockholder Change (PLUS) + 0.01 or 0 for none 
 
Lastly, we sum up the scores for each single mechanism to obtain a corporate gov-
ernance rating for the listed firms. As Table 6.126 shows, corporate governance rat-
ings of Chinese listed firms are nearly the same. On average, listed firms have a score 
between 0.62 and 0.63, which does not differ much from cluster to cluster. 
Table 6.126: Corporate Governance Rating 2000-2002 
Industry Listings Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Total 746 0.627 0.625 0.061 0.405 0.814  
Monopoly 68 0.627 0.627 0.051 0.484 0.771  
Mix 296 0.624 0.621 0.053 0.405 0.785  
Competition 319 0.625 0.623 0.068 0.443 0.814  
B) Regression Models 
We build up three regression models to test the link between the corporate govern-
ance rating and market value of a listed firm in the same period, the first year after the 
period as well as the second year after the period. 
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Models Rating to Tobin’s Q: 
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C) Regression Results 
First, the overall corporate governance rating has a positive impact on a Chinese 
listed firm in our sample. For our total sample, the coefficient amounts to 1.532 and is 
significant on the 0.001 level (See Table 6.127), which means that an improvement of 
1% in overall corporate governance could lead to 1.5% higher market value. This re-
sult suggests that investors at China’s stock market might not care about a listed 
firm’s corporate governance performance in single mechanisms, but they do pay at-
tention to the overall corporate governance quality. 
Second, the positive link between overall corporate governance rating and a listed 
firm’s market value is significant for the Competition cluster, but not significant for 
the Monopoly cluster. In the regression results for the Competition cluster, the coeffi-
cient is even higher than in the results for the total sample, whereas the coefficient is 
much lower in the regression results for the Monopoly cluster (See ibid.). It suggests 
that better corporate governance performance in competitive industries receives en-
dorsement from China’s stock market, in form of a higher valuation. In contrast, the 
stock market participants seem not to pay much attention to the corporate governance 
performance of monopolistic firms. The rationale behind this could be that competi-
tive firms seriously improve their corporate governance to enhance the firm value and 
attractiveness for investors. Monopolistic firms, however, comfortably enjoy their 
monopoly positions and do not really have any incentives to better their corporate 
governance. 
Third, other variables controlled, ratings of China’s listed firms in a certain period 
(2000-2002 in our example) are positively linked to the their market value in the next 
year. Although the coefficient decreases by half (See Table 6.128), this result is still 
significant. But in two years, the ratings do not have a significantly positive influence 
on the listed firms’ market value any more. It suggests that listed firms with a better 
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corporate governance performance tend to have a lasting higher market value, but 
only in the short run.  
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Table 6.127: Rating to Tobin’s Q 2000-2002 
  Listings (Constant) ROA Debt Growth Size Rating Adjusted R2 
Total 746 1.574 0.900 -0.299 -0.020 -0.414 1.532 0.488 
Sig.   0.000 0.013 0.003 0.213 0.000 0.000   
Monopoly 68 1.620 1.281 0.234 -0.034 -0.351 0.852 0.499 
Sig.   0.007 0.257 0.412 0.899 0.000 0.300   
Mix 296 1.700 0.180 -0.378 0.125 -0.423 1.329 0.589 
Sig.   0.000 0.695 0.008 0.007 0.000 0.000   
Competition 319 1.587 1.048 -0.380 -0.031 -0.413 1.585 0.470 
Sig.   0.000 0.085 0.019 0.091 0.000 0.000   
 
Table 6.128: Rating to Tobin’s Q 2003 
  Listings (Constant) ROA Debt Growth Size Rating Adjusted R2 
Total 746 1.213 0.252 -0.461 -0.001 -0.184 0.732 0.241 
Sig.   0.000 0.345 0.000 0.853 0.000 0.001   
Monopoly 68 1.002 1.282 0.000 -0.011 -0.152 0.767 0.237 
Sig.   0.047 0.068 1.000 0.820 0.000 0.287   
Mix 296 1.318 0.904 -0.264 -0.038 -0.196 0.423 0.342 
Sig.   0.000 0.004 0.010 0.002 0.000 0.144   
Competition 319 1.264 -0.201 -0.474 0.000 -0.221 0.802 0.225 
Sig.   0.000 0.698 0.002 0.943 0.000 0.038   
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Table 6.129: Rating to Tobin’s Q 2004 
  Listings (Constant) ROA Debt Growth Size Rating Adjusted R2 
Total 746 1.197 0.476 -0.424 -0.005 -0.123 0.270 0.235 
Sig.   0.000 0.009 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.109   
Monopoly 68 0.859 1.847 -0.028 -0.027 -0.121 0.618 0.229 
Sig.   0.054 0.007 0.867 0.500 0.000 0.331   
Mix 296 1.153 0.576 -0.289 -0.004 -0.141 0.264 0.281 
Sig.   0.000 0.040 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.312   
Competition 319 1.265 0.122 -0.419 -0.036 -0.123 0.154 0.209 
Sig.   0.000 0.626 0.000 0.217 0.000 0.519   
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5. Conclusions 
Using a sample of 746 Chinese listed firms, we have done a series of linear regres-
sions on the links of single corporate governance mechanisms and overall corporate 
governance performance to listed firms’ market value. The conclusions we draw from 
the regression results are as follows. 
First, among all the single corporate governance mechanisms, we find that block-
holding variables can evidently influence listed firms’ market value. Stock market 
investors in China care much more about the blockholder nature, blockholding, li-
quidity of shares, and blockholder change than other corporate governance mecha-
nisms. Chinese stock investors prefer listed firms with a non-state blockholder, lower 
blockholding, more tradable shares, and blockholder changes and tend to give these 
firms a premium in their stock valuation. The rationale behind this is that smaller 
shareholders wish to have more control rights through higher shareholding so as to 
protect their own interests. Our empirical evidence reveals the fact that from the per-
spective of investors, the key issue of China’s corporate governance is the highly con-
centrated ownership by the state and SOEs. 
Second, gender diversity in the board of directors significantly influences listed 
firms’ market value. More precisely, the proportion of women directors in the board is 
negatively associated to the listed firms’ market value. To our knowledge, ours is the 
very first empirical evidence on the negative link between female directorship and 
listed firms’ market value. We trace this back to the once educational disadvantages 
for women of the elder generations. However, we expect that such a negative link will 
not exist in the coming future. As the more younger female directors will sit in the 
boards of Chinese listed firms, the educational disadvantages will disappear. 
Third, overall corporate governance performance, as measured with our rating in-
dex, has a strong impact on the listed firms’ market value. Although most of the sin-
gle corporate governance mechanisms are not significantly correlated to the market 
value of listed firms, our empirical evidence shows that they do contribute to a cumu-
lative impact on it. We also document evidence that the overall corporate governance 
performance of a period (2000-2002 in our research) is positively correlated to a listed 
firm’s market value in the next year. However, this correlation does not apply for the 
year after the next. These findings support the conclusion that it may make sense to 
invest in listed firms with better corporate governance. 
Fourth, impacts of corporate governance mechanisms on listed firms’ market value 
are not significantly positive in monopolistic industries but in competitive industries. 
While single corporate governance mechanisms such as blockholding, liquidity, and 
blockholder change are significantly correlated to the market value of listed firms in 
competitive industries, they have no significant impact on the market value of mo-
nopolistic firms. A more important finding is that whereas the overall corporate gov-
ernance performance, as measured by our rating index, of firms in monopolistic in-
dustries is even better that in other industries, it is not significantly correlated to 
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firms’ market value. One may conclude that corporate governance in monopolistic 
industries in China is rather decorative than effective. 
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VII. Summary and Outlook 
1. Summary 
In the early 1990s, China’s stock market was established to broaden the external 
financing channels for SOEs. Ever since, it has been booming in respect of listings, 
market capitalization, and investors. Lately, the long lasting bear market 2000-2005 
and a few scandals of Chinese listed firms drew the public’s and the government’s 
attention to corporate governance issues. Meanwhile, academic studies on China’s 
corporate governance are emerging rapidly. 
This dissertation, with limitations in spectrum though, intends to combine three 
main research questions of the emerging studies on corporate governance at China’s 
stock market so far: 
1. What does corporate governance look like at China’s stock market? 
2. How have corporate governance practices evolved and what has backed this de-
velopment? 
3. Does corporate governance have an impact on listed firms’ valuation in China? 
Especially for the second and third research questions, we provide new insights in-
to formal and empirical analyses of corporate governance practices in China. 
Compared with the western models, the corporate governance model at China’s 
stock market has weak external mechanisms. On the one hand, the product market and 
the capital markets are still underdeveloped and therefore providing insufficient mar-
ket forces to improve listed firms’ performance. On the other hand, the shareholder 
protection in China is strong on paper, but weak in practice, as far as law enforcement 
is concerned. The internal governance of Chinese listed firms has a two-tier board 
structure: the board of directors is responsible for important decisions and part of 
management functions, while the board of supervisors conducts the monitoring of 
directors and managers. Considering the parallel structure of the internal governance, 
it is doubtful whether the supervisors can efficiently monitor the directors. In common 
with the entire financial system, the ownership structure of the Chinese stock market 
is dominated by the state, who owns a big stake in the listed firms through its central 
and local asset management agencies or holding SOEs/SOE Groups. 
Corporate governance practices at the Chinese stock market have been evolving 
with the SOE reforms, which have undergone three stages since 1978: the incentive 
stage (1978-1983), the contracting stage (1984-1992), and the corporatization stage 
(since 1993). We consider this evolvement as a path-dependent process that is charac-
terized by the state’s dominance. The main changes happened in governance practices 
of Chinese SOEs have not changed the state’s dominance in the ownership structure. 
At the very beginning of China’s reform era, this dominance equalized the state’s full 
control over all SOE assets and operations, through various levels of its agencies 
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though. At the incentive and contracting stages of SOE reforms, the state’s dominance 
or full control remained unchanged in a way that the central government made efforts 
to enhance management incentives instead of clarifying SOEs’ ownership structure. It 
was not until the corporatization stage that the central government began to deal with 
the ownership issues. At this current stage, the state’s dominance in SOEs lessened, 
since (1) countless small SOEs were privatized during the restructuring of the state 
sector, and (2) non-state shareholders have been introduced into the ownership struc-
ture of SOEs after their corporatization. New governance bodies such as the board of 
directors and the board of supervisors were introduced. Nonetheless, the state, owing 
to its blockholding of shares, still dominates in the operation of those corporatized, 
big-sized SOEs, which further features the Chinese stock market where most of the 
listed firms are former SOEs. 
Based on the finished and ongoing SOE reform practices, we work out a path-
dependence to dig into the deeper reasons why China’s stock market is so state-
dominant. The state’s dominance in the SOE governance was determined as Chinese 
government chose to start with incremental reforms in the non-state sector instead of 
restructuring the state sector at the beginning of the reform era. Two radical cam-
paigns, the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, had significantly af-
fected this choice. On the one hand, the disasters caused by the two movements taught 
the Chinese government a bitter lesson that they must be cautious with radical re-
forms. On the other hand, two waves of decentralization during the two campaigns 
facilitated local reforms on experimental basis rather than radical reforms of the entire 
planned economy. Further SOE reforms at contracting and corporatization stages, 
which led to changes in SOE governance, were largely backed by a learning process 
during the transition. Experiences gained in successful reforms of the non-state sector, 
including agriculture, rural industries, and foreign investment, were transplanted into 
the SOE reforms by the government. Changes and mechanisms, however, have been 
introduced along the reforming path to enhance the SOE effectiveness rather than to 
topple down the state’s dominance. 
By means of linear regression models, we examine the impacts of both single gov-
ernance mechanisms and the overall governance performance on the listed firms’ 
market value which is measured by Tobin’s Q. We also study the link between overall 
corporate governance performance in the first three years and market value in the fol-
lowing two years. We define and quantify totally 21 single mechanisms within the 
three scopes of Blockholding, Board Composition, and Executive Incentives. Our 
sample consists of 746 firms that were listed at the Shanghai or the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange over the period from 2000 to 2004.  
We contribute to the empirical literature in that we cluster the non-financial indus-
tries according to the market competitiveness. Since the state still firmly controls 
some strategically important industries and has withdrawn to different extent from 
others, Chinese non-financial industries can be divided into more competitive indus-
tries and less competitive ones. Based on the political and market dimensions, we 
group 19 out of the 21 industries of all the listed firms in our total sample into Mo-
nopoly, Mix, and Competition clusters. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt of 
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clustering industries in the empirical literature on corporate governance. In analyzing 
the regression results, we mainly compare those of the Monopoly and Competition 
clusters with each other and with those of the total sample. Given the strong influence 
of the state in determining governance practices of listed firms, we do not think the 
endogeneity problem is an important issue and exclude it from our regression models. 
As for the scope of Blockholding, we find that the state nature of a blockholder has 
a negative impact on a firm’s market value. The results are significant, when both 
government and SOE holding companies fall under the state nature. Blockholding is 
negatively linked to a firm’s market valuation, whereas this correlation is inversely U-
shaped. The liquidity of a firm, i.e. to which extent its total shares are tradable at the 
market, is positively associated to Tobin’s Q. If a blockholder change happens, the 
listed firm is significantly higher valued at the stock market. 
Although Board Composition variables experience vital changes in our observation 
period due to the government’s efforts to enhance governance qualities of listed firms, 
most of the variables in this scope do not demonstrate a significant correlation to the 
market valuation of a firm. It seems that these changes are rather decorative than ef-
fective. Nonetheless, we provide very surprising evidence that the female proportion 
in the board of directors significantly reduces a firm’s market value. To our knowl-
edge, this evidence is completely new in corporate governance literature. We attribute 
this finding to the social situation before the reforming era and the introduction of 
one-child-policy, where women generally had limited access to good education. 
With respect to Executive Incentives, we cannot provide any significant evidence 
that the remuneration and shareholding of board members and senior managers affect 
a firm’s market value. It might be traced back to the generally low compensations for 
executives of listed firms in China. 
With regard to the influences of single corporate governance mechanisms on listed 
firms’ market value, we find evident differences between the Monopoly and the 
Competition clusters. The regression results for the Competition cluster report signifi-
cant links of blockholding, liquidity, blockholder change, and female director propor-
tion to stock value, suggesting that Chinese stock investors recognize the effective-
ness of single corporate governance mechanisms in the competitive industries and not 
in the monopolistic industries. The regressions on overall corporate governance per-
formance show that participants at China’s stock market pay a higher price for firms 
with better corporate governance performance. This positive link is significant for 
listed firms in the competitive industries but not for those in the monopolistic indus-
tries. 
We originally conduct the empirical research on the link between corporate gov-
ernance in a certain time period and stock value in the following years. Our studies 
document evidence that the 3-year overall corporate governance performance can, to a 
weaker extent though, foretell the stock valuation in the next year. But for the year 
after the next, this link is not significant any longer. It suggests that listed firms with 
better corporate governance performance tend to have a higher valuation in the very 
near future, provided other conditions do not change. 
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2. Outlook 
Despite our observation period appearing to be somewhat “old”, we believe that 
several conclusions are still a useful reference for researchers as well as investors. For 
example, we chose this time period due to the non-tradable share reform since 2005. 
By now, almost all shares of the Chinese listed firms are legally tradable, although 
there are official limitations for the timing to sell the previous non-tradable shares. 
Liquid shares, however, does not change the fact that the ownership structure at Chi-
na’s stock market is still highly concentrated. All the disadvantages caused by block-
holding, for example expropriation of smaller shareholders, might remain the same as 
before. Thus, our conclusions on the impact of single corporate governance mecha-
nisms might still provide useful reference despite the non-tradable share reform. 
We will keep studying the link between single corporate governance mechanisms 
and listed firms’ market value. As the regulations at China’s stock market are becom-
ing stricter and transparency is not only wished by investors but also required by the 
regulators. We expect that more information will be available for example in listed 
firms’ annual reports, which will facilitate further empirical researches on other cor-
porate governance mechanisms.  
In this dissertation, we made the first attempt to examine how different corporate 
governance as well as its impacts can be in different industries. We have drawn our 
first conclusions that there exist such differences across industries. Corporate govern-
ance seems to function better in the non-state sectors. However, we still believe there 
can be improvements in the clustering of industries. The industries defined by the 
CSRC are too simplistic. For example, we cannot groupe firms from the industry of 
petrolchemicals either of the Monopoly and Competition clusters, because the petrol 
business is quite monopolistic in China, while the chemicstry branch is free of compe-
tition. We believe there is a need to improve the classification of industries. Since 
more firms have gone public over the past years, we believe that we can still obtain a 
sample which is, after a finer classification, still big enough for us to do the research 
work. 
So far, we exclude financial firms such as banks, security firms, and insurance 
companies, from our empirical research. The reason is that financial firms have very 
different debt structures and business models from the others. But it remains an inter-
esting research question how corporate governance mechanisms affect financial 
firms’ market value. Until end of 2010, 16 banks, 17 security firms, and 3 insurance 
companies are listed in Shanghai or Shenzhen, which makes empirical researches 
more feasible than before. 
Another interesting research object relates to the family-controlled firms. China’s 
Small & Medium-sized Enterprise Board (SME Board), established in 2004 in Shenz-
hen currently has more than 1100 listed firms. Since all these firms are from the non-
state sector, we believe that corporate governance researches on them will provide 
different formal and empirical evicence than those on the A-share companies. 
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List of Abbreviations 
ABC  Agricultural Bank of China 
bn. billion 
BOC Bank of China 
CBRC China Banking Regulatory Commission 
CCB China Construction Bank 
CEO Chief executive officer 
CFFEX China Financial Futures Exchange 
CNPC China National Petroleum Corporation 
CPC Communist Party of China 
CSRC China Securities Regulatory Commission 
FDI foreign direct investment 
e.g. exempli gratia 
GDP gross domestic product 
GEM Growth Enterprises Market 
GLF Great Leap Forward 
HKD Hong Kong Dollar 
ibid ibidem 
ICBC Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
IMD International Institute for Management Development 
IPO initial public offering 
LLDPE  linear low-density polyethylene 
LLSV La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 
m. million 
NBSC National Bureau of Statistics of China 
NPC National People’s Congress 
NPL non-performing loan 
NYSE New York Stock Exchange 
OTC  over-the-counter 
p. page 
pp. pages 
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
PBOC People’s Bank of China 
PRC People’s Republic of China 
PTA purified terephthalic acid 
Q Tobin’s Q 
QDII Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor 
QFII  Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor 
RMB Renminbi (Chinese currency) 
SEZ Special Economic Zone 
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SHFE Shanghai Futures Exchange 
SINOPEC China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation  
SME small and medium-sized enterprises 
SSE Shanghai Stock Exchange 
SOE state-owned enterprise 
SZSE  Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
T-bond  treasury bond 
TVE Township and Village Enterprise 
USD US Dollar 
WEF World Economic Forum 
WTO World Trade Organization 
YGX Yinguangxia (a listed firm’s name) 
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